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Sustainable Governance Indicators
As the challenges associated with globalization, 
aging societies, digitization and climate change 
grow in number and complexity, OECD and EU 
countries should demonstrate greater resolve  
in the proactive implementation of reforms.  
However, findings for the recent edition of the 
Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) point 
to rather dispiriting developments instead.  
Indeed, the SGI 2018 show that the framework 
conditions for long-term governance in many 
OECD and EU countries have, in recent years, 
deteriorated. As the bar for democratic stand-
ards continues to be lowered and political  
polarization grows, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to carry out sustainable reforms. 
Whereas the model of a pluralistic liberal  
democracy remained in the eyes of many ob-
servers throughout the start of this century 
destined for triumph, it has instead come under 
mounting pressure. As the 2018 edition of our 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) shows,  
this is true for many developing and transfor-
mation countries. But it is also true for highly 
developed industrial states, where we see dis-
tressing trends in the erosion of democratic  
and constitutional standards, particularly in 
terms of press freedoms. Of the 41 OECD and  
EU countries surveyed by the SGI, no less than  
26 states feature a deterioration in the quality  
of their democracy compared with the SGI of 
four years ago. For 19 of these states, including  
Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Mexico and the United 
States, the downward trend is relatively sharp. 
The normative principle of a pluralistic liberal 
democracy underpins the work of the Bertels-
mann Stiftung. In recent years, SGI findings 
have repeatedly underscored the fact that coun-
tries featuring a high quality of democracy and 
high standards of good governance are best-po-
sitioned to formulate and implement sustainable 
policy solutions to the urgent challenges we face 
as a society. The developments identified in the 
current SGI edition are thus even more alarm-
ing: In addition to deteriorating democratic 
standards, we see leadership in several countries 
neglecting important aspects of good govern-
ance. As a result, the capacity to solve problems 
in many OECD and EU countries has, on average, 
diminished in recent years. 
Growing partisan polarization and the rise of 
populist forces across the globe are the main 
drivers of these developments. Difficulties in 
reaching a broad social consensus on policy 
solutions are exacerbated by this polarization  
in party politics. Populist parties in particu- 
lar often exploit emotions in their campaigns  
designed to sabotage efforts to formulate and 
implement relevant policy solutions. As a result, 
parties find themselves in a “permanent cam-
paign” mode that makes fact-driven compromise 
across party lines more difficult. Accordingly, 
the increasing polarization in many countries 
has led to a deterioration in several govern-
ments’ ability to communicate their policies  
and the efficiency with which planned political 
projects are implemented. In addition, many 
governments involve fewer societal actors in 
the planning phase of reforms. Some govern-
ments – for example in Hungary, Poland or 
Turkey – deliberately bypass legally determined 
consultation procedures or exclude govern-
ment-critical actors from these processes.  
In the near future, we can expect that the ob-
Declining quality of democracy  
and governance
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served trends will have a negative impact on the 
economic, social and ecological sustainability of 
many OECD and EU countries. Indeed, Turkey’s 
current economic and currency crisis can be  
attributed to the country’s eroding quality of 
democracy and poor governance under Presi-
dent Erdogan. Furthermore, the clear setbacks 
observed in the United States in all three SGI 
pillars – policy performance, quality of democ-
racy and governance – show that no sustainable 
policy solutions can be expected under the er-
ratic presidency of Donald Trump.
In terms of achieving sustainable policy results, 
the Nordic countries as well as Switzerland and 
Germany continue to excel. And while these 
countries continue to feature the highest qual-
ity of democracy among the countries surveyed, 
they are also subject to the pressures of grow- 
ing political polarization. These developments 
will surely render governance more difficult in 
the future. Nonetheless, there are some positive 
developments identified by the SGI that can 
serve to inspire other countries. France, for ex-
ample, has taken an extremely positive turn in 
terms of governance quality under its new pres-
ident, Emmanuel Macron. Macron’s refreshing 
political style shows that improved government 
efficiency, clear and consistent communication 
and the early involvement and consultation of 
societal groups can go hand-in-hand, even in a 
strongly polarized political system. Canada also 
receives high marks for the similar policy ap-
proach taken under Justin Trudeau’s leadership.
Given the context of growing populist forces, 
governments must be more resolute in mitigat-
ing the lines of conflict in society and reduc-
ing the gap between the governed and those in 
power. Pursuing the simplistic solutions offered 
by populist parties and eschewing principles  
of good governance will undermine any suc-
cess in this regard. Good practices for effective 
governance include the clear communication  
of credible goals that are accompanied by an 
implementation strategy that involves the 
broad-based consultation of societal actors. 
In addition to the elements of good governance 
highlighted here, the new edition of the Sustain-
able Governance Indicators offers a tremendous 
volume of data to be leveraged by professionals 
in politics, academics and the media.
Aart De Geus 
Chairman and CEO,
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Executive Board
Dr. Stefan Empter 
Senior Director 
Program
Shaping Sustainable 
Economies
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Declining quality of democracy, increasing 
polarization and deficits in governance  
capacities – a heavy mortgage for many 
OECD and EU countries
Sustainable Governance Indicators 2018 – Key Findings in Brief
The current issue of the Sustainable Governance Indicators shows some very worrying 
trends within OECD and EU countries which, given the major policy challenges ahead,  
may seriously burden them in the future.
These findings show that even within the OECD 
and the EU, the model of liberal democracy is 
subject to growing pressure – in some countries 
this means that even central democratic and 
constitutional standards such as media freedoms 
are already severely damaged or undermined. 
Countries such as Hungary or Turkey can no 
longer be considered consolidated democra-
cies – a particularly harrowing fact, given that 
OECD and EU membership actually presupposes 
an intact respect for democracy and commit-
ment to protecting fundamental rights. Poland, 
too, which for a long time served as a model of 
democracy development among the Central and 
Eastern European countries, has dramatically  
deteriorated under the right-wing conservative 
PiS government. The country has fallen 29 places.
While the countries at the lower end of the 
ranking (Poland, Romania, Mexico, Hungary, 
Turkey) continued to lose considerable ground, 
scores for the countries leading in the SGI’s  
Democracy Index (Sweden, Finland, Norway, 
Denmark, Germany, Switzerland) remain  
relatively stable. It would therefore be wrong  
to make a negative sweeping judgment of all 
countries in the OECD and the EU. However,  
the discouraging trends in a considerable  
number of countries cannot be denied.
Concept of liberal democracy increasingly  
under pressure in Western industrialized  
nations as well 
The highly developed industrial nations of the 
OECD and the EU are not immune to an erosion 
of democratic quality. On the contrary: The qual-
ity of democracy in many Western industrial na-
tions around the globe is also on the decline.  
Of the 41 OECD and EU countries, no fewer  
than 26 countries show a trend of deterioration 
compared with the SGI edition of four years ago,  
and this trend is relatively clear for 19 of these 
countries. On the other hand, only 14 countries 
are improving their democratic and constitu-
tional standards, and only nine of these have im-
proved significantly on comparison. Particularly 
negative developments are evident in countries 
such as Hungary, Poland, Mexico and Turkey. 
And even a country like the United States,  
despite the fact that democracy and freedom 
have traditionally underpinned its conception  
of itself as a nation, has recently suffered a sig-
nificant loss in the quality of democracy. A pres-
ident who denounces the media as an “enemy of 
the American people” and neither recognizes nor 
values the media as a watchdog signals an egre-
gious attempt to undermine freedom of expres-
sion and constitutes a threat to democracy. 
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Increased political polarization makes 
governance more difficult 
The worrying developments of declining demo-
cratic quality must also be assessed in the con-
text of the increasing party-political polari- 
zation underway in OECD and EU countries.  
In most of the countries surveyed, including 
Germany, ideological polarization has clearly  
increased over the last three elections. The ide-
ological gap between “left” and “right” has 
grown. The growing presence of populist parties 
in a political landscape has generally reinforced 
the impact of polarization. 
Increased polarization is problematic in that  
it can make the process of governance more  
difficult which, in turn, limits the capacity for 
reform. Polarized systems, for example, face 
greater difficulty in building a broad social con-
sensus on political solutions. Populist parties  
in particular often aim to systematically sab- 
otage the struggle for suitable political solu- 
tions by exploiting emotions with their cam- 
paigns. As a result, parties find themselves in  
a kind of “permanent campaign” mode that 
makes fact-driven compromise across party 
lines more difficult. The significant deterio-
ration seen in some key indicators of the SGI 
Governance Index over the last decade is asso-
ciated with growing polarization.
Less societal consultation, more confusing  
policy communication and increasingly weak 
media coverage   
One such problem is the fact that many govern- 
ments today rely less than before on the con-
sultation of societal actors during the planning 
phase of political projects. Societal consultation  
is, however, an important tool in broadening the 
knowledge base needed for policy formulation 
and generating the broadest possible social con-
sensus for political projects. In some cases – such 
as in Hungary, Poland or Turkey – governments 
even purposefully helped harden the lines of so-
cial conflict by engaging in limited and one-sided 
societal consultation. This clearly makes it dif-
ficult to achieve sustainable and balanced policy 
goals for the long term. 
We also observe a clear deterioration in  
the ability of OECD and EU governments to 
communicate their policies. Many govern- 
ments are obviously less successful than before  
in pursuing a coherent communication strat- 
egy that is aligned with broader government 
agendas. Some 16 countries show clear dete- 
riorations and only nine countries show im- 
provements. Here, too, the negative effects of 
greater political polarization are often evident.  
In the current SGI survey, the deterioration of  
the United States under the Trump administra- 
tion is particularly drastic. But governments 
in countries like Germany also demonstrate a 
weakened capacity to pursue a coherent strategy 
in communicating their goals and achievements. 
Another problematic finding is that in many 
countries the implementation of planned  
political projects is increasingly less efficient. 
Here, too, party and social polarization are at  
the root of these implementation difficulties.  
In total, 18 countries have deteriorated with  
regard to implementation efficiency since the 
2014 SGI edition and only nine have improved.
Given that many governments are today less 
likely to involve social actors in the policy plan-
ning process and increasingly fail to commu-
nicate their agendas to the public in a context 
of “permanent campaign” mode, party polari-
zation is unlikely to decline significantly in the 
foreseeable future.  
Another problem in this overall context is that 
a negative trend is also evident in the area of 
participation and control competencies (exec- 
utive accountability), the second component of 
the SGI Governance Index. In addition to a de-
creasing number of quality media in the print 
sector, which can be observed in all countries, 
deteriorations in the quality of media reporting 
are also affecting participatory and monitoring 
mechanisms. Unsurprisingly, there is a direct 
link in some countries between executive ac-
countability and certain negative trends in the 
quality of democracy: where governments in-
terfere with the freedom of the press, the qual-
ity of reporting is also negatively affected and 
the media’s capacity to monitor government 
activity is undermined.
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be greatly improved. Increased investment  
in this area is particularly important if a 
country is to participate in global competition 
and to keep up with rapid technological 
change. 
• The majority of the countries examined are 
affected by an aging population. Although 
these problems have been known for years, 
thoroughly researched and politicians are well 
aware of them, long-term sustainable solu-
tions, especially in the field of pension policy, 
are often lacking. 
• Even the debt crisis in Europe’s southern  
crisis states is still far from over, given the 
extremely high levels of public debt in the  
respective countries. 
• Moreover, the global growth risks are consid-
erable in view of the escalating trade conflict 
with the United States. 
• Finally, with regard to the implementation of 
the global development goals (SDGs) many 
OECD and EU countries have a great deal of 
catching up to do: in terms of ecological sus-
tainability in particular, hardly any signifi- 
cant progress can be observed. Countries such 
as the United States have even set themselves 
on a complete opposite course, sending a  
disastrous signal to all other countries.
Quality of democracy and good governance  
are by no means “only” an end in themselves
A high quality of democracy and a function- 
ing rule of law are in themselves desirable nor-
mative objectives that do not require any in-
strumental justification. Democracy and human 
rights are core components of the fundamental 
canon of values that define the EU and the OECD. 
Demonstrating a clear commitment to these  
values is a basic requirement for membership  
in these organizations. 
Moreover, looking at the countries’ quality of 
democracy and governance performance on the 
one hand and the countries’ policy results on 
the other, we see a clear positive functional link 
In some countries, confidence in government 
is growing – despite lowered democratic 
standards   
Also worth noting is the fact that in countries 
featuring a declining quality of democracy and 
government, citizens’ confidence in the govern-
ment does not automatically decline. On the  
contrary: in countries such as Poland, Hungary 
or Turkey, public confidence in government  
has even increased in recent years. There is, 
however, a significant share of the population  
in each country that stands in opposition to the 
erosion of democracy. This points to a consid-
erable social-ideological division within each of 
these countries and draws attention to the fact 
that fundamental democratic values are not 
sufficiently anchored in the political conscious-
ness of a considerable part of society.
Poor conditions for solving long-term 
political problems  
Overall, increasing political polarization,  
declining quality of democracy and negative 
developments in the criteria for good govern-
ance mean that OECD and EU states will have 
greater difficulty facing numerous complex 
challenges. In many countries, implement- 
ing long-term policy solutions has become  
even more difficult. The policy results of the 
SGI 2018 (Policy Performance Index) show  
that urgent challenges have not yet been  
adequately addressed by many governments.  
The following points are particularly striking:
• Although the economic recovery of recent 
years has helped to stabilize or slightly im-
prove overall policy performance, the upswing 
has not led to an improvement in social sus-
tainability. Moreover, while until the SGI 2016 
edition the states surveyed were more success-
ful in ensuring social participation than in  
ensuring economic performance, the picture 
has reversed since then. 
• Another major problem area is the generally 
weak investment in future viability. The area 
of research and development in many OECD 
and EU countries in particular still needs to 
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between the two dimensions. Countries with a 
higher quality of governance and democracy 
tend to achieve more sustainable policy out-
comes. The Nordic countries are at the top  
in both areas.
We can thus expect that the observed phenom-
ena of reduced democratic quality and dwin-
dling governance capacity will lead to a deteri-
oration rather than an improvement in average 
policy results in OECD and EU countries in the 
future – at least in those countries where such 
trends are strongest. This applies in particular 
to the United States, Poland and Turkey, which 
are among the major losers in both dimensions. 
The fact that the world’s largest economy, the 
United States, has already fallen by nine places 
in the SGI rankings for democracy, governance 
and policy performance since 2014, does not 
bode well for the future. 
However, there are also some positive develop-
ments that can be seen as inspiration for other 
countries. France, for example, has taken an 
extremely positive direction in terms of gov-
ernance quality under new President Emmanuel 
Macron. Macron’s new political style shows that 
improved government efficiency, clear and con-
sistent political communication and the early 
involvement and consultation of societal groups 
can go hand in hand, even in a strongly polar-
ized political system. 
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The highly developed industrial nations of the OECD and the EU are not immune to  
an erosion of democratic quality.
Downward trend in democratic 
standards and the rule of law
SGI 2018 findings: Quality of democracy
indicators is driven by these countries. However, 
there are also countries that have seen signifi-
cant improvements in the quality of democracy. 
Among those countries, South Korea (+0.59) 
shows a particularly positive development. 
Against the background of the fundamental  
importance of democratic standards and the 
rule of law for the long-term stability of a  
political system, the decline in the quality of 
democracy is particularly serious. Democratic 
opportunities for participation and control, 
procedures based on the rule of law and re- 
spect for civil rights are indispensable prereq-
uisites for the legitimacy of a political system. 
A pluralistic formation of will and opinion that 
leads to equal consideration of the interests of all 
social groups in the decision-making process 
may no longer (sufficiently) be guaranteed in 
the event of an excessive decline in the quality of 
democracy. Bearing in mind that the countries 
included in the SGI sample are highly developed 
industrialized nations and long-established de-
mocracies, the negative development in terms 
of democratic quality is even more alarming, 
especially in view of the fact that all members 
of the OECD and the EU commit themselves  
to ensuring a democratic and constitutional 
order upon accession.
Although the negative trend in the quality  
of democracy is strongly driven by certain 
countries, there is also an overall deterioration 
with regard to many indicators. In these cases, 
more countries show negative than positive  
Overall, the aggregated results of the SGI 2018 
show a significant decline in the quality of de-
mocracy in OECD and EU countries. Of the 41 
countries included in the sample, 14 have im-
proved compared to the SGI results for 2014, 
nine of them relatively significantly. In con-
trast, however, 26 countries are experiencing  
a deterioration in the quality of democracy,  
which is relatively pronounced in 19 countries. 
The results over time even show a decline since 
2011 (from +7.48 to +7.05 for a sample of 31 
countries for 2011). Compared to the SGI 2014 
results, these developments are particularly 
worrying in countries such as Poland (–3.08), 
Turkey (–1.78), Hungary (–1.53), Mexico (–1.24) 
and the United States (–0.95). It should be 
noted that the general trend in a number of  
Source: SGI.
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FIGURE 1: Quality of Democracy 
(SGI average) 2011–2018
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developments, while the rest of the countries  
remain at their previous levels. The follow-
ing indicators can be highlighted in particular: 
media access for candidates and parties in  
the electoral process, party financing, media 
freedom, media pluralism, citizens’ access to 
information, civil rights, political liberties, 
non-discrimination and the appointment of 
justices. At the same time, the results show 
that the declining quality of democracy extends 
across all four democracy criteria (electoral  
processes, access to information, civil rights 
and political liberties, rule of law). As a result, 
the entire spectrum of democratic standards  
and the rule of law is affected by this negative 
development, which makes sustainable  
governance considerably difficult.
Despite serious changes in some countries,  
it should be noted that in many countries, the 
quality of democracy has remained constant 
over the years and is not subject to major fluc-
tuations. This is due to the fact that processes 
concerning democratic standards and the rule 
of law are based on a constitutional framework 
that is usually not easy to change. By contrast, 
developments in individual policy areas are 
much more volatile, as the results for the  
dimension of policy performance show  
(see p. 40). On the other hand, if there is a  
drastic deterioration in the quality of democ-
racy, it is often the result of serious internal 
political changes, as can be seen most clearly 
in the example of Poland. The country experts 
for Poland explain that the “quality of democ-
racy has greatly suffered from the changes in-
itiated by the PiS government.”1 The SGI 2018 
results for individual indicators clearly reflect 
this assessment. The PiS party took over  
government at the end of 2015. Since 2016 
scores in the areas of access to information, 
media freedom and pluralism, as well as the 
rule of law have sharply decreased (Figure 3).
It is also particularly worrying that, despite the 
blatant violations of democratic standards and 
the rule of law by the new Polish government, 
citizens’ confidence in their government has 
not declined. According to the UN World Happi-
ness Report 2018, exactly 50% of the respond-
ents stated in the 2017 survey that they trust 
1 Matthes, Markowski and Bönker (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
Source: SGI.
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bán’s government. Hungary is now in second to 
last place in terms of democratic quality – only 
Turkey is doing even worse. But here too,  
people’s confidence in their government has 
tended to rise – albeit at a lower level (from 
25% in 2007 to 38% in 2017). This is a worrying 
finding, since fundamental democratic values 
are apparently not sufficiently anchored in the 
political consciousness of a considerable share 
of society. These countries (especially Hungary 
and Turkey) have in common that democratic 
opportunities for participation and control,  
procedures based on the rule of law and respect 
for civil rights – all central basic prerequisites 
for sustainable governance – are no longer  
sufficiently guaranteed.
However, strong domestic political change can 
also contribute to improving the quality of de-
mocracy, as the example of South Korea shows. 
The country report highlights the change in 
government in May 2017 as the main reason for 
this positive development. The new government 
under Moon Jae-in, which emerged from the 
Democratic opposition party, “has begun a new 
project to restore democracy and revitalize the 
transformation to a mature democracy […].”3
their national government. The development 
over time shows that the proportion of these 
same people has even risen from 19% to 50% 
since 2007 and has thus more than doubled.2
The situation is similar in Turkey, although the 
level of democracy and the rule of law is again 
considerably lower than in Poland. Here, too, 
the democratic and constitutional order has 
deteriorated drastically over the past few years 
as a result of massive government intervention 
under President Erdogan. However, 59% of 
those surveyed said they trusted their govern-
ment in 2017. The proportion of the population 
expressing confidence in the national govern-
ment has remained relatively stable, fluctuat-
ing between 53% and 59% in recent years.  
The negative trend in terms of democratic qual-
ity is therefore not accompanied by a decreasing 
confidence in the government. Accordingly,  
the lines of conflict between those who trust 
their government (and who may even approve 
of the problematic democratic developments), 
and those who are in strong opposition to those  
developments, appear to have intensified.
The situation is similar in Hungary. Here, too, 
the rule of law has massively eroded under Or-
2 World Happiness Report 2018, Chapter 2: Online Data, http://worldhappiness.report/ed/2018/. 
3 Kalinowski, Rhyu and Croissant (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
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In the following, the trends and develop- 
ments concerning the quality of democracy in  
different areas of the SGI Democracy Index  
will be described in more detail. As Figure 5 
shows, there has been a decline in the quality  
of democracy for all four criteria: “electoral 
process,” “access to information, media plu-
ralism and media freedom,” “civil rights and 
political liberties” and “rule of law.” However,  
there are strong differences between the indi-
vidual criteria and their respective indicators.
Electoral processes – accessing media in many 
OECD and EU countries proving difficult 
Within the criterion “electoral processes,” the in-
dicator “media access” stands out. It meas ures 
the extent to which candidates and parties have 
fair access to the media and other means of com-
munication. Compared to the results of the SGI 
2011 and 2014, 14 of the 41 OECD and EU countries 
surveyed show a deterioration in media access. 
By contrast, nine countries have improved and 
18 countries have maintained their levels. In the 
overall average of all countries, media access has 
declined slightly over time – from 7.65 to a score 
of 7.27. Taking a closer look at the results, the 
countries under examination show clear differ-
ences. While some countries, for example Luxem-
bourg, have shown improvements over the years, 
other countries such as Turkey have seen the 
scope of media access decline steadily. Germany is 
one of the countries rated with the highest score 
over the entire period of investigation (cf. Fig-
ure 6). The country experts explain the positive 
development in Luxembourg as follows:
“[...] Newspapers have adopted a more balanced 
line over recent years, reducing their political 
bias, to the benefit of smaller parties and  
organizations. […] Reports and comments  
in print media have become less partisan and 
the media distances itself more from party  
influences than in prior years.”4 
Poland (–5), Hungary (–4) and Turkey (–4) 
each recorded particularly negative develop-
ments. With values between 1 (Turkey) and 
4 (Poland), these countries are far below the 
overall average of the SGI country sample.  
In the Czech Republic, Iceland and Mexico, 
media access has also deteriorated signifi-
cantly, by two points each. The country experts 
for Poland see a close connection between  
the government takeover of the PiS party  
and the deterioration in media access:
“Legally, parties and candidates have equal  
access to public and private media. […] The PiS 
4 Schneider, Lorig and Bandelow (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
FIGURE 6: Media Access 2011–2018
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pendent from the government and other actors 
is particularly notable. While media freedom in 
OECD and EU countries has deteriorated on av-
erage by one point from 7.68 to 6.68, there are  
individual countries where the level remains very 
good (see Figure 7). According to the country ex- 
perts for Finland, for example, the country main- 
tains high standards in terms of media freedom:
“Media consumption rates are fairly high in  
Finland. The rate of media consumption guaran-
tees a strong market and healthy competition,  
promoting high-quality journalism. In addition, 
the Council for Mass Media in Finland has suc-
cessfully managed a system of self-regulation 
among media outlets. Furthermore, as Finland 
is one of the least corrupt societies in the world, 
the government has in general not sought to  
interfere with press freedom.”7 
Based on the SGI country sample, 23 countries 
have deteriorated compared to the results  
of the survey rounds of 2011 and 2014, nine  
countries have improved and 10 countries have 
stagnated in their development. The Czech  
Republic, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Poland,  
Slovakia, Turkey and the United States have  
deteriorated significantly – each by at least 
three points. Freedom of the media in Turkey 
has even declined by five points and is now  
only at one point in the SGI 2018 – a very  
worrying development. Here, too, the country  
report highlights the government’s reaction  
to the coup attempt as the main reason for  
the rapid decline in media freedom:
“Although Turkey has a somewhat diversified 
media structure, the government places direct 
and indirect pressure on media owners in order 
to obtain coverage favorable to the government 
party. […] Most concerning for many observers 
have been the unprecedented expansion in the 
range of reasons given for journalists’ arrests, 
the massive phone-tapping campaign and the 
contempt shown for source confidentiality. […] 
Particularly, the aftermath of the 15 July coup 
attempt saw high numbers of arrests, hearings, 
detentions, prosecutions, censorship cases and 
layoffs. A number of physical attacks on media 
outlets and journalists took place. The closure  
of media outlets, the appointment of trustees  
government’s attempts to control the public 
and private media have increased the partisan 
bias in media reporting and have made media 
access for different parties uneven.”5 
It is particularly noteworthy that on many indi-
cators, Poland is registering poor performance 
in the SGI 2018 results. In terms of the quality of 
democracy, the country as a whole is experienc-
ing the biggest slump. Compared to the SGI 2014 
results, Poland has dropped drastically by 29 
places and, with a score of 5.29, is now one of the 
rear runners in the OECD and EU-wide ranking. 
According to the country report, the already  
limited access to the media in Turkey has further 
deteriorated after the coup attempt in 2016:
“After the 15 July coup attempt, government 
control over “mainstream” media and media 
critical of the government further increased. 
Large-scale lawsuits were systematically used 
against media outlets critical of the govern-
ment. The visibility of opposition members  
in the news media gradually deteriorated.  
This was felt most dramatically by HDP parlia-
mentarians who faced allegations of support-
ing terrorism and whose immunity was sus-
pended in the months following 15 July.”6
Turkey is clearly the worst performer of  
all OECD and EU countries with regard to  
quality of democracy and ranks last with a
score of +2.96 in the ranking. Since the SGI 
2011/2014 results, the quality of Turkey’s  
basic democratic and constitutional order has 
continued to decline. Especially concerning 
freedom of information and the rule of law,  
the results show serious deteriorations.
 
Access to information, media pluralism 
and media freedom – Is freedom of 
information at risk? 
Strong changes can be observed in all three  
indicators assessing access to information, 
media pluralism and media freedom. However, 
with regard to the overall average, the slump  
in the media freedom indicator, designed to 
assess the extent to which the media are inde-
5 Matthes, Markowski and Bönker (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
6 Genckaya, Togan, Schulz and Karadag (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
7 Anckar, Kuitto, Oberst and Jahn (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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to control media groups, and the active  
use of the tax authority, the financial crimes 
unit and courts against critical media intensi-
fied. Intimidating statements by politicians  
and lawsuits launched against journalists  
critical of the government, combined with the 
media sector’s ownership structure, have led  
to widespread self-censorship by media  
owners and journalists.”8
 
Poland has also deteriorated by five points  
and, with a score of 3 in the most recent sur- 
vey round, ranks third-to-last place overall.  
This is a disastrous development in view of the 
fact that Poland has for years been a model  
of democracy among the Central and Eastern 
European states. The country report for Poland 
shows that the PiS government has a strong 
influence on the public media:
“The Polish government no longer respects 
the independence of the media. The Council of 
National Media was established in June 2016 
and appoints the management boards of pub-
lic TV and radio, and the Polish Press Agency 
(PAP). The council is dominated by the PiS 
and takes instructions directly from Jarosław 
Kaczyński. The National Broadcasting Board 
(KRRiT), a constitutional body overseeing elec-
tronic media, has been staffed exclusively with 
PiS personnel. Cases of politically motivated 
appointments and dismissals at TVP, Poland’s 
public TV broadcaster and the public Polskie 
Radio are numerous. According to estimates, 
at least 225 journalists either lost their jobs or 
stepped down from their positions for political 
reasons in 2016.”9 
In contrast, South Korea improved significantly 
by three points. The country experts explain 
this positive development as follows:
“In the Reporters Without Borders’ 2017 Press 
Freedom Index, South Korea was ranked 63rd, 
climbing seven places from 2016. In August 
2017, KBS and MBC union members initiated a 
simultaneous strike, demanding the resigna-
tion of leaders appointed under the old govern-
ment. The protest escalated after it was found 
that the media companies had created black-
lists of journalists based on the contents of 
their news reporting and had subjected those 
on the list to disadvantages. However, the cov-
erage of the impeachment scandal and the 
public protests demonstrated that the media is 
able to freely report if public support and in-
terest in an issue is overwhelming. Some media 
companies such as JTBC even played a crucial 
role in investigating the corruption scandals 
related to the Park administration. The freedom 
of the press is expected to improve further 
under the Moon government.”10 
Furthermore, the indicator “media pluralism” 
is intended to measure the extent to which 
the media in a country are characterized by an 
ownership structure that ensures a pluralism 
of opinions. Out of the 41 OECD and EU coun-
tries surveyed, 20 countries show deteriorations 
since the SGI 2011 and 2014, with four coun-
tries – Hungary, New Zealand, Poland and  
Turkey – having dropped by at least three 
points each. Another four countries showed a 
significant improvement and 17 countries main-
tained their levels. The deterioration of three 
points in the case of New Zealand compared to the 
SGI 2011 results is particularly counter-intuitive: 
The country report lists the following reasons:
“New Zealand’s media market has been af-
fected by major changes in the last few years. 
Private media companies are increasingly sub-
ject to influence by their well-funded owners. 
8 Genckaya, Togan, Schulz and Karadag (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.  
9 Matthes, Markowski and Bönker (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
10 Kalinowski, Rhyu and Croissant (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
Source: SGI.
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Private and public companies are replacing 
public-interest content with programs seek- 
ing high audience ratings. […] Despite this  
development, continued constraints on media 
funding help prevent a strong investigative  
reporting culture from developing. […] New 
Zealand’s media market is dominated by for-
eign companies (mainly from Australia) […].”11 
In terms of media pluralism, Germany ranks 
second behind Finland with a score of 9 points. 
Compared with the results of the SGI 2014, the 
overall quality of democracy in Germany remains 
at an above-average level (8.70) and ranks fifth 
in the OECD and EU-wide ranking. Overall, the 
quality of democracy in Germany is relatively 
stable. Only four indicators show improvements 
or deteriorations of maximum one point each.
Finally, the indicator “access to govern- 
ment information” measures the extent to  
which citizens can obtain official information.  
The results of the SGI country sample show 
that it is particularly difficult for citizens in 
Cyprus (3 points), Malta, Hungary and Turkey 
(each 4 points) to obtain government informa-
tion. Compared to the 2014 edition, 13 countries 
have deteriorated, seven have improved slightly 
and 21 countries show no change. According to 
the country experts, the sharp deterioration in  
Hungary (by 4 points compared to the SGI 2011)  
can be attributed to the following reasons:
“While existing law provides for far-reaching 
access to government information, the govern-
ment has made it difficult for the public and 
the media to obtain information, especially on 
issues relating to public procurement by refer-
ring to business secrets. Under the third Orbán 
government there has been a constant fight 
between the government and the democratic 
opposition over access to government data and 
documents, often fought at the courts.”12 
It is worth mentioning that the quality of de-
mocracy in Hungary has been falling continu-
ously since the 2011/2014 SGI results, reaching 
a new low of 3.50 points in this survey round. 
Strong restrictions can be observed in particu-
lar with regard to the freedom of information 
and the rule of law.
In the case of Turkey, the country report  
refers again to the government’s reaction to  
the coup attempt and the resulting imposition  
of a state of emergency as a decisive reason  
for a clear restriction of access to government  
information. Germany, on the other hand,  
has improved by one point since the SGI 2016  
to a score of 8 points in terms of access to  
government information:
“In an overall assessment in 2017, Andrea Voß- 
hoff [Federal Commissioner for Data Protection 
and Freedom of Information] concluded that 
citizens are increasingly making use of their 
rights and that federal authorities no longer 
regard the information right of citizens as a 
nuisance but as a significant element of a  
civil society.”13 
Results show protection of civil rights 
and political liberties on the decline 
The “civil rights and political liberties” crite- 
rion examines the extent to which the state  
respects and protects civil rights and how  
effectively citizens are protected by courts 
against infringement of their rights. Of the 
countries included in the SGI sample, 14 have 
deteriorated significantly, six of them by at 
least two points. While 24 countries remain at 
their level, only three countries show signs of 
improvement. On average, the OECD and EU 
countries deteriorated by 0.62 points to 6.90 
points. Civil rights are particularly well-pro-
tected in Norway; the country is awarded  
10 points over all survey periods. The country  
experts give the following reasons:
“State institutions respect and protect civil 
rights. Personal liberties are well-protected 
against abuse by state and non-state actors. 
[…] Access to the courts is free and easy,  
and the judiciary system is viewed as fair and  
efficient. […] Respect for civil rights extends  
to the rights of asylum-seekers.”14 
Although there has been a slight improvement 
since the SGI 2017 edition, the scores for South 
Korea are still below average when it comes to 
the protection of civil rights: “Serious issues  
 
11 Kaiser, Miller and Croissant (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.  
12 Ágh, Dieringer and Bönker (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
13  Rüb, Heinemann and Zohlnhöfer (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.  
14 Sverdrup, Ringen and Jahn (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.  
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include limits on the freedom of association;  
limits on free speech related particularly to  
the National Security Law; inadequate rights  
accorded to migrant workers; insufficient pro-
tection accorded to refugees; inadequate pro-
tection for LGBT rights, particularly within the 
military; and the imprisonment of conscientious 
objectors. South Korea also maintains the death 
penalty, though there has been a moratorium  
on executions since 1997. The threat from North 
Korea has been used in the past to suppress  
civil and political rights.”15
 
However, the country experts point out that  
the new government under President Moon  
is taking a new approach to the civil rights  
situation:
“Under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Ge- 
un-hye administrations (2008–2016), South 
Korea experienced many symptoms of a rever- 
sal of democracy, across a wide range of areas. 
The country is now in the process of restor- 
ing that democracy. Civil-rights conditions are 
expected to improve under President Moon,  
a former human-rights lawyer.”16 
The situation is particularly serious in Mexico 
and Turkey, where the ratings for both coun-
tries have fallen to two points, which is cor-
related to an inadequate protection of civil 
rights. The country experts for Turkey draw 
particular attention to the government’s  
drastic reactions to the coup attempt:
“In the aftermath of the 15 July coup attempt, 
even more serious violations of civil rights have 
occurred. Although the government claims it 
conducts the rules of emergency government 
with utmost care, these practices are based on 
executive decrees having the force of law and are 
not subject to judicial review. Some decrees af-
fected policy areas outside the scope of the state 
of emergency. The institutionalized neglect of 
civil rights in Turkey is reflected in mass ar-
rests of alleged coup plotters and sympathiz-
ers, confiscation of their properties, sentences 
against journalists and opposition politicians, 
renewed violence in the southeast, widespread 
restrictions on freedom of expression, associa-
tion and assembly, a deteriorating judicial  
system, violence against women and impaired 
relations with key international actors.”17
Furthermore, the aim of the indicator “non-dis-
crimination” is to determine how effectively 
the state protects its citizens against differ- 
ent forms of discrimination (for example on 
the basis of gender, age, ethnic origin or sexual 
orientation). Of the 41 OECD and EU countries 
surveyed, 12 have deteriorated significantly 
compared to the SGI 2011/2014, four of them 
by at least two points. Five countries have im-
proved and 20 countries have maintained their 
levels. Ireland remains at a consistently high 
level (9 points) throughout the investigation 
period. The country experts emphasize in par-
ticular the specific and effective institutional 
arrangements that the country has established 
to protect against discrimination:
“The Equality Authority is an independent 
body set up under the Employment Equal-
ity Act, 1998 to monitor discrimination. An in-
dependent equality tribunal was established 
under the same act to offer an accessible and 
impartial forum to remedy unlawful discrimi- 
nation. These agencies have been active in  
recent years and successful in prosecuting 
cases on behalf of parties who felt they had 
been discriminated against.”18 
 
15  Kalinowski, Rhyu and Croissant (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.  
16 Kalinowski, Rhyu and Croissant (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
17 Genckaya, Togan, Schulz and Karadag (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
18 Murphy, Mitchell and Bandelow (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.  
Source: SGI.
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Rule of law particularly at risk 
in Hungary, Poland and Turkey 
There have also been some changes when it 
comes to the criterion “rule of law,” particularly 
with regard to the indicators “legal certainty,” 
“judicial review” and “appointment of justices.” 
On average, the level of the rule of law has de-
clined in the 41 OECD and EU countries. However, 
this negative development can be attributed in 
particular to the deterioration of individual coun-
tries – above all Hungary, Poland and Turkey.
The indicator “legal certainty” is intended  
to examine the extent to which government 
and administration act on the basis of and in 
accordance with legal provisions to provide 
legal certainty. Based on the SGI country sam-
ple, 10 countries show a significant deteriora-
tion compared to the SGI results for 2011 and 
2014, five countries have visibly improved and  
26 countries remain at their levels. On aver- 
age, the OECD and EU countries worsened by 
0.63 points to a score of 6.98 points. Some 
countries, such as Sweden, have a particularly 
high level of legal certainty (see Figure 9).  
The country experts highlight the following 
reasons for the consistently high rating  
(10 points) since the SGI 2011:
“The Swedish legal framework is deeply en-
grained and the rule of law is an overarching 
norm in Sweden. […] values of legal security, 
due process, transparency and impartiality  
remain key norms. The only disturbing obser- 
vation in this context is the growing emphasis  
on efficiency in public administration that  
has arisen in the context of a recent public  
management reform. This focus on efficiency 
potentially jeopardizes the integrity of legal  
certainty and security, in particular with  
respect to migration processes. […] The legal 
system is characterized by a high degree of 
transparency. The ombudsmen institution  
(a Swedish invention) remains an important 
channel for administrative complaints. The 
Ombudsman of Justice keeps a close watch on  
the application of the rule of law in Sweden.”19 
Hungary and Poland (both –5), Turkey and  
the United States (both –3) have seen a par- 
ticularly sharp deterioration in legal certainty. 
Turkey scores particularly poorly in the  
overall comparison of OECD and EU countries 
with a score of two points and ranks last.  
The country report states the following reasons 
for this negative result:
“The 15 July failed coup attempt caused a  
major uncertainty in legal and practical terms. 
The governmental decrees issued during the 
state of emergency are not subject to judicial  
review. Moreover, at least 110,000 public  
servants mainly from the military, judiciary, 
health sector and universities were dismissed. 
[…] Besides, more importantly, the government 
regulated some public matters by the state of 
emergency decree instead of a law as required 
by the constitution. During the review period, 
detention and release of numerous journal-
ists and pro-Kurdish politicians on uncertain 
grounds became a regularity.”20 
With regard to “legal certainty,” Hungary 
scores as poorly as Turkey and shares the  
second to last place in the ranking with Mexiko. 
The country experts for Hungary give the  
following reasons for this development:
“As the Orbán government has taken a  
voluntaristic approach toward lawmaking,  
legal certainty has strongly suffered from  
chaotic, rapidly changing legislation. The hasty 
legislative process has regularly violated the  
Act on Legislation, which calls for a process  
of social consultation if the government  
presents a draft law.”21 
The development in the United States is inter-
esting as well: Legal certainty was still at a very 
high level (9 points) in the SGI 2011, but fell 
to six points in the latest survey round; the 
United States is now only in the lower third of 
the 41 OECD and EU countries. The country  
experts blame in particular the comprehensive 
use of executive orders for this development:
“In 2015 and 2016, federal courts nullified 
Obama’s expansive executive actions on un-
documented immigrants and coal-fired power 
plants, indicating that unilateral presidential 
action can result in legal uncertainty. In 2017, 
President Trump adopted an even more  
 
19  Pierre, Jochem and Jahn (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.    
20 Genckaya, Togan, Schulz and Karadag (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.   
21 Ágh, Dieringer and Bönker (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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aggressive approach to unilateral action,  
canceling many Obama-era regulations,  
especially on the environment.”22 
Interestingly, since the SGI 2017, the United 
Kingdom has also deteriorated from a very 
high level (9 points) to a score of 7. The rea-
sons for this lie in the still unforeseeable legal 
consequences of Brexit. The unclear situ- 
ation regarding the conditions of the United 
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU leads to  
a high level of legal uncertainty, not least in  
the economy. 
Finally, the question of the extent to which  
independent courts control whether govern- 
ment and administration act in conformity with 
the law is covered by the indicator “judicial  
review.” The results show a deterioration for 
eight countries compared to the SGI 2011/2014 
results, with Hungary (–3) and Poland (–5) also 
being the most striking negative examples.  
According to country experts, the decline in  
judicial review in Poland is connected to the 
takeover by the PiS-government:
“In 2017, the takeover of the Constitutional 
Tribunal in the PiS government’s first year  
in office was followed by a series of reforms  
that aimed at limiting the independence of the 
courts. These reforms sparked massive inter-
national protests and were only slightly  
watered down after President Duda vetoed  
two out of four laws. […] These legal changes, 
some of which are clearly unconstitutional, 
were accompanied by the dismissal of dozens  
of justices and a media campaign against the 
judiciary financed by public companies.”23 
Particularly interesting is the improvement 
of the United States by one point (to 9 points) 
compared to the SGI 2017, which may not seem 
intuitive at first glance. The country report 
highlights the courts’ reaction to the increas-
ing use of executive orders:
“Judicial review remains vigorous. In 2015 and 
2016, the federal courts struck down several  
expansive uses of executive power by the Obama 
administration as well as potentially discrimina-
tory voter registration requirements in a num-
ber of states. During 2017, federal courts have 
blocked the Trump administration’s constitu- 
tionally dubious travel ban affecting visitors 
from certain Muslim countries as well as Trump’s 
executive decision to end the DACA program.”24 
The extent to which the process of appointing 
judges of the Supreme Court or the Constitu-
tional Court guarantees the independence of  
the judiciary is measured by the indicator  
“appointment of justices.” In an overall  
comparison of the OECD and EU countries, 
eleven countries have deteriorated signifi- 
cantly, eight countries have improved and 21 
countries have maintained their levels com-
pared to the SGI 2011/2014. Poland and Hun- 
gary each recorded a decline of five points to a 
score of 2, a development which is once again 
particularly worrying. Results over time are also 
interesting for Japan, which is also rated with 
only two points in this respect. The country  
experts justify the poor score with the lack of 
transparency in the appointment of justices: 
“According to the constitution, Supreme Court 
justices are appointed by the cabinet, or in the 
case of the chief justice, named by the cabi-
net and appointed by the emperor. However, 
the actual process lacks transparency. Supreme 
Court justices are subject to a public vote in  
the Lower House elections following their ap-
 
22  Quirk, Lammert and Thunert (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.    
23 Matthes, Markowski and Bönker (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.   
24 Quirk, Lammert and Thunert (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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pointment, and to a second review after 10 
years if they have not retired in the meantime. 
These votes are of questionable value, as vot- 
ers have little information enabling them to 
decide whether or not to approve a given jus-
tice’s performance. In all of postwar history,  
no justice has ever been removed through  
public vote. In response to the call for more 
transparency, the Supreme Court has put  
more information on justices and their track  
record of decisions on its website.”25 
It is also worthwhile to take a look at the in-
dicator “corruption prevention.” Although the 
overall average score increased slightly (from 
6.48 in the SGI 2011 to 6.51 in the SGI 2018), 
Turkey (–3) in particular shows a significant 
deterioration. The country experts cite the in-
creasingly authoritarian tendencies in the ad-
ministration, the weakening of parliamentary 
supervision and a reduced functioning of the 
administrative and financial control institutions 
as reasons. The United States also deteriorated  
by two points to a score of 7. It is particularly 
interesting here that the country was consist-
ently rated with nine points until the SGI 2017 
and therefore had very good mechanisms for 
preventing corruption until the change of  
government. The country experts explain the 
abrupt downward trend as follows:
“The first year of the Trump presidency has 
brought a brazen and unprecedented disregard 
of established practices to prevent conflict of 
interest. […] Most obvious, he has refused to 
sell off his extensive domestic and interna-
tional business interests (especially hotels,  
casinos, and resorts) and to put the proceeds  
in a blind trust to avoid the potential of his  
financial interests influencing presidential  
decisions. […] The administration has been 
heedless of conflict-of-interest in appointments 
to regulatory and other positions. The adminis-
tration simply refused to provide information  
to the Office of Government Ethics concerning 
potential conflicts among appointees, prompt- 
ing the respected nonpartisan director of the  
office to resign in protest. Several Trump  
officials have been embroiled in scandals  
involving abuse of public resources (such as 
using military aircraft for vacation travel).”26 
Germany, on the other hand, has improved  
by one point to eight since the SGI in 2011 and  
2014 in the area of “corruption prevention.” 
Nevertheless, the country experts continue  
to see certain weaknesses, especially with  
regard to the declaration of supplementary  
income of members of parliament:
“Despite several corruption scandals over  
the past decade, Germany performs better  
than most of its peers. […] Until very recently, 
provisions concerning required income decla-
rations by members of parliament have been 
comparatively loose. […] However, beginning 
with the current parliamentary term, members 
of the German parliament have to provide addi-
tional details about their ancillary income in a 
ten-step income list. […] It appears likely that, 
in order to avoid public attention, members of 
parliament may resort to partitioning their aux-
iliary income. Thus, the current system remains 
an insufficient transparency regime unable to 
eradicate corruption or conflict of interests.”27 
 
25  Pascha, Köllner and Croissant (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.     
26 Quirk, Lammert and Thunert (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.   
27 Rüb, Heinemann and Zohlnhöfer (2017), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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 Sustainable Governance Indicators
Major differences in the strategic 
governance and problem-solving 
capacities of OECD and EU countries
SGI 2018 findings: Governance
ernance is thus slightly negative if one looks  
at the last five years under review. In compar-
ison to the SGI 2011 edition, an even stronger 
negative trend becomes visible. However,  
when interpreting the averages, it should be 
noted that only 31 countries were considered 
in the 2011 edition – in contrast to the current 
country sample of 41 countries, which has  
remained constant since the 2014 edition.
Behind this general slight downward trend in 
aggregated scores, however, there are very differ-
ent, large-scale developments in the individual 
industrialized countries themselves. The results 
also differ considerably within the individual di- 
mensions of reform capability and the chrono-
logical sequence of the respective developments.
According to our experts’ assessments of  
the OECD and EU governments’ executive  
capacities (“executive capacity” dimension  
of the SGI Governance Index), there is only a 
slight downward trend in the overall average  
of all 41 OECD countries. In fact, hardly any  
significant changes can be observed for the  
period between the SGI 2014 and the 2017  
edition on an aggregate level. However,  
there are some important individual indicators 
that show a clear negative trend (see below).
The slight downward trend is mainly driven  
by the ongoing long-term decline observed in 
In the area of governance, the aggregated  
results of the SGI 2018 show a mixed picture. 
After the peak of the economic and financial 
crisis, the ability of OECD and EU countries  
to effectively initiate and implement reforms 
has declined slightly overall. The aggregate  
of our Governance Index shows a slight down-
ward trend between 2014 and 2018. Eighteen of 
the 41 countries surveyed improved compared 
to the SGI 2014 results (nine of them relatively 
markedly), while deteriorations are apparent in 
21 countries (14 relatively markedly). Overall,  
the aggregate overall trend in the area of gov-
Increasing political polarization makes sustainable governance difficult in many  
OECD and EU countries.
Source: SGI.
FIGURE 10: Governance (SGI average) 
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Turkey, Romania, Poland and Mexico – as well  
as the current negative developments in the 
United States. On the other hand, positive de-
velopments with regard to executive capacity  
(at a relatively high level) compared with the 
period before the economic and financial crisis 
are particularly evident in France and Ireland.
In comparison to the government’s political 
steering capacity, however, expert assess- 
ments of the opportunities for participation  
and control of various social actors vis-à-vis  
the government (“executive accountability” 
dimension) show a longer-term negative  
trend in the overall average from 2014 on-
wards. A majority of 24 countries are experi-
encing deteriorations in the assessment of  
the country experts. According to our experts,  
only one country can achieve substantial  
improvements in this area: Greece. 
Overall, the negative developments in the  
area of governance are not quite as pronounced 
across the board as they are in the area of  
quality of democracy. Particularly interesting 
are the cases in which both the quality of the 
constitutional-democratic conditions and the 
quality of governance have deteriorated (con-
siderably). These include countries such as 
Hungary, Poland, Turkey and Mexico, but also 
the United States. It can be assumed that both 
areas are closely linked. This assumption is con-
firmed when one considers in particular devel-
opments concerning individual key indicators.
Among the criteria and indicators showing  
a rather strong negative trend, policy commu-
nication, societal consultation and govern- 
ment efficiency stand out within the executive  
capacity dimension. Within the dimension  
of executive accountability, a particularly  
negative trend is noticeable when it comes to 
the media criterion. These general trends are 
very worrying – especially in combination  
with the declining quality of democracy  
observed in many countries. It is therefore 
worth taking a closer look at these items.
The deteriorations outlined below in the areas 
of executive capacity and executive accounta-
bility should be assessed in the context of other 
Source: SGI.
FIGURE 11: Ranking – Governance SGI 2018
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variables as well, such as the degree of party 
polarization. Party polarization refers to the 
ideological distance depicted in the party sys- 
tem on a right-left scale. It is an important 
finding that the polarization of the party sys-
tem has increased in most of the states consid-
ered, in some cases significantly over the last 
three elections. As a rule, strongly polarized 
party systems are characterized by the presence 
of populist parties. Populist parties thus  
reinforce the effect of polarization.
Cyprus features the highest degree of overall 
polarization. There are two parties of relatively 
equal strength; one is extremely left-wing and 
the other strongly conservative. France, Greece 
and Spain have also recently recorded an in-
crease in the polarization of their respective 
party systems, so that the programmatic dis-
tance between the parties is now above aver-
age in international comparison. While for a 
long time Germany had a comparatively low po-
larized party system, this has changed signifi-
 Sustainable Governance Indicators
FIGURE 12: Party Polarization (average) 2008–2018
Source: Calculations by Prof. Dr. Uwe Wagschal, University of Freiburg.
FIGURE 13: Party Polarization for selected countries 2009–2018
Source: Calculations by Prof. Dr. Uwe Wagschal, University of Freiburg.
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cantly with the entry of the right-wing populist 
party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) into 
the German parliament.
Increased polarization is problematic in that  
it can make the process of governance more  
difficult, which in turn reduces the capacity 
for reform. In polarized systems, for example, 
it is becoming harder to build a broad social 
consensus on political solutions. Populist par-
ties in particular often aim to systematically 
sabo tage the struggle for suitable political 
solutions by exploiting emotions with their 
campaigns. As a result, parties find themselves 
in a kind of “permanent campaign” mode that 
makes fact-driven compromise across party 
lines more difficult. A closer look at the indi- 
vidual parts of the SGI Governance Index also  
reveals these effects.
Executive capacity – results 
show a slight downward trend 
Let us first take a closer look at developments in 
the area of executive capacity. Results show the 
most dramatic losses in the United States and 
Poland. Both countries have fallen by more than 
20 places in the ranking compared to the sur-
vey four years ago. Denmark, Sweden, New Zea-
land, Finland, Norway and Canada are at the  
top. While Canada has shown an upward trend,  
Finland has deteriorated to the same extent. 
However, all six countries in the top group are 
still characterized by an above-average level of 
executive capacity. In these countries, effective 
institutional mechanisms and structures are in 
place for long-term oriented political steering 
and implementation. Overall, Germany has im-
proved slightly over the last four years and now 
ranks 11th, similar to France, which has improved 
considerably under the new President Macron.
Comparing the development of political steering 
capacity over a longer period of time, Figure 15 
shows not only the slight overall negative trend, 
but above all the drastic losses in the United 
States. This can be clearly explained by Donald 
Trump’s entrance into government, but even 
under the Obama administration there was al-
ready a slight deterioration recorded between 
 
FIGURE 14: Ranking – Executive Capacity SGI 2018
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the SGI 2011 and 2014. Unlike Mexico and Tur-
key, which have recorded a continuous negative 
trend since the SGI 2011, Poland has only slipped 
sharply since the right-wing conservative PiS 
government took office, after the governments 
of Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopasc had previously 
improved the executive power. Until the PiS 
government took office, Poland was a role 
model among the Visegrad states in terms of 
quality of governance. Unfortunately, this has 
changed fundamentally. Poland now ranks 
poorly, similarly to Hungary and Slovakia.
The previous analysis of executive capacity  
focused on the respective aggregated average 
value per country. However, a look at the indi-
vidual index categories and selected individual 
indicators is far more revealing than highly  
aggregated index values. The following line 
graph already shows that different trends are 
evident in the criteria comprising executive ca-
pacity. Particularly clear negative developments 
over time can be observed in the criteria of pol-
icy communication, societal consultation and 
policy implementation, while a slight improve-
ment can be observed only with the criterion of 
evidence-based instruments, and that at a low 
overall level. What role do these trends play in 
detail, particularly against the background of 
the negative developments observed in terms 
of the quality of democracy and increased party 
polarization in the OECD and EU countries?
The criterion “societal consultation” measures 
the extent to which governments proactively 
and comprehensively involve societal actors 
(e.g, interest groups, civil society groups) in the 
policy-planning process in order to broaden 
the knowledge base for policy formulation and 
at the same time generate the greatest possi- 
ble societal support for political projects. Of the 
41 OECD and EU countries in the SGI sample,  
18 countries in the SGI 2018 results were in  
part significantly worse than in 2011 and 2014,  
while only 10 countries improved during this 
period. The other 13 countries have maintained 
their levels. The corresponding trends are par-
ticularly negative in Hungary, Mexico, Poland, 
Turkey and the United States. These countries 
have deteriorated by at least three points and, 
with values between two (Hungary) and five 
points (USA), they are also significantly worse 
than the average of all countries for this important 
indicator (6.2). Spain, Greece and Turkey also 
show a clear deterioration of two points in the 
long-term trend and rank in the lower third of 
the country sample. In their current country  
 
28  Genckaya, Togan, Schulz and Karadag 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org.     
29 Matthes, Markowski and Bönker 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org.  
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FIGURE 15: Executive Capacity 2011–2018
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Source: SGI.
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report, the country experts for Turkey high- 
light the following reason for the corresponding 
negative trend in their country:
“Political polarization during the review period 
increased the government’s restrictions and bi-
ases on public access to policymaking processes 
and strengthened its preference to consult only 
with pro-government actors. In general, gov-
ernmental authorities consider this requirement 
to have a “slowing” effect on policymaking […]. 
Although it is required by the legal framework, 
societal consultation has largely been neglected 
or rendered ineffective.”28 
In the case of Poland and Hungary, the country 
experts also criticize a very one-sided consulta-
tion of societal actors by the respective govern-
ments or even a deliberate circumvention of the 
usual procedures:
“Generally speaking, the government’s clear 
majority in parliament has reduced the need for 
winning over social actors, and the government 
perceives many of them as enemies. Public con-
sultation has been bypassed by introducing leg-
islative initiatives through parliamentarians, 
since such initiatives do not require the regular 
consultation mechanisms, and therefore exclude 
experts and public. Moreover, the quick passage 
of major laws has reduced the time available for 
meaningful consultation.”29
Such trends are very problematic because  
they point to deep social cleavages that are not  
addressed by the respective governments with 
inclusion in mind, but are instrumentalized for 
polarizing effects. In the worst-case scenario, 
this leads to the implementation of unbalanced 
and ultimately unsustainable policy goals.
 
A clearly negative trend is evident with regard 
to the question of policy communication. On av-
erage, the ability of governments to communi-
cate in a coherent way has declined over the last 
few years. Comparing the values of the SGI 2014 
edition with the corresponding values of the SGI 
2018 edition, one can see deteriorations in 16 
countries, while only nine countries were able 
to improve. Here, too, there is often a connec-
tion with an increase in political polarization. 
The deterioration is particularly drastic in the 
case of the United States. Under the Trump  
administration, the government’s ability to 
communicate coherently and consistently has 
declined from nine to four points – the strong-
est downward trend of all countries examined.  
But even in the United Kingdom, whose govern-
ments usually had a clear and coherent com-
munication strategy in the past, a clear dete-
rioration in government communication has 
manifested itself in the course of politically 
heated discussions on Brexit:
“Government communication around the divi-
sive issue of UK membership of the European 
Union has been far from clear and this lack of 
coherence is still apparent as the government 
struggles to explain its stance to the public.  
So far, Theresa May has been unable to de- 
velop a clear message for her government.  
The division that marked the Brexit campaign 
has seamlessly continued in cabinet friction and 
intra-Conservative parliamentary quarrels.”30
While the examples of the United States and 
the United Kingdom show that incoherent exter- 
nal communication can also have a negative  
impact on the government’s internal capacity to 
act, France is a positive example. Compared to 
Francois Hollande’s term of office, the govern-
ment’s communication under President Macron 
has improved significantly – from three points 
(in 2015) to nine points. Given the fact that 
there is also a high degree of party and societal 
polarization in France, it is all the more remark-
able that this was possible:
“[…] Macron has defined a new strategy: pre- 
cise indications about his program during the 
presidential campaign, a commitment to fully 
and speedily implement these policy measures, 
and strict control over the communication pol-
icy under the tight supervision of the Élysée 
staff. This has conferred a significantly higher 
degree of coherence on governmental commu-
nication.”31 
However, France remains an exception. In fact, 
negative developments in the area of govern-
ment communication have predominated over 
the past few years. Countries such as Mexico, 
 
30 Busch, Begg and Bandelow 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
31 Mény, Uterwedde and Zohlnhöfer 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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Poland, Turkey, Slovakia, Croatia and Romania 
are also included in the list of negative exam-
ples. However, countries such as Austria or Ger-
many have also traditionally performed poorly 
on the issue of government communication in 
recent years. The party-political divergences 
between individual ministries and/or the center 
of government were often too strong. In the 
case of Germany, the country experts also point 
to increased party polarization as an obstacle to 
more coherent communication:
“Given that the traditional political parties 
are confronted with the success of a new 
right-wing populist party, the Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD), conflicts between the gov-
erning parties have increased and have become  
a burden for strategic and coherent governmen- 
tal policy communication.”32 
The fact that many governments are showing 
declining values in both indicators of societal 
consultation and policy communication can 
point to a growing gap between those who gov-
ern and those who are governed. At the very 
least, governments that neither ensure the 
broad involvement of societal groups in the pol- 
icy-planning process nor a coherent commu- 
nication, risk averting parts of the electorate  
or exacerbating social lines of conflict.
The criterion of policy implementation also 
shows a slightly negative overall trend. The in-
dicator “government efficiency” in particular 
is decisive for this development. Since the SGI 
2014, it appears to have become harder for  
governments in 18 countries to implement their 
respective government programs, while only 
nine countries have improved in this respect.
In many cases, difficulties regarding implemen-
tation capability can be attributed once again 
to the high degree of polarization within soci-
ety and the party system. This has become very 
clear in the United States during the last years 
of the Obama administration:
“In comparison to parliamentary systems that 
have an expectation of nearly automatic legis-
lative approval of government bills, policy im-
plementation in the U.S. separation-of-pow-
ers system is presumed to depend on coalition 
building, negotiation and relatively broad con-
sensus. In the current, highly polarized state  
of the major political parties, the ability to act 
depends heavily on whether partisan control of 
the presidency and Congress is unified (with the 
same party controlling the presidency, House, 
and Senate) or divided.
From 2011 to 2016, with a Democratic president, 
Republicans controlling one or both houses of  
Congress and an aggressive far-right (“Tea 
Party”) Republican faction that was often able 
to block action, the U.S. government had pro-
found difficulty in accomplishing any policy 
goals. The two Congresses of this period were 
the least productive (i.e., enacting the fewest 
laws) of any Congress in the modern era (since 
the 1920s pre-depression era).”33 
What is interesting, however, is that even  
under the institutional framework of a majority 
of Republicans in Congress, the new Trump  
administration has not been successful in 
achieving political goals through legislation:
“Until the enactment of this tax cut in De- 
cember 2017, Trump’s first year was shaping up 
to be the first time in modern history when a 
new president had failed to secure even a sin-
gle piece of legislation. Trump’s objectives on 
immigration were pursued by administrative 
 
32 Rüb, Heinemann and Zohlnhöfer 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org.   
33  Quirk, Lammert and Thunert 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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Source: SGI.
FIGURE 17: Government Efficiency 
2011–2018
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means, without legislation. Trump was success-
ful in sharply increasing deportations of undoc-
umented immigrants, primarily from Mexico. 
Due to judicial interventions, he was not suc-
cessful in implementing a ban on entry by Mus-
lims or people from select Muslim countries. 
Regulatory agencies withdrew large numbers of 
Obama-era regulations, but whether these  
decisions will hold up against judicial appeal 
remains uncertain. At the end of the first year, 
very few of Trump’s policies had been adopted 
in a manner that promises to be enduring.”34 
Accordingly, the United States has deterio-
rated the most in recent years with regard to 
the question of the government’s implemen- 
tation capacity when compared to all other  
OECD countries – from seven to four points.  
In this respect, the world’s largest economy  
is a particularly negative example of the loss  
of executive capacity through extreme societal 
polarization and a current government that  
does nothing to overcome social divisions.
In the current SGI edition, France is once again 
a positive example of the opposite. With the new 
President Macron, the government’s implemen-
tation capacity has considerably improved – from 
three points under the Presidency of Francois 
Hollande to six points. The SGI country report 
explains this improvement as follows:
“The main improvement has been the capac- 
ity of the Macron government to combine its 
policy commitments with intense stakeholder 
concertation before finalizing legislative pro-
posals. Until now, this method of policymak- 
ing has been quite successful. Though it is  
still rather early to evaluate the effectiveness  
of this strategy, and its likely success in the 
medium- to long-term.”35
At this point it becomes clear that improved  
implementation capacity, clear and consistent 
political communication as well as the early in-
volvement and consultation of societal groups 
go hand-in-hand. Although it may be too early 
to assess the long-term success of Macron’s 
strategy, the initial results are quite promising. 
This is interesting and could also prove an ad-
visable approach for other governments, since 
France is also characterized by a fairly high  
degree of social polarization. Overall, Canada  
performs best on all three criteria considered 
here – societal consultation, policy communi- 
cation and effective implementation. Indeed,  
Canada slightly improved under the new  
government of Justin Trudeau.
Among the various SGI indicators for executive 
capacity, there are only a few criteria that have 
developed positively since 2014. These excep-
tions include that addressing evidence-based 
instruments. This criterion analyses the extent 
to which governments are in a position to sys-
tematically assess the potential impacts of ex-
isting and prepared legal acts – also with a view 
to the sustainability of certain political actions. 
The slightly positive development is based 
mainly on the fact that traditional latecomer 
countries in this area such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain have recently been 
able to make up some ground.
Compared to the other aspects of executive ca-
pacity, evidence-based instruments is still clas-
sified as the item with the greatest potential for 
improvement. It is also worrying that, despite 
the general slight upward trend, two once pi-
oneering countries have in some cases experi-
enced considerable deterioration in this regard.
The United States traditionally belonged to  
the top group (third place in 2017) in terms  
of its capacity and willingness to use evidence- 
based instruments. Since the last survey, 
however, the United States has deteriorated  
so dramatically in terms of the scope of im- 
pact assessment (–5 points), the quality of  
impact assessment (–2 points) or the system-
atic review of the sustainability of policy  
measures (–2 points) that it has now fallen 
to 19th place. The SGI country report explains 
these substantial deteriorations as follows:
“[…] the Trump administration largely aban-
doned impact analysis and other professional 
expertise. Agencies have been under a strong 
presidential mandate to reduce regulations  
and reverse decisions taken during the Obama 
administration. Since the first several months 
of the Trump presidency, this effort has been 
 
34 Quirk, Lammert and Thunert 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
35 Mény, Uterwedde and Zohlnhöfer 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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aggressively carried out on the basis of mini-
mal analysis. The president also issued an order 
saying that for every new regulation that an 
agency adopts, it is required to cancel two  
existing regulations – a mechanical solution 
that does not permit analytic influence.”36  
In Poland, which ranked 7th in the SGI 2016,  
the dramatic decline in the importance of  
evidence-based policy strategies under the 
PiS-government is continuing (currently rank 
39). Similar to the United States, the formal  
institutions and rules of impact assessment  
remain largely intact. In practice, however, 
these are increasingly being undermined:
“From 2001 to 2015, Poland established a  
relatively comprehensive system of regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA). The PiS govern- 
ment has left this system largely unchanged  
in formal terms but has not taken RIA seri- 
ously. It has bypassed RIA by strongly relying  
on ‘fast-track’ legislation or on legislative  
initiatives by members of parliament, and the 
quality of RIA has been low.”37 
Executive accountability – a longer-term 
negative trend in OECD and EU countries 
The negative trends described above in terms  
of quality of democracy and the deterioration  
of key indicators in the area of executive capac-
ity are in themselves already a problematic 
finding. However, this finding corresponds with 
the fact that a longer-term negative develop-
ment can also be discerned in the area of exec-
utive accountability, the second dimension of 
the Governance Index. In the overall ranking 
of executive accountability by citizens, parlia-
ments, parties, media and intermediary organ-
izations, the Nordic states are in the lead – fol-
lowed by Luxembourg and Germany. But even 
for these countries, which are still very well 
placed, a negative trend can be observed for the 
last four years.
However, the level of executive accountability 
of actors outside the government in the leading 
countries is still high. Unfortunately, the sit-
uation is quite different in the case of Poland, 
 
36  Quirk, Lammert and Thunert 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org.      
37 Matthes, Markowski and Bönker 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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FIGURE 18: Executive Accountability SGI 2018
Source: SGI.
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Mexico, Hungary and Turkey. Turkey and Hun-
gary are at the bottom of the league and have 
experienced a massive deterioration in executive 
accountability over the last few years. Although 
Poland is currently still significantly better than 
these two countries, a negative trend is also ev-
ident. This trend has intensified, particularly 
since the PiS-government took office. This is a 
very problematic finding, which points to the 
increasing interference of the governments of 
these countries with democratic accountability 
and control mechanisms. In contrast, Greece 
and South Korea have recently developed again 
more positively. However, these two countries 
are an exception to the mostly negative over-
all trend.
What accounts for the negative development 
observed at the aggregated level? A look at the 
individual items comprising the dimension of 
executive accountability is revealing. The de-
cline in executive accountability is largely 
driven by the media’s waning ability to pro-
vide high-quality and comprehensive report-
ing on government action. Only in one coun-
try do we observe a slight improvement (South 
Korea), while all other countries showed stag-
nating or declining values for the media report-
ing criterion. The case of South Korea illustrates 
how important the media’s control function can 
be. Despite continuing considerable deficits in 
the quality of the Korean media system, the SGI 
country experts underscore the media’s role  
in exposing the corruption scandal associated 
with former President Park:
“Nevertheless, the media played an important 
role in uncovering and reporting on the recent 
political scandals involving Choi Soon-sil and 
President Park Geun-hye. Several new-media 
organizations, including JTBC and the Chosun 
Broadcasting Company, investigated the case 
and helped uncover the evidence of corruption. 
The public movement that led to Park’s im-
peachment could not have been achieved  
without media reporting on the government’s 
abuses of power.”38
By contrast, the setbacks in the quality of media 
coverage are particularly striking in those coun-
tries in which governments specifically inter-
vene in freedom of the press. This applies in 
particular to Hungary and Turkey, which are 
the two countries ranking last with three points 
each. The country report on Hungary states:
“The Hungarian media landscape has under-
gone two different processes in the last years: 
depolitization and scandalization. Depolitization 
is the result of a new type of self-censorship, 
caused by the attacks of the government and 
their representatives on the press and civil soci-
ety organizations. Scandalization is the result of 
polarization. The sharp polarization of political 
life in Hungary has facilitated a replacement of 
in-depth analysis by a preoccupation with scan-
dals, whether real or alleged. There is relatively 
little in-depth analysis of government decisions 
and the performance of the government in the  
government-controlled public media, or in 
those private outlets close to Fidesz.”39  
In the case of Turkey, the country experts arrive 
at a very similar conclusion:
“Despite the pluralistic media scene in Turkey, 
the Turkish media (TV channels, newspapers, 
etc.) seems increasingly split between propo-
nents and opponents of the AKP government. 
Media freedoms deteriorated significantly after 
the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016. Numer-
ous journalists were imprisoned without in-
 
38  Kalinowski, Rhyu and Croissant 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org.     
39 Ágh, Dieringer and Bönker 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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dictment, which had an intimidating effect on 
other journalists. In consequence, it is difficult 
for citizens to find objective or substantive in-
depth information on government policies and 
government decision-making. A media-owner-
ship structure based on industrial conglomer-
ates (the so-called Mediterranean or polarized 
pluralist media model), the government’s clear-
cut differentiation between pro- and anti-gov-
ernment media, and the increasingly polarized 
public discourse make it difficult for journal-
ists to provide substantial information to the 
public. News coverage and debates are mainly 
one-sided in the pro-government media, while 
self-censorship is common in the mainstream, 
neutral media. This is true even of the main 
news agencies, such as Anadolu, ANKA, Doğan 
and Cihan. Superficial reporting, self-censor-
ship and dismissal of critical journalists from 
their job are widespread within the major media 
outlets. Media ownership, and direct and indi-
rect government intervention in private-media 
outlets and journalism obscure the objective 
analyses of government policies. Thus, few news-
papers, radio or TV stations offer in-depth 
analysis of government policies or their effects 
concerning human rights, the Kurdish issues, 
economic conditions and so on.”40 
To a certain extent, the worrying trends of  
government influence on the media system  
also apply to Poland, where – especially in  
the public media sector – a worrying trend  
of declining quality in media reporting has 
also emerged over the past few years. Overall, 
however, the situation is not yet as dramatic  
as it is in Turkey or Hungary:
“Government decisions are widely covered 
by the country’s main TV and radio stations. 
Due to the media law, the public TVP is often 
dubbed TV-PiS. Jacek Kurski, party ideologist, 
was appointed as TV director and hired several 
party loyal journalists as anchors for the news 
shows and other relevant positions. In the pri-
vate media, despite a tendency toward info-
tainment, the quality of reporting, especially 
of the two major TV companies, POLSAT and 
TVN, has increased. Rzeczpospolita, the sec-
ond-largest daily paper in Poland, has bene-
fited from a change in ownership and editorial 
staff, and has become less politically parti- 
san. Still, there are few print outlets and TV 
and radio stations that resist political pressure, 
and the media is divided into pro or contra gov-
ernment. Public trust in the objectivity of the 
media was always been quite low, but now it  
is at a very low position. The main TV news 
show Wiadomosci in TVP has lost 17% of its 
viewers.”41 
The decline in the number of available qual-
ity newspapers is also having a particularly 
strong impact in almost all countries surveyed. 
The underlying reason is undoubtedly the pro-
cess of increased digitization in the media sec-
tor. There is currently no sign that the declining 
circulation and number of quality newspapers 
will be fully compensated by new online offer-
ings. Findings for the media reporting indicator 
described above, which also takes into account 
the quality of online offerings, confirm this  
assumption.
In addition to the diminishing ability of  
the media to provide high-quality and com- 
prehensive reporting on government action,  
there is also a sharp decline in the opportunities 
for participation and control of societal actors,  
particularly in Poland, Mexico and Turkey.
 
40 Genckaya, Togan, Schulz and Karadag 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
41 Matthes, Markowski and Bönker 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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In Poland, these negative developments also  
become apparent with regard to the question of 
the extent to which the parliament effectively suc-
ceeds in controlling the government, for example,  
with regard to adequate personnel and structural  
resources of the parliament, the possibility for 
parliamentarians to request documents and in-
formation from the government or to listen to 
experts. The country report on Poland states:
“The members of the Sejm, the Polish parlia-
ment, have permanent support staff and can 
draw on the Sejm’s library and the expertise  
of the Sejm’s Bureau of Research (BAS). […] 
However, the quality of expertise provided by 
the BAS has declined since the parliamentary 
elections in 2015. Moreover, the PiS majority 
has made the monitoring of the government 
difficult by not publicizing its plans for new 
legislation, by circumventing the normal proce-
dures by letting individual members of parlia-
ment submit draft laws and by passing legisla-
tion very quickly. […] On paper, parliamentary 
committees have full access to government  
documents. Members of parliament may de-
mand information from government officials, 
either in written or verbal form, at the sitting 
of the Sejm plenary or at a committee meeting.  
Since the parliamentary elections in 2015,  
however, it has become more difficult for  
opposition members of the Sejm to obtain  
government documents and to receive them in 
good time. […] Parliamentary committees have 
the right to invite experts to give statements on 
hearings on particular issues or to take part in 
normal committee proceedings. However, if bills 
are introduced by individual members of parlia-
ment (as has often been the case under the PiS 
government), the summoning of experts must 
be supported by a majority of members of par-
liament. The PiS majority in the Sejm has used 
this procedural rule to limit the invitation of  
experts close to the parliamentary opposition. 
Given the maneuvering of the PiS in the Sejm, 
some experts have refrained from participating 
in what they consider political manipulation.”42 
In Turkey as well, the control function of par-
ties, interest groups and the parliament is very 
severely restricted, in addition to the lack of the 
media control function. With regard to the pos-
sibilities for parliamentary committees to sum-
mon and question ministers, the country report 
on Turkey states, for example:
“During the review period, the effects of  
the state of emergency, corruption scandals,  
resignation of metropolitan mayors, economic 
instability and regional affairs (e.g., Turkey’s 
involvement in the war in Syria, the massive 
movement of refugees from neighboring coun-
tries into Turkey, and Kurdish developments  
in and outside of Turkey) are highly visible. 
None of the government’s senior executives 
took responsibility for or allowed an independ-
ent parliamentary investigation into these is-
sues. Instead, the government demonstrated a 
lack of accountability vis-à-vis parliament.”43 
In Mexico, besides deficiencies in the media’s 
capacity to exercise its monitoring function,  
deteriorations are primarily apparent for the  
indicators of “policy knowledge” and “in-
tra-party democracy.” The country report  
on Mexico provides the following information 
regarding policy knowledge:
“Most citizens are not aware of important  
decisions made by the government. For exam-
ple, only one-third of Mexicans were aware that 
the federal government decided to cut spend-
ing in 2017. To a great extent, this is explained 
by a lack of interest in politics. According to the 
most recent data of the National Survey on Po-
litical Culture (ENCUP 2012), 65% of Mexicans 
have little to no interest in politics and 77% 
think of government as an instrument of ma-
nipulation that benefits only politicians and 
wealthy people.”44 
Although executive capacity has declined dra- 
matically in the United States during the last 
survey period, executive accountability currently 
remains strong in contrast to countries such  
as Mexico, Turkey or Poland. Even during Don-
ald Trump’s presidency, this positive finding 
has hardly changed, at least so far. The United 
States remains in the top group (rank 5) when it 
comes to the structural control and supervisory 
competences of legislative actors. The available 
resources of Congress remain unique in inter-
national comparison. However, the country ex-
 
42  Matthes, Markowski and Bönker 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org.       
43 Genckaya, Togan, Schulz and Karadag 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
44 Harbers, Razu, Faust and Thunert 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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perts also point to some recent problematic  
developments in this regard:
“Importantly, Congress has cut staff person-
nel significantly in recent years. This reflects 
an increasing reliance on ideologically oriented 
think tanks for policy advice and centraliza-
tion of control in the party leadership. The role 
of individual members and committees in pol-
icymaking has been diminished. Nevertheless, 
Congress’s staff levels remain unmatched in  
the world.”45 
The effective control of government action by 
independent courts has recently even increased 
in the United States:
“Judicial review remains vigorous. In 2015 and 
2016, the federal courts struck down several  
expansive uses of executive power by the  
Obama administration as well as potentially 
discriminatory voter registration requirements 
in a number of states. During 2017, federal 
courts have blocked the Trump administration’s 
constitutionally dubious travel ban affecting 
visitors from certain Muslim countries as  
well as Trumps executive decision to end the 
DACA program.”46 
 
45  Quirk, Lammert and Thunert 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org.    
46  Quirk, Lammert and Thunert 2018, available under www.sgi-network.org. 
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Despite their economic recovery, the OECD and EU countries have made only marginal 
progress in terms of social or environmental sustainability.
Considerable need for reform remains
SGI 2018 findings: Policy performance
years and less to progress in social or environ-
mental sustainability. With regard to the indi-
vidual dimensions, there are clear differences 
in development, especially with regard to eco-
nomic policies and social policies.
In general, the challenges for the 41 OECD and 
EU countries have not decreased but increased 
in recent years. Many of the highly developed 
industrial nations are lagging far behind in the 
implementation of the sustainable develop-
ment goals (SDGs). Only a few of the countries 
considered here have so far served as global 
role models in matters of sustainable policy.47 
The core challenges faced by all states include  
climate change, demographic changes in the 
form of an aging society and migration pro-
cesses, digitization with its not yet fully assess-
able consequences for work and social security 
systems, and – at the global level – the threat 
posed by increasing protectionism to free trade 
globally. What about the political performance 
of the countries under consideration in the in-
dividual SGI policy areas in view of the above?
While until the SGI 2016, states were more suc-
cessful in terms of social policy outcomes than 
in ensuring economic performance, the picture 
has since reversed. This can be attributed in 
part to the fact that social policy performance 
has declined significantly more than has eco-
nomic policy performance in the course of the 
economic and financial crisis. Secondly, eco-
nomic policy performance improved quite sig-
nificantly from 5.88 to 6.30 points in the course 
of the global economic recovery between 2014 
and 2018, while social policy performance rose 
only slightly from 6.04 to 6.09 over the same 
How successful are individual countries in 
achieving sustainable policy results? The Policy 
Performance Index, which measures the per- 
formance of the 41 states surveyed in terms  
of economic, social and environmental policy 
outcomes as core aspects of sustainability,  
provides answers to this question. The Policy 
Performance Index thus reflects each country’s 
current need for reform in key policy areas.
Overall, across all countries and dimensions, 
the downward trend that continued until 2014 
as a result of the global financial and economic 
crisis has been stopped and a slight upward 
trend – albeit on a low level – can be observed. 
The slight improvement of the aggregated pol-
icy performance scores can be attributed in 
particular to the economic recovery of recent 
47 Cf. Sachs, J., Schmidt-Traub, G., Kroll, C., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G. (2018): SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2018.  
 New York: Bertelsmann Stiftung and Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN).
Source: SGI.
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period. It can therefore be said that the eco-
nomic upturn of recent years has not resulted 
in a commensurate improvement of the social 
situation in the respective countries.
Little progress has been made in terms of  
environmental sustainability since the 2011  
SGI edition. The corresponding point value  
has increased from 5.88 in 2011 to 6.07 in 2018. 
This shows that the EU and OECD countries still  
have a lot to do in terms of environmental policy. 
This is also the conclusion of the latest report 
on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network (SDSN). With 
regard to climate policy, the report states that: 
“with the exception of India, NDCs (Nationally 
Determined Contribution) and current climate 
policies pursued by G20 countries are insuffi-
cient and, in some cases, critically insufficient 
to achieve the ‘well below 2°C’ objective of the 
Paris Climate Agreement. Some countries have 
set insufficient targets, which they can reach 
without implementing new policies. Others have 
implemented policies that will not even allow 
insufficient targets to be met.”49 
However, the developments described above  
do not apply equally to all countries. A total  
of 30 countries have improved their overall  
policy performance score since 2014. In addition 
to Ireland (+0.66) and Canada (+0.57), the big-
gest increases were recorded in the crisis-rid-
den countries of southern Europe, albeit from 
a (very) low level: Spain (+0.82), Italy (+0.72), 
Portugal (+0.58) and Malta (+0.54). Despite this 
success, the need for reform in these southern 
European countries remains high, with all  
four countries still in the lower half of the  
performance ranking. The situation in Greece  
is particularly dramatic. Although the country 
has also significantly increased its score since 
2014 (+0.45), Greece continues to rank last in  
the country comparison (see Figure 22).
While Canada’s positive development is mainly 
due to an increase in environmental sustaina-
bility policy (+1.40), the improvement in over-
all policy performance in the other five countries 
mentioned above is based on significant pro-
48 When interpreting the scores, it should be noted that, since the SGI 2014, the country sample includes 41 countries,  
 compared with 31 in the SGI 2011 edition.
49  Cf. Sachs, J., Schmidt-Traub, G., Kroll, C., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G. (2018).
FIGURE 22: Ranking – Policy Performance SGI 2018
Source: SGI.
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gress in economic policy performance. There has 
also been a marked improvement in the social 
dimension in the southern European countries, 
although, in line with the trend described above, 
this is considerably lower than that observed in 
economic policy performance.
In 10 countries, the policy performance score  
has fallen since the SGI 2014, although the de-
cline is minimal in seven of these countries.  
In Australia (–0.43), the United States (–0.39) 
and Poland (–0.25), on the other hand, there was 
a noticeable deterioration, which led to a de-
crease of a few places in the overall performance 
ranking. It is striking that Australia recorded 
losses in all three dimensions (economic, social 
and environmental policies), while the decline in 
the United States and Poland is solely due to a de-
terioration in social and environmental indicators.
Sweden shows the best overall policy perfor-
mance. Despite a slight deterioration in terms 
of social policy, the country is the undisputed 
leader in the performance ranking with 8.13 
points. In addition to Sweden, the other Nordic 
countries Norway (rank 2), Denmark (rank 3) 
and Finland (rank 5) as well as Switzerland 
(rank 4) and Germany (rank 6) belong to the 
top group. As expected, the greatest need for 
reform continues to exist in the countries of 
southeastern Europe, Mexico, Turkey and 
Greece, which brings up the rear.
New to the group of countries in greatest need 
of reform is the United States, which has fallen 
by nine places to 38th place since the SGI edition 
2014 due to a significant deterioration in terms 
of social policies and environmental policies. 
Compared to the SGI 2017, the sharpest decline 
can be observed in terms of environmental pol-
icies targeting sustainability (–1.27). As a result, 
the United States is the only country in the SGI 
sample where the overall performance has fallen 
significantly in the past year (–0.59).
“From a sustainable-governance perspective, 
the United States must deal with numerous 
challenges. Among them a dangerously ex- 
cessive long-term budget deficit, increased 
economic inequality, the loss of well-paying 
middle-class and working-class jobs, and cost 
problems and provider shortages in some 
health care insurance markets. Racial tensions 
have increased and there has been an explo- 
sion of drug addiction (i.e., the opioid crisis). 
The Trump administration lacks motivation 
and thereby effective policies to reduce green-
house gas emissions. Beyond its borders, the 
United States faces several major foreign-policy 
challenges centering on North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program, the Syrian war and Russian 
expansionism. The Trump administration and 
Republican-led Congress have few plans, if any, 
that credibly address these challenges.”50
Economic policies – upswing with risks 
With regard to the category assessing economic 
sustainability, it is striking that all six criteria 
comprising this item have shown a continuous 
and more or less significant improvement  
since the 2014 edition of the SGI (cf. Figure 23).  
Following the economic slump in the wake of 
the financial and economic crisis, global eco-
nomic growth has picked up notably since 2014 
and currently stands at around 4% (OECD: 
2.5%). The increase in growth is mainly at-  
tributable to monetary and fiscal policy stimuli, 
with around three-quarters of OECD countries 
currently pursuing an expansive fiscal policy 
course. Growth is also driven by an upturn in 
investment and world trade, with both effects 
weaker than in previous expansion phases.  
In many countries, the strong growth is fortu-
nately accompanied by a strong revival of the 
labor markets. It can be assumed that the OECD 
average unemployment rate is likely to fall to  
its lowest level since 1980.51  
However, the positive development of labor 
market indicators conceals the fact that the 
labor market situation remains very hetero- 
geneous. While countries such as the Czech  
Republic, Iceland and Japan have an unem-
ployment rate of under 3%, unemployment  
remains very high in the crisis-ridden coun-
tries of southern Europe. The situation in Greece 
is still dramatic. Although the unemployment 
rate was reduced from 28% in July 2013 to 21% 
in July 2017, it is still almost three times higher 
than that observed in 2008 (7.9%).
 
50 Quirk, Lammert and Thunert (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
51  OECD (2018), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2018/1, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_outlook-v2018-1-en. 
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“As the economy has stagnated, and domes- 
tic and foreign investors are still reluctant to  
invest given Greece’s unpredictable institu-
tional environment, whatever progress has 
been achieved in tackling unemployment is  
due to the following reasons: lower wages,  
a rise in flexible forms of employment,  
growth in the tourism sector where jobs are 
available during an almost six-month-long 
summer season, and an increase in emigration 
(of both skilled workers and migrants). […] 
About 75% of unemployed people have been 
out of work for more than one year. This [is a] 
phenomenon which has detrimental effects for 
economic growth. […] Young people have been 
hit particularly hard by the economic crisis. 
Yet there has been some progress, as unem-
ployment among 15 to 24 year olds (excluding 
students and soldiers) fell from 59% in July 
2013 to 43% in July 2017. Of course, this is still 
one of the highest youth unemployment rates 
among OECD countries.
The primary reason why the labor situation 
has failed to improve much is the govern-
ment’s reluctance to implement measures 
which would facilitate job creation in the  
private sector. The government continues 
to give contradictory messages to investors. 
Throughout 2017, Prime Minister Tsipras and 
his finance ministers traveled abroad, including 
to the United States, in order to attract foreign 
investors, while other government ministers 
and the governing party Syriza still resist large-
scale, industrial or other private investments, 
which could create job opportunities.”53 
The positive development of the global econ-
omy should not conceal the fact that it is sub-
ject to considerable downside risks. Increasing 
trade protectionism has already undermined 
investors’ confidence. Further escalation would 
have a negative impact on investment activity, 
the labor market situation and living standards. 
Moreover, geopolitical uncertainties have con-
tributed to a significant increase in oil prices. 
If lasting, this increase would lead to increased 
inflationary pressures and a slowdown in real 
wage growth.54
Furthermore, there is still the risk of rising  
interest rates, which could cause serious  
financial problems, particularly for highly  
indebted countries. This applies in particular  
to the southern European countries Greece,  
Italy and Portugal, which not only feature  
high national debt levels (Greece: 182%, Italy: 
131%, Portugal: 125%), but also have to spend 
a large part of their economic output (around 
3.6%) on interest payments. The situation in 
Japan is particularly critical. The debt ratio of 
236% of GDP is by far the highest among the 
countries under consideration. Although the  
rise in net borrowing in Japan has been re- 
duced significantly in recent years – currently  
at 3.74% of GDP – it remains the highest in 
comparison with all other countries included  
in the SGI sample.
“The Abe government has repeatedly reiterated 
its intention to achieve primary budget balance 
by 2020. However, before the October 2017 snap 
election, Abe announced that only half of the 
proceeds of the consumption-tax hike planned 
for 2019 would be used for debt consolidation, 
so the 2020 target for primary budget balance 
is now out of reach. Based on the weaknesses  
in the public-finance analysis category, Scope,  
 
52  When interpreting the scores, it should be noted that, since the SGI 2014, the country sample includes 41 countries, compared with 31 in the SGI 2011 edition. 
53 Sotiropoulos, Huliaras and Karadag (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
54 OECD (2018), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2018/1, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_outlook-v2018-1-en.
Source: SGI.
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a major European rating agency, downgraded  
Japan’s credit rating to A+ in September 2017.”55 
Despite a slightly positive development, there 
is a clear need for action by OECD and EU coun-
tries, particularly with regard to the criterion 
“research and innovation.” The SGI 2018 score 
for this criterion is not only significantly lower 
than that of the other criteria in the SGI’s eco-
nomic policies category, but also lower than that 
recorded in the SGI 2011, partly due to the fact 
that government investment activity in this  
sector has hardly changed in the last 20 years.  
Since then, the governments of the 41 countries 
surveyed have spent an average of around 0.5% 
of GDP on research and development. The fact 
that no increase can be observed is worrying in-
asmuch as innovations are of great importance 
for the economic sustainability of a country.  
Austria and South Korea spend the most (approx-
imately 1%), while less than 0.25% of GDP is  
invested in research and development in Roma-
nia, Turkey, Latvia, Cyprus, Chile and Bulgaria.  
In terms of non-public research and development 
spending, the average value of 1.26% of GDP is 
much higher, but here too there are significant 
differences between the countries. For example, 
the value of non-public R&D spending varies  
between 3.72% in Israel and 0.16% in Mexico.
A total of 34 countries have improved their  
economic policy performance since the SGI  
2014 edition. Since then, Ireland has made the 
greatest progress (see Figure 24), with four of 
the six criteria (economic policy, labor market,  
budgetary policy and global financial system) 
showing the greatest improvement. The devel-
opment of labor market indicators is particu-
larly impressive.
“Ireland’s rapid economic growth since 2014 
has been reflected by significant improvements 
in the labor market. From a peak of 15% in 
2012, the unemployment rate fell to 6.2% in 
2017 and is forecasted to fall further, to 5.4%, 
in 2018. Employment has pushed over the 
two million mark to 2,072,000 and the unem-
ployment level has correspondingly fallen to 
136,000. […] With respect to long-term unem-
ployment, there has been some improvement 
as it fell by a rate of 19% in 2017 faster than 
short-term unemployment (rate of 11%).  
The composition of the labor force has shifted 
significantly away from relatively low-skill 
construction work toward higher-skill service 
and advanced manufacturing jobs. Some active 
labor market strategies, such as making unem-
ployment support payments increasingly con-
tingent on evidence of active job search, have 
contributed to these favorable developments.”56 
The labor market in Germany also continues  
to develop very positively. Compared to the SGI 
2017 results, the country was able to increase  
the corresponding score by 0.6 points to 8.1, 
thus jumping from 6th place to 2nd place in  
the labor market ranking.
“Germany’s success in reducing structural  
unemployment since the mid-2000s has been 
impressive. According to the German Council  
of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat),  
more than 44.3 million people were employed 
in Germany in November 2017, 0.6 million more 
than the previous year’s record. Unemployment 
rates are at their lowest level in 20 years (4.0% 
according to the OECD) and are further decreas-
ing. Germany’s youth unemployment rate is 
the third lowest in the OECD (7.0%), attributa-
ble largely to a highly effective vocational train-
ing system. The unemployment rate is expected 
to further decline in 2018. Increasingly, the Ger-
man labor market shows signs of a labor short-
age with 1.1 million unfilled vacancies in the 
third quarter 2017.”57  
However, there is a downside to this positive 
development. In recent years, a dual labor  
market has developed, with traditional em- 
ployment relationships on the one hand and  
a large proportion of atypical employment  
(e.g., low-wage sector, marginal employment, 
and temporary work) on the other hand. The 
proportion of employees earning less than  
two-thirds of the median income was 22.48% 
in 2014, significantly higher than the average 
for the countries in question (16.06%, rank 32). 
To counteract this, the German government in-
troduced a statutory minimum wage in January 
2015. Another central challenge in Germany in 
the coming years is the integration of refugees  
into the labor market.
 
55 Pascha, Köllner and Croissant (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
56 Murphy, Mitchell and Bandelow (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
57  Rüb, Heinemann and Zolnhöfer (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
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“Reducing barriers to labor market access,  
especially the regular labor market, as well as 
support for training and education will be cru-
cial for the successful integration of refugees.  
The German Council of Economic Experts esti- 
mates a constantly decreasing unemployment 
rate of refugees during the next years from 
76.2% in 2016 to 43.1% in 2022 (Sachverständi-
genrat 2017/2018: 150). Concerns that the 2015 
wave of refugees would push up the total un-
employment rate have so far not materialized 
with unemployment further declining through-
out 2017.”58
There is also still a clear need for action in  
the labor market integration of migrants in 
general in Germany. Unemployment among 
the foreign-born population in 2017 was al-
most twice as high as among the non-foreign-
born population (1.94 times as high, rank 33  
in the country comparison). This unfavorable 
ratio is not solely due to the refugee crisis.  
Already in 2014, one year before the massive 
influx of refugees began, the ratio of 1.76 was 
only slightly better and already significantly 
higher than the OECD/EU average (1.47).
In comparison with the SGI 2014 edition,  
the largest increases in the economic sector 
were recorded in Spain and Portugal alongside 
Ireland. As a result of the economic recovery,  
the situation on the labor markets in these coun-
tries has improved noticeably. In both countries, 
both the unemployment rate of the total popu-
lation (from 24.6% to 17.3% in Spain and from 
14.5 to 9.2% in Portugal) and long-term unem-
ployment were significantly reduced. Signif-
icant progress has also been made in reducing 
the youth unemployment rate. It has been re-
duced by around 11 percentage points in Portugal 
since 2014 and by around 15 percentage points 
in Spain. However, with a youth unemployment 
rate currently at 38.6%, this is still the second 
highest level of unemployed young people after 
Greece. Furthermore, (long-term) unemploy-
ment is higher only in Greece than in Spain.
With regard to budgetary policy, Portugal is  
the country that, alongside Ireland, has made 
the greatest progress since 2014. The country 
report states:
“Clearly, the most important economic  
development during the reporting period  
was Portugal’s departure from the European  
Union’s excessive deficit procedure black  
list in May 2017. The budget deficit for 2016 
stood at 2% of GDP, the lowest level since  
democracy was established in the mid-1970s. 
Moreover, this deficit was below the govern-
ment’s own forecast for the year, as well as  
the forecasts offered by the EU and major  
credit-rating agencies. This represents a re- 
duction of the deficit by more than half rela- 
tive to 2015, when the shortfall stood at 4.4%  
of GDP. This review period’s advances were 
aided by some one-off measures, including  
the sale of military equipment. […] However,  
it should be noted that the absolute level of 
public debt remains very high, actually in- 
creasing marginally in 2016 to 130.1% of GDP,  
up from 128.8% of GDP in 2015. Within the EU,  
this level is exceeded only by Greece and Italy.”59
Despite this positive development, both Spain 
and Portugal are still in the lower third of the 
SGI’s economic policies ranking and are there-
fore still in urgent need of reform.
In seven countries, economic sustainability  
has worsened compared to the SGI 2014  
edition, most severely in Norway. Although  
the country is still one of the top performers,  
the country experts point so to some negative 
developments:
“Growth rates are slowing and unemployment 
has increased in the country’s western region, 
which is most affected by reduced activity in 
the petroleum sector. […] Although the country 
has managed its petroleum wealth responsibly, 
the economy is strongly petroleum-dependent 
and entrenched at a high-cost level, although 
costs have dropped significantly. Some observ-
ers are concerned that a lack of competitive-
ness in the mainland economy might pose a  
future challenge to maintaining the country’s 
high standard of living and to expectations  
for continued high public-service standards.  
The downside of a petroleum-dominated econ-
omy, critics argue, is an economy that lacks en-
trepreneurship, is weak in terms of conventional 
industries and has less long-term strength 
 
58  Rüb, Heinemann and Zolnhöfer (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
59 Bruneau, Jalali and Colino (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
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than might be suggested by current favorable 
indicators. It also makes the economy vulner-
able to changes in petroleum prices in world 
markets. These problems have now become 
strongly visible in the economy and a factor  
in economic policymaking.”60 
Social policies – findings show 
hardly any progress 
In contrast to economic policy sustainability, 
which has improved on average since the SGI 
2014 edition, hardly any progress can be seen  
in terms of social policy performance (cf. Figure 
25). As a result, for the first time since the SGI 
2016 edition, the economic performance of the 
countries under consideration is better than the 
social performance (cf. Figure 21). The social 
consequences of the economic crisis are still 
significant: The score for seven of the eight 
criteria in the SGI’s “social policies” category in 
2018 remains below the value recorded in 2011 
(cf. Figure 25). Only in the area of education 
do we observe a slight improvement compared 
to the SGI 2011 results. By contrast, the per-
formance of pension and health care systems 
has – on average – even deteriorated slightly 
but continuously since the SGI 2011. However, 
this does not apply equally to all countries,  
since almost half of them have made progress 
in these systems. Turkey recorded the largest 
jump in the health sector, albeit from a very low 
level (+1.23 points). The country report states:
“By 2014, Turkey had achieved near-universal 
health insurance coverage, increasing finan-
cial security and improving equity in access to 
health care nationwide. The scope of the vacci-
nation program has been broadened; the scope 
of newborn screening and support programs 
have been extended; community-based men-
tal-health services have been created; and can-
cer screening centers offering free services  
have been established in many cities. The key 
challenge in health care is to keep costs under 
control as demand for health care increases,  
the population ages and new technologies  
are introduced. Total health expenditure as  
a share of GDP has been increasing steadily 
since 2003, reaching 5.4% in 2015. In 2015,  
 
60 Sverdrup, Ringen and Jahn (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
61  When interpreting the scores, it should be noted that, since the SGI 2014, the country sample includes 41 countries, compared with 31 in the 
 SGI 2011 edition. 
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78% of this spending was funded by public 
sources, as compared to a 62% public share  
in 2000.”62  
Trends in the U.S. health care system are par-
ticularly unfavorable. Indeed, no other country 
records higher losses for this indicator’s score  
in the last two years.
“In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act (ACA, Obamacare). 
The main goals of the legislation were to lower 
costs in the health care sector and extend health 
care coverage to more people. The design of the 
ACA was essentially to fill gaps in the patch-
work of financing arrangements that were em-
bodied in the existing health care system. […] 
In 2017, the Trump administration and Repub-
lican majorities in the House and Senate tried 
to enact a repeal bill but could not achieve suf-
ficient agreement within the party on a specific 
measure. […] Although the ACA has gradually 
become quite popular, the potential for contin-
uing efforts at repeal will hamper the stabiliza-
tion of health care insurance markets. Trumps 
tax reform will eliminate major tax subsidies in 
the health care system, especially for low-in-
come people. This will result in a higher number 
of uninsured people.”63
With regard to pension systems, the pace  
of pension reforms in OECD countries has  
slowed down since 2015. One reason for this  
development is that the improvement in public  
finances has reduced the pressure to reform  
pension systems. However, some countries 
have changed the retirement age, benefits,  
contributions or tax incentives. Concerns about 
the financial sustainability of pension systems  
and the adequacy of pension income remain,  
considering the projected acceleration of  
population aging, higher inequality during the  
working age and the changing world of work.  
Previous financial sustainability reforms will 
reduce pension benefits in many countries.64
Among the SGI countries, Latvia in particular 
recorded a negative development. The corre-
sponding score for the pensions criterion has 
dropped by 1.61 points to 3.8 compared with the 
SGI 2014 edition; no country shows a worse 
score. The consequences of this lack of sustaina-
bility manifest themselves particularly in an in-
creasing poverty in old age. In Latvia, for ex-
ample, the proportion of elderly people living 
in poverty has more than doubled from 10.1%  
to 25% over the past four years. Only Mexico,  
Australia and South Korea feature an even larger 
proportion of older people living in poverty.
Germany also faces the great challenge of  
making its pension system fit for the future.  
With 5.7 points (SGI average 5.97), the country 
only ranks 25th in the country comparison.  
On a positive note, Germany has been the leader 
in increasing the employment rates of older 
workers since the turn of the millennium (+30 
percentage points in the age group 55–64 since 
2000). However, the rapid aging of the popu- 
lation will increasingly become a challenge to 
the financial sustainability of the public pension 
system. The old-age dependency ratio (i.e., ratio 
of the number of persons of retirement age and 
the number of persons of working age) was 32.4 
in 2016, making it the fifth highest in the coun-
try sample. This dependency ratio will increase 
further in the coming years as the so-called baby 
boomers enter retirement. Moreover, as Ger-
many has experienced an increase in wage  
inequality over the past decades, the close link  
between wages and pension benefits is likely to 
 
62 Genckaya, Togan, Schulz and Karadag (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
63  Quirk, Lammert and Thunert (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
64 OECD (2017), Pensions at a Glance 2017: OECD and G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Source: SGI.
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lead to increased wage inequality also being  
reflected in greater pension inequality in the 
future. In particular, certain groups such as  
single parents, people with interruptions in 
their working biographies and low earners with 
low levels of education will be at higher risk of 
poverty in old age. The risk is particularly high 
for women in Germany, who currently suffer 
from the largest gender-specific pension gap in 
the OECD region. The net replacement rates of 
future pensioners are expected to remain below 
the OECD average. This applies in particular  
to low-income earners, who receive half of  
the average wage. Their net replacement rate  
is 55% compared to 73% in the OECD aver- 
age. For average earners it is 51% compared  
to 63%.65
Overall, social policy sustainability has slightly 
improved in a total of 27 countries compared 
with the SGI 2014, with the crisis countries 
of southern Europe – Italy, Malta, Spain and 
Greece – and Turkey making the greatest pro-
gress, albeit on a low level (see Figure 26).
Despite this slight upward trend, social policy  
sustainability in these countries still needs to be 
greatly improved. This applies in particular to 
the social inclusion of young people. Youth un-
employment in Greece (43.6%), Spain (38.6%) 
and Italy (34.7%) is still dramatically high.  
At 27.9%, Italy also has the second-largest  
proportion of young people who are neither  
in education or training nor in employment 
(NEET rate). The country report states:
“The impact of the crisis on the incomes of a 
significant percentage of households and the in-
creasing levels of unemployment – particularly 
among young people – have had important  
negative effects on social inclusion. The gap  
between the more protected sectors of the popu-
lation and the less protected ones has increased. 
The traditional instruments of social protection 
(such as those guaranteeing unemployment 
benefits for workers with permanent labor  
contracts) do not cover a large part of the newly 
impoverished population, while new policies 
are only slowly being implemented. […] Italian 
family networks still constitute the most impor-
tant though informal instrument of social wel-
fare. […] The government must also address the 
large proportion of young people not in educa-
tion, employment or training, particularly in the 
south of Italy. Otherwise, a generation of young 
people will be marginalized, unable to partici-
pate in the economy. The high rate of youth  
unemployment is also threatening the pension 
system and future tax revenues. The government 
will need to develop special social policies.”66 
In Malta, the upward trend in social policy 
sustainability can be attributed mainly to an 
improved family policy. No other country has 
made greater progress in this respect since  
the SGI 2014. For example, the proportion of 
under-three year olds cared for in state insti- 
tutions increased from 18.2% in the SGI 2014  
to 31.3% in the SGI 2016. In the same period, 
child poverty was reduced from 14.8 to 10.9%. 
The country experts explain:
“In recent years, new workplace policies  
were designed to ensure that employed par- 
ents retain or are able to return to their jobs.  
This has included parental leave (both ma-
ternity and paternity leave), reduced working 
hours, career breaks, the introduction of finan-
cial incentives for mothers returning to work,  
free child-care centers, school breakfasts and 
after-school clubs. These measures are enabling 
more women to enter and remain in the labor 
market, with Malta experiencing the highest fe-
male activity rate increase in the EU since 2008.”67 
In 14 countries social policy sustainability is 
(slightly) lower in the SGI 2018 than in the 2014 
results, with the largest decline of 0.6 points 
in the United States. The United States do not 
only show the most significant deterioration of 
health system conditions (–1.0 points), but also 
in no other country there has been a stronger 
decline in terms of integration conditions  
(–1.22 points compared to the SGI 2014 results).
“Events in 2016 and 2017 profoundly increased 
the insecurities faced by large categories of  
immigrants. In 2016, the federal courts blocked 
an Obama administration order that would have 
allowed several million current undocumented 
immigrants to remain in the country indefinitely. 
The Trump administration has taken numer-
 
65 OECD: Pensions at a Glance 2017 – How does GERMANY compare? http://www.oecd.org/germany/PAG2017-DEU.pdf. 
66 Cotta, Maruhn and Colino (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
67 Pirotta, Calleja and Colino (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
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ous major actions on immigration during 2017. 
The administration has banned nationals of eight 
countries, most majority-Muslim, from enter-
ing the United States and reduced refugee ad-
missions to the lowest level since the resettle-
ment program was created in 1980. […] The U.S. 
government also ended the designation of Tem-
porary Protected Status for nationals of Haiti, 
Nicaragua and Sudan, and signaled that Hondu-
rans and possibly Salvadorans may also lose their 
work authorization and protection from removal 
in 2018. Even more concerning, both as a presi-
dential candidate and as president, Donald Trump 
has made intense, categorical opposition to  
immigration a centerpiece of his policy agenda.  
It is difficult to say how this active hostility to-
ward immigration at the presidential level will 
affect, for example, educational and job oppor-
tunities and support for legal immigrants. In any 
case, Muslim, Latino and other immigrant com-
munities have experienced a massive increase in 
uncertainty about their status and acceptance.”68 
Poland, which alongside the United States,  
the Netherlands and Australia is one of the  
biggest losers when it comes to the aspect of 
social policy, has also experienced setbacks in 
terms of integration policy in recent years.
“[…] when Europe faced a larger influx of  
migrants than usual in the summer of 2015,  
Poland was one of the countries that objected to 
the integration of refugees and other migrants, 
especially from countries with a predominantly 
Muslim population. […] In many public speeches 
and on other occasions, PiS representatives de-
nounced Muslim immigrants as potential terror-
ists, health risks and a threat to Polish culture 
and society. In 2017, the parliament amended 
the Act on Foreigners with a view to making the 
domestic institutional framework for dealing 
with immigrants harsher again.69 
Unfavorable developments in Poland’s old-age 
pension system also account for the deteriorat-
ing social situation in the country: “A bill al-
lowing women to retire at the age of 60 and 
men at the age of 65 was eventually passed in 
parliament on 16 November 2016 and became 
effective in November 2017. It will cost PLN 15 
billion annually. The lowering of the retirement 
 
68  Quirk, Lammert and Thunert (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
69  Matthes, Markowski and Bönker (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
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age has reduced the sustainability of the Polish 
pension system and is likely to increase poverty 
among women.”70 
Environmental policies – urgent 
need for action remains 
With regard to ecological sustainability,  
comparatively little progress can be observed 
across all countries since the SGI 2011 edition. 
The gap between the SGI scores for the indicator 
assessing national environmental policies and 
that assessing global environmental regimes  
increasingly grew smaller until 2017, only to 
have widened slightly since then. This is due 
to the fact that, for the first time since the 2011 
survey, the score for national environmental 
policy has declined, while the score for global 
environmental regimes has improved slightly 
(cf. Figure 27).
However, this analysis of scores based on  
averages conceals the heterogeneous nature  
of developments in different countries since  
the SGI 2014 edition. A total of 23 countries have 
increased their scores in the field of environ-
mental policies since then, five of them signifi-
cantly, that is, by more than 0.5 points: Finland, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Italy and Chile. Sweden,  
the frontrunner, has also improved significantly 
and extended its lead in terms of environmental 
policy (cf. Figure 28). The country report states:
“Sweden continues to present a very strong  
international record in terms of supporting inter-
national environmental protection regimes,  
including the Paris climate change conference  
in November and December 2015. Indeed, the 
country has a record of going beyond the require-
ments of international accords, from the Kyoto 
Protocol to the Paris Agreement, as a means of 
setting an example to other countries.”71 
With an increase of 1.4 points since 2014,  
Canada shows the best development by far.  
For both criteria of national environmental 
policies and global environmental regimes, 
Canada recorded the highest increase in score. 
Despite this success, the country is only 25th  
in the country ranking with 5.84 points,  
around three points behind the frontrunner 
Sweden (8.79 points):
“In 2016, Canada ratified the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change, committing to a reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions by 30% under 
2005 levels by 2030, adopting this commit- 
ment as a national target. The Pan-Canadian 
Framework on Clean Growth and Climate 
Change represents a collaborative effort to en-
sure the target is met through carbon pricing, 
investing in energy efficiency and renewable 
energy strategies. Renewable energy policy is  
largely the responsibility of the provinces and 
several have already made significant efforts  
in the fight against climate change. However, 
the 2017 Commissioner of the Environment  
and Sustainable Development report con-
cluded that federal government departments 
and agencies are ‘nowhere near being ready 
to adapt to the impacts of climate change.’ 
Further, in November 2016, the federal gov-
ernment approved two out of three major oil 
pipelines, including the controversial Kinder 
Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline. The Kinder 
Morgan pipeline would triple the capacity of 
the existing pipeline, increase greenhouse gas 
emissions and increase tanker traffic around 
British Columbia’s coast sevenfold. In the com-
ing years, it will be challenging for Canada to 
fulfill its environmental commitments […].”72 
 
70 Matthes, Markowski and Bönker (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
71 Pierre, Jochem and Jahn (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
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While Canada has recorded positive develop-
ments in recent years, the situation in its neigh-
boring country, the United States, has been  
exactly the opposite. The United States’ already 
low score for environmental policies, particu-
larly with respect to the SGI 2017, has again 
decreased significantly, registering a –1.0 
point difference for the criterion of environ-
mental policy and –1.54 point difference for 
global environmental regimes. While the leader 
Sweden scored 9.23 out of 10 possible points 
for this criterion, the United States scored  
just 2.13 points. This puts the United States  
in last place – by far – for both criteria and  
thus also for the environmental policy rank- 
ing. The country experts give the following  
explanation in their report:
“The Trump administration has been a rapidly 
escalating disaster for environmental policy. 
Trump has embraced an extreme version of cli-
mate change denial and declared that the United 
States will withdraw from the Paris Climate 
Agreement. Although some of the more liberal 
states will attempt to continue reducing carbon 
emissions, no national action can be expected 
during Trump’s presidency. Indeed, Trump has 
promised to rejuvenate the coal-mining indus-
try, an economic absurdity. Meanwhile, Trump 
has appointed hardliner opponents of environ-
mental regulation from industry to top envi-
ronmental positions. His EPA [Environmental  
Protection Agency] has ordered the cancellation 
of numerous Obama-era environmental regu-
lations – actions that may, in the end, be struck 
down by the courts. It has decimated the EPA’s 
scientific and expert staff – with more than 200 
already departed.”73 
In addition to the United States, 17 other  
countries record a worse score for environ- 
mental policies in the SGI 2018 as compared  
to the 2014 edition, with Poland (–0.7 points) 
and Australia (–0.58 points) registering the 
largest losses among these countries.
 
72  Kessler, Sharpe and Thunert (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org.
73  Quirk, Lammert and Thunert (2018), available under www.sgi-network.org. 
FIGURE 28: Ranking – Environmental Policies SGI 2018
Source: SGI.
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Declining quality of democracy, 
increasing polarization and deficits in 
governance capacities – a heavy mortgage 
for many OECD and EU countries
Conclusions
Increased political polarization 
makes governance more difficult
The worrying developments of declining  
democratic quality must also be assessed in  
the context of the increasing party-political po-
larization underway in OECD and EU countries.  
In most of the countries surveyed, including 
Germany, ideological polarization has clearly 
increased over the last three elections. The ide-
ological gap between “left” and “right” has 
grown. The growing presence of populist parties 
in a political landscape, has generally reinforced 
the impact of polarization. 
Increased polarization can make the process  
of governance more difficult which, in turn, 
limits the capacity for reform. Polarized sys-
tems, for example, face greater difficulty in 
building a broad social consensus on polit- 
ical solutions. Populist parties in particular 
often aim to systematically sabotage the  
struggle for suitable political solutions by  
exploiting emotions with their campaigns.  
Parties often find themselves in a kind of  
“permanent campaign” mode that makes  
fact-driven compromise across party lines 
more difficult. Growing polarization is  
The model of liberal democracy is 
subject to increasing pressures
Overall, the quality of democracy in the  
OECD and the EU has declined over the  
past few years. Although this is mainly due  
to particularly negative developments in  
countries such as Hungary, Poland, Mexico  
and Turkey, many other countries, such as  
the United States, are also showing signs  
of deterioration. The fact that since the 2014 
edition of the SGI, democracy in 26 out of  
41 countries has deteriorated while only 14 
countries have seen improvements in this  
regard – is itself a worrying finding. It shows 
that even within the OECD and the EU,  
the model of liberal democracy is subject to 
growing pressure – in some countries this 
means that even central democratic and con-
stitutional standards such as media freedoms 
are already severely damaged or undermined. 
With countries such as Hungary or Turkey,  
we can no longer speak of consolidated  
democracies – a particularly harrowing  
fact, given that OECD and EU membership  
actually presuppose an intact respect for  
democracy and commitment to protecting  
fundamental rights. 
The current issue of the Sustainable Governance Indicators shows some very worrying 
trends within OECD and EU countries which, given the major policy challenges ahead,  
may seriously burden them in the future.
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also associated with the significant deterio-
ration seen in some key indicators of the SGI 
Governance Index over the last decade. 
Less societal consultation, more confusing  
policy communication and increasingly weak 
media coverage 
One such problem is the fact that many  
governments today rely less than before on  
the consultation of societal actors during the 
planning phase of political projects. Societal 
consultation is, however, an important tool  
in broadening the knowledge base needed for 
policy formulation and generating the broad- 
est possible social consensus for political  
projects. In some cases – such as in Hungary, 
Poland or Turkey – governments even pur-
posefully helped harden the lines of social  
conflict by engaging in limited and one-sided 
societal consultation. This clearly makes it  
difficult to achieve sustainable and balanced 
policy goals for the long term. 
We also observe a clear deterioration in the 
communication ability of OECD and EU govern-
ments in recent years. Many governments are 
obviously less successful than before in pur-
suing a coherent communication strategy that 
is aligned with broader government agendas. 
Here, too, the negative effects of greater polit-
ical polarization are often evident. In the cur-
rent SGI survey, the deterioration of the United 
States under the Trump administration is par-
ticularly drastic. But governments in countries 
like Germany also show a weakened capacity  
to pursue coherent, strategic external commu-
nication. The recent fierce and notably public 
clashes between the Chancellor (CDU) and her 
Minister of the Interior (CSU) over the direction 
of future migration and refugee policy are evi-
dence of this. This dispute must also be under-
stood against the background of Germany’s new 
party-political coordinates in which the ascend-
ant right-wing populist party “Alternative für 
Deutschland” (AfD) now plays a role. 
Another problematic finding is that in many 
countries the implementation of planned  
political projects is increasingly less efficient.  
Here, too, party and social polarization are at 
the root of these implementation difficulties.  
In total, 18 countries have deteriorated with  
regard to implementation efficiency since the 
2014 SGI edition and only nine have improved.
Given that many governments are today less 
likely to involve social actors in the policy plan-
ning process and increasingly fail to commu-
nicate their agendas to the public in a context 
of “permanent campaign” mode, party polari-
zation is unlikely to decline significantly in the 
foreseeable future.  
Another problem in this overall context is that 
a negative trend is also evident in the area of 
participation and control competencies (exec- 
utive accountability), the second component of 
the SGI Governance Index. In addition to a de-
creasing number of quality media in the print 
sector, which can be observed in all countries, 
deteriorations in the quality of media reporting 
are also affecting participatory and monitoring 
mechanisms. Unsurprisingly, there is a direct 
link in some countries between executive ac-
countability and certain negative trends in the 
quality of democracy: where governments in-
terfere with the freedom of the press, the qual-
ity of reporting is also negatively affected and 
the media’s capacity to monitor government 
activity is undermined.
In some countries, confidence in government is 
growing – despite lowered democratic standards
Also worth noting is the fact that in countries 
featuring a declining quality of democracy  
and government, citizens’ confidence in the 
government does not automatically decline.  
On the contrary: in countries such as Poland,  
Hungary or Turkey, public confidence in gov-
ernment has even increased in recent years.  
There is, however, a significant share of the 
population in each country objects to the  
erosion of democracy. This points to a consid-
erable social-ideological division within each 
of these countries and draws attention to the 
fact that fundamental democratic values are 
not sufficiently anchored in the political  
consciousness of a considerable part of society.
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Poor conditions for solving 
long-term political problems
Overall, the trends noted above of increasing 
political polarization, declining quality of  
democracy and negative developments in the 
criteria for good governance mean that OECD 
and EU states will have greater difficulty facing 
numerous complex challenges such as:
• ongoing demographic change and its effects 
on social security systems;
• increasing digitization and its effects on  
the working world of tomorrow;
• ongoing climate change;
• sociopolitical challenges, such as increasing 
social inequality in many countries or the 
continuing dramatic situation of many young 
people in southern Europe;
• fears of globalization and increasing protec-
tionism.
The policy results of the SGI 2018 show that 
these challenges have so far been insufficiently 
addressed by many governments and that long-
term, sustainable policy solutions are often 
lacking. Formulating and implementing such 
long-term policy solutions – as explained 
above – has become even more difficult in-
stead of easier in many countries. 
Social sustainability lower than economic 
performance for the first time since SGI 2016, 
weak investment in sustainability, backlog in 
SDG implementation
Although the economic recovery of recent  
years has helped to stabilize or slightly improve 
overall policy performance, the upswing has  
 Sustainable Governance Indicators
Source: SGI.
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not led to an improvement in social sustainabil-
ity, which remains underdeveloped. Moreover,  
while until the SGI 2016 edition the states sur-
veyed were more successful in ensuring social 
participation than in ensuring economic perfor-
mance, the picture has reversed since then. 
Another major problem area is the generally 
weak investment in future viability. The area  
of research and development in many OECD  
and EU countries still needs to be greatly im-
proved. Increased investment in this area is, 
however, particularly important in order to 
participate in global competition and to keep  
up with rapid technological change. 
Moreover, many OECD and EU countries are 
facing unresolved problems in coping with de-
mographic change, as the majority of the coun-
tries examined are affected by an aging popula-
tion. Although these problems have been known 
for years, thoroughly researched and politicians 
are well aware of them, long-term sustainable 
solutions are often lacking. This also applies to 
Germany, for example, which cannot avoid a 
comprehensive reform of its pension system if 
poverty among the aged is to be avoided.
Even the debt crisis in Europe’s southern states 
is still far from over, given the extremely high 
levels of public debt in the respective countries. 
And the global growth risks are also considera-
ble in view of the escalating trade conflict with 
the United States. 
Finally, with regard to the implementation  
of the global development goals (SDGs) many 
OECD and EU countries have a great deal of 
catching up to do: in terms of ecological sus-
tainability in particular, hardly any significant 
progress can be seen. In global comparison, 
only a few countries can serve as role mod-
 
FIGURE 30:  Correlation Governance and SDG-Index 2018
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els in terms of SDG implementation (see Fig-
ure 30). Countries such as the United States 
have even set themselves on a complete oppo-
site course, sending a disastrous signal to all 
other countries.
Quality of democracy and good governance 
are by no means “only” an end in themselves
A high quality of democracy and a function- 
ing rule of law are in themselves desirable  
normative objectives that do not require any  
instrumental justification. Democracy and 
human rights are core components of the fun-
damental canon of values that define the EU  
and the OECD. Demonstrating a clear commit-
ment to these values is a basic requirement for 
membership in these organizations.  
Moreover, looking at the countries’ quality of 
democracy and governance performance on the 
one hand and the countries’ policy results on the 
other, we see a clear positive link between the 
two dimensions. Figure 29 shows that countries 
with higher governance quality tend to achieve 
more sustainable policy outcomes. The Nordic 
countries are at the top in both areas. These are 
also the countries that have been most successful 
in implementing the SDGs so far (see Figure 30). 
If the trend line is taken as a benchmark,  
the countries above (or below) the line show  
below-average (or above-average) perfor- 
mance compared to their political governance.  
For example, the overall quality of govern- 
ance score (executive capacity and executive 
accountability) in the United States is almost 
identical to that in Estonia, but with 7.05 points 
Estonia performs much better than the United 
States, which scores only 4.93 points on the 
issue of sustainable policy results. In addition 
to the United States, underperformers include 
Australia, Greece, Israel and New Zealand.  
By contrast, Slovenia and Switzerland posted 
significantly better results in terms of policy 
 Sustainable Governance Indicators
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outcomes than governance quality. Notably,  
all Eastern European countries also (still)  
surpass the trend line and achieve better 
political results than their governance qual-
ity would suggest. Germany is also one of the 
countries that has recently performed better 
with regard to policy outcomes than with  
respect to its governance capacities.
A similar picture can be seen in Figure 31,  
which reflects the connection between the qual-
ity of democracy and policy outcomes. While the 
link is not quite as strong as in terms of gov-
ernance quality and policy performance, it is 
also evident here that countries with a higher 
quality of democracy tend to achieve better  
policy outcomes. 
The Nordic countries, for example, have top 
values in terms of both the quality of democ-
racy and political results. Here too, the under-
performers include the United States and Greece, 
which are showing significantly worse politi-
cal results than the quality of democracy would 
suggest. On the other hand, Turkey and Hungary 
could have expected even worse political results 
due to the extremely poor state of democracy. 
Germany almost reaches the benchmark. 
Outlook
Drawing on the aforementioned correlations,  
we can expect that the observed phenomena  
of reduced democratic quality and dwindling 
governance capacity will lead to even greater 
deficiencies rather than improvements in the 
average policy outcome in OECD and EU countries 
in the future – at least in those countries where 
such trends are strongest. This applies in particular 
to the United States, Poland and Turkey, which 
are among the major losers in both dimensions. 
The fact that the world’s largest economy,  
the United States, has already fallen by nine 
places in the SGI rankings for democracy,  
governance and policy performance since 2014, 
does not bode well for the future. 
However, there are also some positive develop-
ments that can be seen as inspiration for other 
countries. France, for ex ample, has taken an  
extremely positive direc tion in terms of gover-
nance quality under new President Emmanuel 
Macron. Macron’s new po litical style shows that 
improved government efficiency, clear and con-
sistent political commu nication and the early 
involvement and consul tation of societal groups 
can go hand in hand, even in a strongly polari-
zed political system. 
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burden on future generations. This also means 
governments need to safeguard the long-term 
health of their societies’ economic, social and 
environmental systems. However, long-term 
thinking of this nature is currently rare. Most 
governments tend instead to act with the short 
term in mind. Mounting public debt, the unequal 
allotment of participation opportunities and the 
wasteful exploitation of natural resources have 
significant negative implications for present 
Challenges such as economic globalization, social 
inequality, resource scarcity and demographic 
change, each of which cut across policy sectors 
and extend beyond national boundaries, require 
policymakers to adapt rapidly and learn from the 
examples of others. Ideally, governments should 
act with long-term consequences in mind. This 
involves generating policy outcomes that main-
tain or improve the quality of life for present and 
future generations without placing an unfair 
Sustainable Governance Indicators
The Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) address one of the central social-policy 
questions facing the highly developed states of the OECD and the European Union at the 
outset of the 21st century: How can we achieve sustainable policy outcomes and ensure that 
political decision-making target long-term objectives?
Measuring Sustainable Governance
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practical knowledge applicable to the daily 
work of policymaking. The SGI thus target the 
spectrum of those individuals who formulate, 
shape and implement policies, from political 
decision-makers in centers of government and 
the democratic institutions of the OECD and EU 
states, to representatives of civil society and 
international organizations, to scholars and 
interested citizens. Underlying the SGI project 
is a cross-national comparison of governance in 
and future generations, thus imperiling the 
overall sustainability of OECD and EU states. 
Taking stock of these problems, the Sustainable 
Governance Indicators project aims to support 
OECD and EU governments’ capacity to act with 
the long term in mind, thereby achieving more 
sustainable policy outcomes. 
The SGI function as a monitoring instrument 
that uses evidence-based analysis to provide 
Measuring Sustainable Governance
INFO
www.sgi-network.org 
The entire set of results 
and each country  
report are available
for direct use or down-
load on our interactive 
website.
> Website, page 76
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at the same time casting a spotlight on vital 
reforms for decision-makers and the public.
This instrument is built on three pillars – the 
Policy Performance Index, the Democracy Index 
and the Governance Index – that collectively 
identify examples of sustainable governance.
41 states of the OECD and the EU on the basis of 
a customized set of indicators. Operationalized 
as a survey, the SGI help identify successful 
examples of sustainable governance as well as 
policy and governance innovations. By compa-
ring strengths and pitfalls, the SGI aim to acti-
vate (international) learning processes while 
The SGI project is built on three pillars – the Policy 
Performance Index, the Democracy Index and 
the Governance Index – that collectively identify 
examples of sustainable governance. 
Sustainable Governance Indicators
INFO
The SGI expert network
With its innovative approach, the SGI project is the first survey of its kind to allow far-reaching assessments of the
sustainability of OECD and EU member states. The SGI are by no means a system of purely quantitative data;
the SGI also include qualitative expert assessments, which are gathered by means of a questionnaire used
as part of a multistage data capture and validation process. A network comprising a total of more than 100
renowned scholars from around the world has been engaged for the study.
The inclusion of qualitative indicators is a major advantage of the SGI over many other indices, as this allows
context-sensitive assessments that purely quantitative indicators cannot yield.
> Methodology, page 72
The SGI provide an 
itemized comparison
of policy outcomes in 
41 states that draws 
upon a customized
catalog of indicators.
Three analytical pillars
Sustainable Governance Indicators
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Governance and
reform capacity
Democratic
Framework
Profile of strengths
and weaknesses
(reform needs)
Measuring Sustainable Governance
 Policy outcomes in 16 policy areas
 Aligned with the three pillars of
 sustainability: economic develop-
 ment, environmental protection 
 and social equity
 Domestic action taken by govern- 
 ments sensitive to international   
 responsibilities
 State of democracy and the rule  
 of law
 Criteria address substance and
 procedures of democracy
 Focus on institutional
 and procedural quality
 Executive capacity (steering
 capability, implementation,
 institutional learning)
 Executive accountability
 (participatory competencies
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Index dimension 1
Economic policies – prospects for
inclusive growth 
Economic policies that encourage competition
and strengthen market principles remain the 
driver of growth, while safeguarding the re-
sources necessary if a society is to be adaptable. 
However, such policies will be of the greatest 
advantage to the greatest number of people if 
they are accompanied by redistributive tax and 
labor-market policies, and underpinned by  
social policies that facilitate a just societal  
allocation of the benefits of economic growth. 
Therefore, sustainable governance can only be 
achieved through a successful, future-oriented 
approach to economic challenges. The decisive 
question with respect to sustainability is  
how opportunities for self-realization can be 
provided to the greatest number of people today 
without unjustly burdening future generations.
Excessive public debt, for example, can leave 
future generations with a massive mortgage on 
their opportunities for self-realization, dwar-
fing the constraints felt by today’s generations.
In assessing the individual policy areas
comprising the economic sustainability pillar,
the following aspects are addressed:
Instead, this pillar of the SGI also relies on data 
that measure the success of states in a variety 
of policy areas that must be taken into account 
in seeking to develop robust, high-performing, 
long-lasting economic, sociopolitical and en-
vironmental systems, not to mention high le-
vels of social participation.
The Policy Performance Index measures the 
performance of the 41 states surveyed in terms 
of the three core dimensions of sustainability, 
manifested here as economic, social and en-
vironmental policies. A total of 16 individual  
policy areas are addressed, with policy out- 
comes captured by means of a wide range  
of quantitative and qualitative data. In this re-
spect, the SGI 2018 goes further than previous 
SGI surveys, as it also encompasses the cont-
ribution of individual countries in promoting 
sustainable development at the international 
level. And in the context of the United Nations’ 
new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
the highly developed OECD and EU states  
have a particular responsibility for contributing  
to an increase in global public welfare.
The Policy Performance Index creates a map of reform needs in key policy areas for each 
country, asking how successful individual countries have been in achieving sustainable 
policy outcomes. In so doing, it references a range of ideas central to current international 
discourses on measuring sustainability, social progress and quality of life. Thus, the Policy 
Performance Index does not limit itself to the data associated with conventional measures of 
a society’s economic growth and material prosperity.
Policy Performance
Sustainable Governance Indicators
Sustainable policy outcomes
A broad set of 
economic, social 
and environmental 
indicators. 
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Assessment criteria for economic sustainability (Index dimension 1)
 Are economic policies applied on the basis of a coherent institutional framework, thereby enhancing 
 the country’s international competitiveness? 
 How successful are government strategies in addressing unemployment and increasing 
 labor-market inclusion? 
 To what extent do the country’s tax policies promote social equity, competition and positive 
 long-term state-revenue prospects? 
 To what extent are budgetary policies underpinned by principles of fiscal sustainability?
 To what extent do research and development policies contribute to the country’s capacity for 
 innovation?
 Does the country actively contribute to the effective regulation and stabilization of international 
 financial markets?
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prise well-being. These include feeling safe, 
having good health and gainful employment, 
engaging in political participation, enjoying 
social relations, being able to participate in 
cultural life, and living in favorable environ-
mental conditions. Seeking to enhance sustain-
ability thus means ensuring the long-term  
viability of social welfare systems. Assessing 
the performance of OECD and EU states with 
this in mind involves more than evaluating the 
extent to which society provides opportuni-
ties and enables participation. It also involves 
taking a close look at factors such as the sus-
tainability of public financing and the potential 
for reform within existing systems. Sustaina-
bility-minded decision-makingmaintains and 
even expands opportunities for social partici-
pation for today’s generations without com-
promising the opportunities afforded to future 
generations.
The SGI’s social policies category addresses  
the following questions:
Index dimension 2
Social policies – securing participation
for present and future generations
Social policies designed to enhance sustain-
ability involve maintaining or increasing in-
dividuals’ opportunities to act and live in ac-
cordance with their own values, which thereby 
ensures a high degree of participation in  
society. Political, social and economic systems 
must be constituted in such a way that indivi-
duals are provided with substantive opportuni-
ties for self-realization. Ensuring broad-based 
social participation involves more than provi-
ding safeguards against classic risks such as 
illness, accidents, aging, assisted living, di-
sability and unemployment. Social policies 
should also be integrative in nature and empo-
wer members of the community to participate 
actively in public affairs. At the same time, all 
members of society should have equal access  
to these substantive opportunities:  
No one should be systematically excluded from 
those activities and states of being that com-
Sustainable Governance Indicators
Ensuring broad-scale 
participatory oppor-
tunities and justice 
across society are 
essential.
Assessment criteria for social sustainability (Index dimension 2)
 To what extent do the country’s education policies foster high-quality, inclusive and efficient 
 education and training systems? 
 To what extent do sociopolitical measures facilitate social inclusion, while effectively combating 
 social exclusion and polarization? 
 How successfully do policies secure quality, inclusivity and cost efficiency in the country’s 
 health care system? 
 To what extent do family-policy measures make it easier to combine career and family?
 How successful are the country’s pension policies in preventing old-age poverty while promoting 
 intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?
 To what extent do the country’s political measures foster the effective integration of migrants 
 into society?
 How successful is the country in establishing secure living conditions for its citizens by combating 
 crime and other security risks?
 And looking to the international level: To what extent is the country engaged in efforts to combat 
 global social inequalities, such as the promotion of fair global-trade structures and just participation 
 opportunities within developing countries?
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Index dimension 3
Environmental policies
In terms of sustainability, environmental poli-
cies are particularly important given the far-re-
aching effects environmental conditions have 
on the quality of life. Our surrounding environ-
ment can influence the quality of life positively 
(by providing access to clean water, air and recre-
ation areas) or negatively (through water, air 
or noise pollution, for example). The attractions 
or challenges provided by natural environments 
help determine where people want to live, drive 
migratory movements and make basic human 
existence possible. But natural environments 
(with their ecosystemic functions) are also de-
pendent on human social systems – particularly 
the extent to which these latter systems observe 
principles of environmental sustainability. Lifes-
tyles and economic systems dependent on an in-
tense use of resources destabilize the ecosystem 
in the long term.  
Indeed, the growing expectations of an expan-
ding global population represent the greatest 
risk of destabilization. And yet the ability to ful-
fill these demands is constrained by immuta-
ble planetary limits. Environmental sustainability 
therefore means ensuring that regenerative re-
sources are used only to the extent that they can 
be replenished. Environmental sustainability also 
involves ensuring that nonrenewable resour-
ces are consumed only to the extent that similar, 
renewable substitutes can be developed. Harm-
ful pollutants such as greenhouse gases should be 
emitted only to the extent that they can be absor-
bed by natural systems. The goal of sustainable 
environmental policies must be to secure the  
natural foundation of human existence and leave 
an intact ecosystem for future generations. 
Therefore, in this category of sustainability,  
the SGI address the following key questions for 
each of the 41 OECD and EU countries:
A broad range of quantitative indicators under-
lying this category also allow for a systematic 
assessment of environmental-policy outcomes 
(e.g., greenhouse-gas emissions, renewable 
energies, particulate pollution, waste recycling).
 
Comparing strengths and weaknesses across the 
three categories of the Policy Performance Index 
allows us to identify not only the areas in which 
individual countries are achieving positive policy 
outcomes, and the extent to which this is occur-
ring, but also the areas in which there is a pres-
sing need for further reform.
Behind this model is the idea that the long-term 
viability of economic, social and environmental 
systems can be achieved only through measures 
that consider these systems together. It is  
important to consider the diverse interactions 
and conflicting goals that arise from the three 
systems and their associated policies, with no 
single component viewed in isolation from  
the others. The structures, actors and processes 
through which such conflicting goals are ad-
dressed, and where possible resolved, are there-
fore of central importance in sustainable policy 
formulation (for more on this, see also aspects  
of quality of democracy and governance, on the 
next page).
Policy Performance
Assessment criteria for environmental 
sustainability (Index dimension 3)
 How successful are the country’s  
 environmental policies in protecting  
 natural resources and promoting  
 livable environmental conditions? 
 How committed is the country to the  
 advancement of binding global
 environmental-protection regimes?
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level of democracy quality and a rigorous obser-
vation of the rule of law are vital to achieving 
sustainability in the sense of long-term syste-
mic viability. The SGI measure these conditions 
in detail through the Democracy Index.
 
Quality of Democracy
The SGI’s Democracy Index is oriented toward 
the institutional and organizational realization 
of sound democratic standards.  
Its normative reference point is an ideal  
representative democracy.
The SGI criteria by which government systems 
in the OECD and EU are measured derive from 
those dimensions identified by democratic the-
ory as most significant, and contain key indi-
cators by which the quality of democracy can 
be assessed. In total, 15 qualitative indicators, 
comprising four criteria, are used to evaluate 
the fabric of democracy in each country. Crite-
ria include the following:
Indeed, the quality of democracy in a society 
must be high if it is to sustain pluralism in the 
processes that build and shape public will and 
opinions (input legitimacy), as well as in the 
policy-formulation and decision-making 
processes that accommodate the interests and 
needs of a broad spectrum of stakeholders in 
society (throughput legitimacy), while ulti- 
mately transforming these processes into con-
crete and efficacious actions (output legiti-
macy). Democracy and the rule of law are  
therefore fundamental to preventing the  
systematic exclusion or neglect of social groups 
or individuals, enabling all members of a society 
to participate in shaping opinions and building 
the will to reform. When managing the inherent 
conflicts underlying sustainable policy goals,  
it is particularly important to prevent the syste-
matic exclusion of any group, thus following the 
principle of equal opportunity.The legitimacy of 
a political system rests upon its ability to pro-
vide appropriate oversight of decision-makers’ 
activities, opportunities for democratic partici-
pation, protection of civil rights and legal cer-
tainty. Citizens’ consent to and trust in a po-
litical system will depend heavily on these 
conditions. Moreover, democratic participation 
and oversight are essential in enabling con-
crete learning and adaptation processes, as well 
as the capacity for change. In SGI terms, a high 
How do OECD and EU states compare with regard to the quality of democracy and the rule 
of law? This question is also vital in assessing sustainable governance because the rule of law 
and citizens’ ability to participate in political processes are essential to ensuring a political 
system’s good performance and long-term stability. Fully developed opportunities for 
political participation must be in place if a society is to achieve high levels of participatory 
justice.
Democracy
Sustainable Governance Indicators
Comparing frameworks for
democracy and the rule of law
The quality of demo-
cratic standards
and the rule of law are 
key to any political 
system‘s long-term
viability.
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Excerpt SGI-Codebook: www.sgi-network.org
Democracy
Assessment criteria for the quality of democracy
 The electoral process, which includes the rules governing political-party ballot qualification and 
 voter registration as well as the issue of party financing; for the first time, this edition of the SGI 
 also evaluates direct-democracy structures and participation opportunities 
 The public’s access to information, which can be measured by the extent of media freedoms 
 and media pluralism
 Civil rights and political liberties
 The rule of law, including legal certainty, the judicial review of laws and the prevention of corruption
Media Freedom
Media Pluralism
Access to Government
Information
Candidacy Procedures
Media Access
Voting and 
Registration Rights
Party Financing
Popular Decision
Making
Legal Certainty
Judicial Review
Appointment 
of Justices
Corruption
Prevention
Civil Rights
Political Liberties
Non-discrimination
Quality of Democracy
FOUR CRITERIA AND THEIR INDICATORS
Rule of LawElectoral Processes Access to Information
Civil Rights and
Political Liberties
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terial coordination, knowledge management, 
consultation and communication processes,  
as well as policy implementation and learning 
capacity. The key actors examined here are the 
governments of the OECD and EU states along 
with the organizational and institutional re-
sources at their disposal (centers of govern-
ment, ministries, agencies, etc.).
Index dimension 2
Executive accountability
The second category within the Governance 
Index, executive accountability, focuses on the 
forms of interaction between a government and 
other stakeholders in the policymaking pro-
cess. It seeks to assess the extent to which par-
ticipation and oversight competencies are pro-
duced and cultivated. If policies are to succeed 
in the long term and yield sustainable effects, 
governments clearly cannot afford to formu-
late and implement policies in isolation. Bea-
ring this in mind, the SGI examine the extent to 
which other actors who perform essential fun-
ctions in consolidating and mediating interests 
in a political system are able to participate in 
policymaking and monitor the process at each 
The SGI’s Governance Index answers these 
questions using a broad and innovative set of 
indicators. These indicators permit a contex-
tualized assessment of the extent to which the 
governments of OECD and EU states – work- 
ing together with other institutions and social 
stakeholders in the course of democratic  
decision-making processes – are able to  
identify pressing issues, develop appropriate 
solutions and implement them efficiently  
and efficaciously.
The modern concept of governance employed  
by the SGI emphasizes a government’s capacity 
to deliver sustainable policies (executive capa-
city) as well as the participatory and oversight 
competencies of actors and institutions beyond 
the executive branch (executive accountability).
Index dimension 1
Executive capacity
 
The executive capacity category focuses on the 
core activities of a government and examines 
the steering capabilities demonstrated by a  
political system’s administrative apparatus. 
This includes strategic planning, interminis-
In a context of rapidly changing environments and growing complexity, it is ever more  
important for policymakers (and the institutions through which they act) to respond 
quickly and resolutely while bearing in mind the long-term impact of actions taken today. 
It is therefore important that any assessment of sustainable governance look not only at 
policy outcomes, a country’s underlying democratic order and the rule of law, but also at the 
political leadership’s capacity to steer processes with success. Just how effective are OECD 
and EU leaders in managing strategic processes, and how well do they address and resolve 
the problems they face?
Governance
Sustainable Governance Indicators
An international comparison of reform capacities
The Governance Index 
looks at a government’s 
capacity to deliver 
sound policies as well 
as the participatory
and oversight compe-
tencies of social actors.
71
case for the Policy Performance and Democracy 
indices, the figure depicting the Governance 
Index represents merely an overview of its 
most important features. In sum, 67 qualitative 
and 69 quantitative indicators underlie  
the three indices.
The issues and concerns discussed thus far 
highlight the SGI’s two-pronged objective in 
assessing the future viability of OECD and EU 
states: to measure the need for reform with re-
ference to sustainable policy outcomes and the 
quality of democracy; and to measure the ca-
pacity for reform in terms of governments’ and 
social groups’ abilities to steer these processes. 
The SGI take this approach further than other 
international rankings in two respects. First, 
the SGI never regard OECD and EU states’ re-
form needs from a purely economic point of 
view. Instead, the SGI intentionally incorporate 
cross-cutting topics such as education, the en-
vironment, social issues and security. Second, 
the dimension of reform capacity remains un-
derexplored by other indices to date. No other 
ranking offers a comparable analysis with such 
depth of field.
step along the way. The capacity to exercise 
this oversight function in part reflects the  
government’s obligation to account for its  
actions to citizens, parliaments, the media, 
parties and interest groups.
Moreover, executive accountability addresses 
the effectiveness of government communica-
tion, examining how well a government acqui-
res and disseminates information, and the ex-
tent to which it involves and activates various 
elements of society in formulating and  
implementing policy. The SGI therefore include  
a series of indicators exploring the extent to 
which governments consult entities such as 
special-interest groups early in legislative 
planning processes. The category also includes 
indicators that explore the extent to which the 
associations, citizens and legislatures possess 
participatory competencies (knowledge of po-
litics, financial resources, etc.). In short, this is 
about the checks and balances and participatory 
processes that can enhance the quality and  
legitimacy of political decision-making. 
These aspects of modern governance are  
reflected in the architecture of the Governance 
Index, as shown in the figure above. As was the 
Governance
Strategic Capacity
Interministerial Coordination
Evidence-based Instruments
Societal Consultation
Policy Communication
Effective Implementation
Adaptability
Organizational Reform Capacity
Citizens’ Participatory Competence
Legislative Actors’ Resources
Media
Parties and Interest Associations
Executive Capacity Executive Accountability
Governance
    Interministerial Coordination 
    GO Expertise 
    GO Gatekeeping
    Line Ministries
    Parteien und Interessengruppen
    Intra-Party Democracy 
    Association Competence (Business)
    Association Competence (Others)
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allowing for precise evaluations on a scale of 1 
(lowest score) to 10 (highest).  
The response to each question includes both 
a numerical score and a written response that 
substantiates and illustrates the score given. 
Throughout the course of the online survey  
process, experts refer to the quantitative indi-
cators for all 41 countries as benchmarks,  
allowing assessments to be made on the basis 
of sound empirical data.
To ensure the comparability of quantitative
and qualitative data, all quantitative data are 
standardized by linear transformation on a 
scale of 1 to 10. These figures are then subject 
to simple aggregation in establishing the three 
Policy Performance, Democracy and Gover-
nance indices. 
The SGI evaluation process yields two products: 
detailed rankings and comprehensive reports 
on each of the 41 OECD and EU states surveyed 
(available free of charge at www.sgi-network.
org). The SGI website provides access to every 
The quantitative data underlying the SGI is 
drawn from official statistical sources, in parti-
cular those provided by the OECD and EU.  
While the SGI project team compiles this quan-
titative data centrally, the qualitative data is 
procured from a global network of more than 
100 experts in a multiphase process of survey 
and validation. Each country is evaluated by  
(at least) two country experts (political scien-
tists and economists) as well as a regional  
coordinator, each of whom respond to the 
questions posed in the SGI codebook. Country 
reports are then produced through an iterative 
evaluation process involving reviews and com-
ments by each expert. This procedure is similar 
to that used by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in the 
SGI’s sister project, the Transformation Index.
The SGI Codebook (available at www.sgi-net-
work.org) details the rationale behind each of 
the 67 qualitative indicators, thereby ensuring 
a shared understanding of each question among 
the SGI experts. The questions comprising this 
codebook include a range of answer options, 
The SGI draw on established survey and aggregation methods. In order to ensure the proper
operationalization of the individual index components, the SGI rely on a combination
of qualitative and quantitative data. This allows for an analysis in which the strengths
of both types of data can be applied, and it avoids the pitfalls associated with the use of
purely quantitative or qualitative surveys. In the SGI, the “objectivity” of quantitative data
from official statistical sources is complemented by experts’ context-sensitive qualitative
assessments. This combination delivers a detailed portrait of policy outcomes, the quality of
democracy and steering capacities.
Methodology: Generating better data  
through an iterative process
Combining quantitative data with
experts’ qualitative analysis
SGI methodology 
stands out for being 
transparent and con-
textsensitive.
Sustainable Governance Indicators
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level of aggregation, from individual indicators 
up to the top-level indices. The country reports 
are also available as downloads.
The survey period for the Sustainable Governance 
Indicators 2018 extended from November 7, 2016 
to November 8, 2017. The assessments provided 
therefore refer to governance exclusively within  
this period of time. Following earlier edition in 
2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017, this is the 
seventh SGI survey.
Methodology
The first expert responds 
to the questionnaire, pro-
viding scores and drafting
a country report.
The second expert reviews 
and revises the draft report, 
providing scores for each 
indicator without being 
able to view the first ex-
pert’s scores.
A regional coordina-
tor reviews the re-
port and scores pro-
vided, revising both 
in consultation with 
the experts to cre-
ate the final report. 
The coordinator also 
oversees the collec-
tion of data for up to 
eight countries.
Regional coordi-
nators convene to 
compare and cal-
ibrate across re-
gions the results for 
each.
In a final step, the 
SGI Board reviews 
the validity of the 
findings and ap-
proves the final 
scores.
1 
Initial survey
2 
Review
3 
Intra-regional
calibration
4 
Inter-regional
calibration
5 
Validity
check
Democracy GovernancePolicy Performance
A multi-stage survey of 41 OECD and EU states
ensures that results are reliable and valid
Economic Policies Electoral Processes Executive Capacity
Social Policies
Access to Information
Executive Accountability
Environmental Policies
Civil Rights and Political Liberties
Rule of Law
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Survey structure
Electoral Processes
· Candidacy Procedures
· Media Access
· Voting and Registration Rights
· Party Financing
· Popular Decision-Making
Access to Information
· Media Freedom
· Media Pluralism
· Access to Government Information
Civil Rights and 
Political Liberties
· Civil Rights
· Political Liberties
· Non-discrimination
Rule of Law
· Legal Certainty
· Judicial Review
· Appointment of Justices
· Corruption Prevention
Quality of Democracy
Criterion
· Indicator
· Indicator
· Indicator
Category
Criterion
· Indicator
· Indicator
· Indicator
Category
Economy
· Economic Policy
· GDP per Capita
· Inflation
· Gross Fixed Capital Formation
· Real Interest Rates
· Potential Output, Growth Rate
Labor Market
· Labor Market Policy
· Unemployment
· Long-term Unemployment
· Youth Unemployment
· Low-skilled Unemployment
· Employment Rate
· Low Pay Incidence
Taxes
· Tax Policy
· Tax System Complexity
· Structural Balance
· Marginal Tax Burden for Businesses
· Redistribution Effect
Budgets
· Budgetary Policy
· Debt to GDP
· Primary Balance
· Debt Interest Ratio
· Budget Consolidation
Research and Innovation
· Research and Innovation Policy
· Public R&D Spending
· Non-public R&D Spending
· Total Researchers
· Intellectual Property Licenses
· PCT Patent Applications
Global Financial System
· Stabilizing global financial markets
· Tier 1 Capital Ratio
Economic Policies
Environment
· Environmental Policy
· Energy Productivity
· Greenhouse Gas Emissions
· Particulate Matter
· Water Usage
· Waste Generation
· Material Recycling
· Biodiversity Protection
· Renewable Energy
Global Environmental 
Protection
· Global Environmental Policy
· Multilateral Environmental
Agreements
· Kyoto Participation 
  and Achievements
Environmental Policies
Integration
· Integration Policy
· FB-N Upper Secondary Attainment
· FB-N Tertiary Attainment
· FB-N Unemployment
· FB-N Employment
· (FB-N = Foreign-Born to Native)
Safe Living
· Safe Living Conditions
· Homicides
· Assaults and Muggings
· Confidence in Police
Global Inequalities
· Global Social Policy
· ODA Rate
Social Policies
Education
· Education Policy
· Upper Secondary Attainment
· Tertiary Attainment
· PISA Results
· PISA, Socioeconomic Background
· Pre-primary Expenditure
Social Inclusion
· Social Inclusion Policy
· Poverty Rate
· NEET Rates
· Gini Coefficient
· Gender Equality in Parliaments
· Life Satisfaction
Health
· Health Policy
· Spending on Health Programs
· Life Expectancy
· Infant Mortality
· Perceived Health Status
Families
· Family Policy
· Child Care Density, Age 0-2
· Child Care Density, Age 3-5
· Fertility Rate
· Child Poverty
Pensions
· Pension Policy
· Older Employment
· Old Age Dependency Ratio
· Senior Citizen Poverty
Citizens’ Participatory 
Competence
· Policy Knowledge
· Voicing Opinion to Officials
· Voter Turnout
Legislative Actors’ Resources
· Parliamentary Resources
· Obtaining Documents
· Summoning Ministers
· Summoning Experts
· Task Area Congruence
· Audit Office
· Ombuds Office
Media
· Media Reporting
· Newspaper Circulation
· Quality Newspapers
Parties and  
Interest Associations
· Intra-party Democracy
· Association Competence (Business)
· Association Competence (Others)
Executive Accountability
Implementation
· Government Efficiency
· Ministerial Compliance
· Monitoring Ministries
· Monitoring Agencies/
Bureaucracies
· Task Funding
· Constitutional Discretion
· National Standards
Adaptability
· Domestic Adaptability
· International Coordination
Organizational Reform
· Self-monitoring
· Institutional Reform
Executive Capacity
Strategic Capacity
· Strategic Planning
· Scholarly Advice
Interministerial Coordination
· GO Expertise
· GO Gatekeeping
· Line Ministries
· Cabinet Committees
· Ministerial Bureaucracy
· Informal Coordination
Evidence-based Instruments
· RIA Application
· Quality of RIA Process
· Sustainability Check
Societal Consultation
· Negotiating Public Support
Policy Communication
· Coherent Communication
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Results and data 
at a glance
The SGI Website
78
 
The SGI website’s interactive features provide access to the findings for 41 countries. Users 
can explore the full range of data provided, from individual indicators across various analytic 
categories to fully aggregated indices.
Results and data 
at a glance
SGI Website
Sustainable Governance Indicators
2
3
1
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 SGI Website
4
1    Intuitive navigation
Direct access to the entire 
set of data, downloads and 
comparative features.
3    News and studies
Studies and ongoing blog  re-
ports that draw upon data 
for each of the SGI countries.
2    3 pillars, 6 categories
Access to every level of  
analysis – from indicators 
to indices.
4    Interactive features
A variety of visualizations 
allow for a systematic compar-
ison of strengths and weak-
nesses.
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 SGI Website
5    Time series analysis
Compare a variety of items 
over time (SGI 2014, 2015, 
2016, 2017 and 2018).
7    Policy areas in comparison
The SGI also allow for the 
crossnational comparison of 
policy areas.
6    Country reports
Explore country reports from 
every angle.
8    Determine weighting
Users can for the first time 
select the relative weights of 
criteria used in rankings.
7
8
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The SGI website offers a variety of opportunities to access our country experts’ qualitative 
assessments, compare individual countries and thus explore the data and information 
behind each ranking. The written assessments for each indicator and country have been 
integrated into the website. The following pages feature excerpts from the assessments, 
showcasing different dimensions, indicators and countries. Each of the 41 country reports 
are available for download at no cost. 
Countries and indicators – a sample
Excerpts from country experts’  
qualitative assessments
41 Country Reports, www.sgi-network.org
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 Countries and indicators – a sample
Indicator: Education Policy
The Education and Research Development Plan, 
revised every four years by the government,  
directs the implementation of education- and 
research-policy goals as stated in the govern-
ment program. Since 2011, the plan has focused 
on the alleviation of poverty, inequality and  
exclusion. While Finland’s expenditure on  
educational institutions as a percentage of GDP  
was above the OECD average some years ago,  
heavy cuts by the government in the education 
sector have now weakened the financial condi-
tions for designing and pursuing education  
policy. In 2016, new curricula for compulsory 
basic education was introduced, designed to  
increase equality in compulsory education,  
enhance pupil participation in goal-setting and 
evaluation, and integrate more technology 
in teaching. While the curricula reflect more 
thoroughly the growing needs of a knowledge 
society, it has been criticized for the short  
period of transition involved with implement-
ing it and the lack of resources and training for 
teachers. Additionally, partial restrictions on 
the right to day care for children whose parents 
are not participating in the labor market under-
mine equal access to early education, especially 
in socially vulnerable families.
FINLAND – Policy Performance, Social Policies Rank 2
Excerpt Country Report Finland:
 Prof. Dr. Dag Anckar
 Dr. Kati Kuitto, Christoph Oberst
 Prof. Dr. Detlef Jahn (Regional coordinator)
FIGURE: Does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable education and training? 
www.sgi-network.org
  6.2   8.0
Education Policy
  5.2   7.2
Pre-primary 
Expenditure
  6.3   7.0
PISA, Socioeconomic 
Background
8.4   7.2
Upper Secondary 
Attainment
7.6   6.4
Tertiary Attainment
7.7   5.3
PISA results
7.8 6.1
OECDFinland
Policy Performance
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Indicator: Civil Rights and Political Liberties 
In the aftermath of 15 July coup attempt, even 
more serious violations of civil rights have oc-
curred. Although the government claims it con-
ducts the rules of emergency government with 
utmost care, these practices are based on the de-
crees having the force of law and are not subject 
to judicial review thereof. In addition to mass ar-
rests of alleged coup plotters and sympathizers, 
confiscations of their properties and sentences 
against journalists and opposition politicians, 
renewed violence in the South-east, widespread 
restrictions on freedom of expression, associa-
tion and assembly, deteriorated judiciary, vio-
lence against women and impaired relations with 
the international key actors demonstrate the in-
stitutionalized neglect of civil rights in Turkey.
Political influence and pressure on the judiciary 
as well as allegations of conspiring with Gülen-
ist organizations weaken the independence of 
the judiciary as the sole guarantee for civil and 
political rights and liberties. The Justice Minis-
ter’s right of veto, as ex officio President of the 
High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), 
continued to be a source of major concern. 
TURKEY – Democracy Rank 41
Excerpt Country Report Turkey:
 Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Genckaya
 Prof. Dr. Subidey Togan
 Dr. Ludwig Schulz
 Dr. Roy Karadag (Regional coordinator)
Quality of Democracy
FIGURE: Are civil rights and political liberties respected? is there protection against discrimination?
www.sgi-network.org
  7.1   2.0
Civil Rights
4.0   6.8
Non-discrimination
3.0   8.1
Political Liberties
3.0 7.3
OECDTurkey
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 Countries and indicators – a sample
Indicator: Strategic Capacity/Strategic Planning 
The strategic capacity of government has been 
enhanced over the past few years. Much of that 
capacity is found in the Department of Finance 
where most of the long-term planning takes 
place. The main role of the Prime Minister’s 
Office is not so much long-term planning but 
more coordination within government.
A case in the point is the so-called “future 
commission” which presented its final report  
in early 2013. In the final report, the commis-
sion assesses the economic and social changes 
that are likely to shape the Swedish society in 
the longer term. Exactly how the commission’s 
findings will flow into the policy process is yet 
to be seen. The commission is not an instituti-
onalized feature of the normal policy process, 
but was a group of experts the government  
appointed to look into the long-term issues.  
The creation of the commission does signal  
the government is thinking in the longer term,  
and there have since been other commissions 
appointed to take a similar long view on various 
issues on the policy agenda. 
SWEDEN – Governance Rank 1
Excerpt Country Report Sweden:
 Prof. Dr. Jon Pierre
 Prof. Dr. Sven Jochem
 Prof. Dr. Detlef Jahn (Regional coordinator)
Governance
FIGURE: Does the government have strong steering capabilities? 
  6.0   8.0
Strategic Capacity
  6.7   9.5
Adaptability
  6.4   9.0
Organizational Reform
  6.8   8.1
Implementation
6.7   7.2
Interministerial 
Coordination
8.0   6.4
Societal 
Consultation
7.0   5.7
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Instruments
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Policy Communication
8.4
OECDSweden
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ernment securing the passage of major reforms 
through the senate, as the balance of power in 
the senate is held by several minor parties and 
independents. That said, after an initial period  
of policy paralysis, in the current review period, 
the Turnbull government has begun to have 
some success in passing legislation to achieve 
reform. To a significant extent, this reflects the 
government adopting a more moderate or bal-
anced agenda, which has been more acceptable 
to independents and minor parties.
Under Turnbull’s leadership, the govern-
ment has recognized the need to develop new 
growth industries. The prime minister has par-
ticularly emphasized the need for Australia to be 
“innovative and agile,” although he has not laid 
out a plan for fostering innovation and agility. 
One factor supporting the economy is the rela-
tive weakness of the Australian dollar, which im-
proves the competitive position for tourism and 
education services in particular. 
Policy performance has improved very 
slightly over the review period. Slight progress 
Executive Summary
Despite its comfortable victory in the September 
2013 federal election, the center-right govern-
ment of Prime Minister Tony Abbott soon found 
itself deeply unpopular with the electorate, par-
ticularly after the May 2014 budget was defeated 
in parliament. Discontent with Prime Minister 
Tony Abbott’s leadership within the Liberal Party 
led to his replacement by Malcolm Turnbull in 
September 2015. However, Turnbull’s popularity 
quickly evaporated and he secured only a narrow 
victory in the July 2016 federal election. Indeed, 
Turnbull’s gamble on a “double-dissolution” 
election (whereby all 76 senate seats were con-
tested, rather than 40) backfired and the senate 
has proven more intransigent since the election. 
Since the end of the mining boom in 2012, 
Australia’s economic circumstances have fun-
damentally altered and living standards have  
remained stagnant. Difficult fiscal-policy deci-
sions will be necessary over the coming years,  
but there appears to be little hope of the gov-
Australia
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ate and compromise with other parties to achieve 
policy reforms. Unfortunately, he has so far been 
unable to translate this into substantive change.
Key Challenges
Australia faces a number of major strategic chal-
lenges over the coming years. The most pressing 
are the lack of investment in physical infrastruc-
ture, and the continued dependence of the econ-
omy on primary product exports and an inflated 
real estate sector. In addition, the tax system re-
quires reform. While it is unclear how Australia 
could reduce its dependence on primary prod-
uct exports and unwind the bubble in real estate 
prices without a crash, the tax system could be 
fixed more easily. The OECD has suggested rais-
ing the tax on goods and services tax, and intro-
ducing a land tax. The land tax would distribute 
the benefits from substantial foreign investment 
in real estate more evenly. Fiscal policy is heav-
ily exposed to external risk and, in the medium 
term, Australia should establish a stabilization 
fund, as other resource-rich economies like  
Norway, have done. 
Meanwhile, significant public investment 
is required to bring Australia’s physical infra-
structure to a level comparable to other advanced 
economies. The price for Australia’s low level of 
has been made in balancing the government 
budget, and policies to improve the funding and 
quality of health and education were implemented 
as part of the 2017 budget. Economic and social 
outcomes continue to be relatively good in abso-
lute terms, and sustainable policy performance 
compares reasonably favorably with many other 
developed countries. In particular, the fiscal po-
sition continues to be considerably stronger than 
in many other OECD countries. That said, GDP 
growth has remained tepid, the labor market has 
remained relatively weak, and real wages and 
household incomes remain stagnant.
There is considerable scope for improvement 
in governance. The coalition government has 
cut public-sector employment, reduced funding 
for several government agencies, and partially 
reneged on the health and education funding 
agreements reached with the state and territorial 
governments prior to the 2013 election. This sit-
uation improved only slightly during the review 
period. Persistent problems therefore remain, 
such as vertical fiscal imbalances between  
the federal, state and territory governments;  
the absence of legally protected human rights;  
the politicization of the public sector; and the 
degree of concentration in media ownership.
Prime Minister Turnbull has demonstrated an 
appreciation of the problems currently faced by 
the country, along with a willingness to negoti-
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successive governments, and the issue of water 
security remains a prominent and immediate 
issue. Australia’s failure to address the water 
issue reflects structural problems in the federal 
system.
The tax system also remains complex and 
inefficient. The 2010 Henry Tax Review pro-
duced 138 recommendations for improvements. 
However, the previous Labor government only 
adopted a few recommendations. Similarly,  
the Liberal-National coalition government  
has shown little inclination to radically reform  
the system. Other long-standing deficiencies  
that should be priorities for reform include  
diversification of media ownership; improving  
regulatory impact assessments by expanding 
their scope and application; increasing public 
consultation and transparency, and conducting 
consultation prior to policy decisions; and intro-
ducing a bill of human rights.
In the past, Australia has addressed environ- 
mental challenges haphazardly. Considering 
Australia’s climate, there is much room for the 
development of sustainable policies on energy 
and the environment. Transport could be made 
greener, for instance, by financing improve-
ments to inadequate public transport systems 
through an increase in excise duties on fuel.
Finally, the situation of indigenous Australi-
ans continues to be the most serious social  
failure of the Australian political system.  
Over recent decades, numerous policy initiatives 
have attempted to address the appalling  
outcomes experienced by indigenous people,  
but there is little evidence that substantive  
progress has been made. Remedying this  
must remain a priority over the coming years.
public debt has been underinvestment in roads, 
ports and railroads. Yet, the “structural fiscal 
deficit” impedes large spending programs on  
infrastructure. The coalition government has  
attempted to address some of the shortfalls in 
infrastructure investment, but has primarily  
focused on roads. It is unclear to what extent  
real increases in investment will materialize. 
Furthermore, the government has scaled back 
Labor’s National Broadband Network infrastruc-
ture project, essentially replacing the “fiber  
to the home” model with an inferior, cheaper 
hybrid fiber-copper network model.
In international relations, Australia is facing  
a rapidly deteriorating situation. Its biggest  
customer, China, is intervening in Australia’s 
domestic policymaking and becoming a much 
more aggressive player in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion. The Australian government is aware of the  
challenges, but may have to choose between  
political preferences and commercial interests. 
The choice will not be simple given the vulnera-
bilities of the Australian economy. 
Other strategic challenges are more peren-
nial. Closely related to the structural deficit  
has been managing the implications of an  
aging population. Existing policies have better 
prepared Australia for this demographic shift 
compared to most other developed countries. 
However, the inefficiencies inherent in the fed-
eral system of government have proven more 
problematic. Notable problems include the divi-
sion between federal and state responsibilities, 
and a vertical fiscal imbalance. The need to se-
cure agreement with the states on most major 
issues of shared concern has proven difficult  
for recent federal governments, particularly  
in the policy areas of water, health, education 
and transport infrastructure. The autonomy  
of states and their accountability should be 
strengthened, while the conditionality of grants 
from the federal budget should be reduced.
The federal Labor government was at least  
as proactive in addressing this issue as any  
past government but found progress difficult.  
“Cooperative federalism” was supposed to over-
come entrenched, parochial interests, but has 
proven inadequate in facilitating reform on con-
tentious issues. Policies designed, for example, 
to increase the efficiency of water use or ensure  
a fairer allocation of water rights have eluded 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Roger Wilkins
 Heribert Dieter
 Aurel Croissant
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Austria
Country profile SGI 2018
Membership rates in political parties  
are now lower than ever. At the same time,  
electoral volatility has increased as voting  
behavior grows increasingly less predictable, 
with the success of several new parties demon-
strating the system’s adaptability. There has 
been widespread debate in recent years over  
instruments of direct democracy, such as  
popular initiatives, which could enhance the  
role of citizens in the policymaking process. 
However, greater direct democracy would make 
politics less predictable. The new government 
has included the introduction of such instru-
ments in its agenda, but without clearly defin- 
ing the instruments.
As a consequence of globalization and  
migration, social-partnership networks have 
lost some significance. Labor unions are  
playing less of a role in the economy, while 
globalization has meant the loss of traditional 
industries. As the Austrian economy is less and 
less an island led and controlled by Austrian  
institutions – from the government to the  
Executive Summary
Incorporating a broad swath of interests into 
the policymaking process has traditionally been 
a strong point of the Austrian political system. 
However, this has started to change for two rea-
sons, one more general and one more specific. 
As a result of Austria’s de iure integration into 
the European Union (and especially into the  
European Single Market) and Austria’s de facto 
integration into an ever more globalized 
economic system, the ability of Austrian 
governments to integrate and control social 
and economic trends is declining. Furthermore, 
the formation of a new coalition government, 
which includes a party that is widely seen as  
a prototype of right-wing populism (the FPÖ), 
introduces an additional factor. It remains to be 
seen to what extent the conservative Austrian 
People’s Party (ÖVP) will succeed in controlling 
the government’s right-wing populist elements 
and the wider risk populism poses to the Aus-
trian political system.
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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Key Challenges
If the Austrian government’s overall perfor-
mance is to improve, the government must  
examine and debate specific institutional and 
policy features more thoroughly. 
From an institutional perspective, strength-
ening the authority of the central executive 
could significantly improve government effi-
ciency. Within Austria’s parliamentary system, 
this would involve the Federal Chancellery,  
not the Office of the Federal President. It could 
also imply strengthening the party of the chan-
cellor – a move not in the interest of any coa-
lition partner. In either case, it would certainly 
require shifting power from the state (Länder) 
governments to the federal government.
The fragmentation of the party system  
since the 1980s seems to have stopped. In 2017, 
all three major parties won votes (ÖVP, FPÖ  
and SPÖ), especially the ÖVP. It remains to be 
seen whether such a re-alignment of the party 
system is an exception or marks an end to the 
established trend. 
A specific strategic option to improve the  
response to new challenges would be to follow 
the Swiss model: legally establish a permanent 
coalition of all major parties with significant im-
provements for direct voter participation. A per-
manent coalition would guarantee government 
neocorporatist social partnership – the situation 
is indubitably changing. The new government 
also aims to reduce the role and importance of 
the so-called social partners in the Austrian 
political landscape. A growing number of young 
people, in particular those without higher ed-
ucation, are finding it increasingly difficult to 
access the labor market, while migrants often 
feel isolated and unable to improve their posi-
tion within society.
Austria also features contradictory tensions 
with regard to interest accommodation and  
societal participation. Austrian political parties 
have proved reluctant to criticize the xeno- 
phobic attitudes articulated by some influen- 
tial print-media publications – and some  
parties (especially the FPÖ) are instrumentaliz-
ing xenophobic attitudes. Fears of losing votes 
have trumped concerns regarding participation, 
which has left Austria without an effective  
integration policy.
Austrian society and its political system  
are changing. Long considered to have one  
of the most stable party systems in Europe, 
Austria is increasingly subject to political  
polarization and voter volatility. Policymakers 
have yet to respond credibly to these develop-
ments, which underscores that the risks posed 
by growing instability are not being taken  
seriously.
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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Environmental policies must be updated  
and better enforced, with a particular focus on  
a significant reduction of CO2 emitted by vehicle 
traffic and industry. The challenges arising from 
Austria’s geographic position as a transit country 
can only be addressed by improving cargo-rail 
infrastructure, which implies the need for coher-
ent modal shift policies and substantial invest-
ment in rail infrastructure. This would be best 
combined with policies facilitating research and 
production of more green technologies. Finally, 
public resources should be more equitably allo-
cated between older and younger generations, 
especially with respect to retirement policies  
and the health care sector.
The European dimension of these reforms  
is evident in all policy areas. A migration policy 
is only feasible if coordinated within the Euro-
pean Union, while any reform of the educational 
system must draw on lessons provided by other, 
significantly more successful European education 
systems. Austria has to deal with the conse-
quences of integration into the European Union, 
including weakened national sovereignty.  
It could accept integration into the European 
Union with all its consequences and try to  
advance its own national interest within the  
European political framework. Alternatively,  
it could follow the example of the so-called 
Visegrád countries and torpedo the common  
European interest. The second option not only 
implies slowing down European integration ef-
forts, but excluding the country from the current 
construction of a “core European Union,” with 
all the detrimental effects of such an exclusion 
on the Austrian economy (and society) at large.
stability, while greater direct participation would 
provide the possibility to correct decisions made 
by a cartel-like government structure. 
For its part, the parliament’s efficiency  
could be improved by giving the opposition the 
right to better monitor government activities. 
With the exception of the vote of confidence 
(which is inherently a right of the majority),  
all oversight competencies can and should become 
minority rights. The 2014 reform, which made it 
possible for a minority to establish an investiga-
tive committee, was a significant improvement.
Current imbalances between the federal and 
state levels of government could be improved 
through a better separation of powers. There are 
two options: either allow the states to raise their 
own taxes or increase centralization. Allowing 
the states to raise their own taxes could result  
in decreased spending, but may also encourage 
unfavorable tax competition between very small 
jurisdictions. Meanwhile, given the small size 
of Austria, centralization of certain authorities 
(e.g., education or public health care) now seems 
mandatory. 
A more coherent migration policy – an in-
creasingly urgent subject given the recent mass 
immigration into Austria – would allow the  
government to better manage the challenges 
and benefits associated with migration, many 
of which are not fully acknowledged. Migration 
policies that define who to attract and how to fa-
cilitate their integration into Austrian society are 
a must. From a democratic perspective, the neg-
ative consequences of intra-European economic 
migration on less educated populations and more 
vulnerable sections of the Austrian workforce 
must be addressed, if those people are not to be 
left to populist seduction.
In terms of education, Austria’s school  
system could benefit from coherent reform  
of its two-track system which determines an  
individual’s educational and vocational trajec- 
tory at an early age. Moreover, a new universi-
ty-system structure is needed to secure adequate 
funding for universities and students. Access to 
the tertiary sector for students from the middle 
and lower social strata should be improved,  
and measures such as admission examinations 
and student fees evaluated with regard to effects 
on the social composition of students.
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Anton Pelinka
 Rudolf Winter-Ebmer
 Reimut Zohlnhöfer
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a vigorous tightening of unemployment-benefit 
conditions imposed by the government, official 
unemployment rates have remained consistently 
below the euro area average. However, employ-
ment rates have also fallen consistently below 
targets, and have shown little growth. 
The country boasts a well-educated popula-
tion, attracts substantial foreign direct invest-
ment, maintains high-quality hospitals and R&D 
facilities, and hosts the seats of multiple supra-
national institutions (prominently including the 
European Union) as well as the European head-
quarters of numerous multinational companies. 
Global macroeconomic conditions affecting the 
country are generally favorable and should keep 
improving given accelerating growth across the 
EU. With its comprehensive road, rail, water and 
information-technology networks, as well as its 
world-class harbors, Belgium provides direct  
access between Europe and the rest of the world. 
Its openness in terms of trade and high reliance 
on exports forces Belgian companies to maintain 
competitiveness or lose their market position. 
Executive Summary
Belgium, located at the heart of northwestern  
Europe, is a small, densely populated country of 
11.4 million inhabitants. Its economy is generally 
healthy despite strong and enduring regional dis-
parities. In comparative terms, Belgium has been 
one of the euro zone’s most stable performers in 
recent years. At the time of writing, the country’s 
2017 gross domestic product (GDP) was projected 
to reach € 436 billion (at current prices, equiv- 
alent to $ 492 billion). In real terms, this rep-
resents a 8.5 % increase over 2008. As contrast, 
France and the Netherlands each registered cu-
mulative GDP growth rates of 6.7 % over the same 
period, while Germany’s economy grew by 10.9 %.
Belgium has an extremely open economy, 
with imports and exports totaling 170 % of GDP. 
This renders the country very vulnerable to  
international trade fluctuations. This openness 
has also led to employment losses as a result of 
the country’s tendency toward inflation rates 
higher than those of its neighbors. In part due to  
Belgium
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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institutional infighting, resolving to focus in-
stead on structural and socioeconomic reforms. 
It has had some success in this regard. Belgium’s 
main policy challenge is that of successfully bal-
ancing economic growth with social inclusion, 
both among economically weak native Belgians 
and within its foreign-origin population. It must 
accomplish this while capping government out-
lays, particularly with regard to social expendi-
tures, and reinforcing the long-term sustaina-
bility of its public finances. Future public pension 
liabilities, which represented close to 180 % of 
GDP in 2002 (Flawinne et al. 2013), are a criti-
cal concern here. This general financial challenge 
has become increasingly complex in the wake  
of the refugee crisis and in the context of the 
slow-growth environment that plagued much  
of Europe through early 2017. 
However, a restoration of economic growth 
was evident last year thanks to a positive global 
environment, increasingly restrictive immigra-
tion policies (with some decisions testing both 
moral limits and the limits of the Geneva con-
ventions, though stopping short of outright 
abuses). Moreover, a series of political scandals 
involving abuses of office by mid-level public of-
ficials (not ministers nor party leaders) triggered 
a fall of the subnational Walloon government, 
which was followed by majorities that were  
de facto more homogeneous across the various 
Yet despite its economic strength, Belgium 
has recently found it difficult to maintain its  
international standing. This is in part due to a 
succession of external shocks. Like all euro area 
nations, the country suffered from the global  
financial and economic crisis and was forced to 
bail out some of its banks. In combination with 
these economic shocks, a series of terror attacks 
on the country had a non-negligible impact on 
the economy. This reinforced the country’s pre-
existing public-debt problem and required sig-
nificant budgetary adjustment, with the result 
that public investments in infrastructure and in 
education have declined below a healthy level, 
with the consequences already visible. From a 
structural perspective, Belgium is also home  
to one of the most significant separatist move-
ments in Europe, a fact that has produced pub-
lic institutions that are both complex and fragile, 
undermining efficiency. 
Summarizing these strengths and weaknesses, 
the International Institute for Management De-
velopment (IMD) ranks Belgium as the 23nd most 
competitive economy in the world (a five-position 
improvement over 2014, but one place below its 
level a year ago), and the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) ranks the country 20th out of 137 (17 th in 
2014) in terms of global competitiveness. 
The Charles Michel government, which took 
power in October 2014, committed to avoiding 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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During the Great Recession, Belgium man-
aged to limit the damage inflicted on the coun-
try’s small- and medium-sized enterprise sec-
tor. On the whole, the country experienced only  
a slight recession. By 2010, real GDP had fully  
recovered and today sits 8.5% percentage points 
above its 2008 level. Clearly, Belgium’s economic 
situation better resembles that of Germany than 
that of Greece. However, it has suffered from 
a progressive erosion of competitiveness that 
the government has struggled to address effec-
tively. It has one of the most open economies 
in the world, with small policy missteps thus 
having sizable consequences. Belgium’s (and, 
more generally, Europe’s) share of global ex-
ports has shown a consistent decline, as has its 
share of technological exports more specifically. 
The country has lost considerable ground in the 
car-manufacturing and high-tech-steel sectors, 
as well as in other industries. It thus needs to 
identify new areas capable of fostering high  
levels of GDP growth and aggressively transfer 
productive efforts toward these sectors.
To improve its economic standing, the  
country needs to free up resources in such a  
way as to enable it to resume infrastructure  
investment and tackle its environmental and 
mobility issues. In the longer run, it will have to  
improve its education system further and rein-
force the economy’s general innovative capacity, 
both by improving workers’ skills and through 
product-market reforms stimulating the entry 
and expansion of new innovative firms. To date, 
the government has largely focused on a so-called 
tax shift intended to increase incentives for firm- 
level investment and job creation. Together with 
a tightening of unemployment-benefit condi-
tions, this has slightly reduced the cost of labor. 
However, results have been limited – perhaps 
due to sluggish growth and investment levels 
worldwide. However, many pundits have criti-
cized these reform efforts as being too timid.
With respect to institutional arrangements, 
Belgium has suffered from decades of political 
instability caused by persistent cultural and  
political tension between the Flemish and the 
Walloon regions. Flanders remains wealthier, 
with unemployment rates about half the level 
seen in Wallonia. Wallonia’s economy once  
relied on coal mining and heavy industry.  
Today, the region continues to struggle with  
levels of government, potentially improving  
government efficiency. 
As noted, the federal government did man-
age to achieve some of its objectives. However, 
distinct failures were also evident, such as its 
botched attempt to tax capital gains, which it 
had to reverse after only a single year. A more 
significant corporate-tax reform seems on 
track. Planned pension reforms are progress- 
ing as well, albeit slowly. Other “structural”  
reforms aimed at improving labor-market  
competitiveness have had some limited impact. 
However, there has been little effort to engage 
in structural reform of the goods and services 
markets, and progress with regard to limiting 
corruption and abuse of office has been slow. 
Among its other ambitious goals, the govern-
ment has set its sights on improving govern-
ment efficiency, restoring the sustainability of 
social security and strengthening the judiciary. 
To date, limited progress has been made in any 
of these areas.
The long-term challenges for the current  
and for future governments will be fourfold: 
They must increase investment and jobs in ways 
that benefit all Belgian regions and socioeco-
nomic groups; they must maintain fair intra- 
and intergenerational transfers; they must pro-
mote knowledge creation and innovation in the 
private sector without impairing access to the 
public goods and services necessary for social 
cohesion; and they must better integrate the  
second- and third-generation immigrants who 
are now Belgian citizens, both socioeconomically 
and culturally. These challenges will require  
better concertation and more fluid collaboration 
between the political authorities at the national 
(federal) and subnational levels.
Key Challenges
Belgium’s key challenges are several. It must 1) 
improve its competitiveness and reinforce the 
sustainability of its economy (in numerous areas 
including public accounts, the environment,  
education and so on); it must 2) rationalize and 
stabilize its institutional arrangements; and it 
must 3) better integrate those on society’s mar-
gins, particularly second- and third-generation 
Muslim minorities.
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a large share of the country’s immigrants.  
However, education-sector underinvestment 
means that space within the city’s schools has 
been increasingly insufficient to provide ade-
quate schooling to the city’s growing student 
population. It is unclear whether recent increases 
in investment will be reverse this problem.  
Given the comparatively broad dissemination  
of radical Islamist propaganda in the country, 
disenfranchisement must be addressed. Integra-
tion is bound to remain a major issue in Belgium 
over the next decade.
the process of shifting away from dependence on 
these industries. Moreover, the Spanish separatist 
tensions pitting Catalans against Castilians may 
prove to rekindle similar frustrations in Belgium. 
Maintaining a relationship of mutual respect be-
tween the country’s different communities will be 
critical in order to avoid falling back into political 
paralysis and sluggish socioeconomic reforms.
The current government has said it would  
relinquish any additional institutional reforms, 
seeking to minimize political complications. 
Nonetheless, tax reforms implemented on the 
national level will have significant distributional 
consequences on the regions (in particular,  
for Wallonia). As a result, the deficit in Wallonia  
may balloon in the coming years. This will  
prevent the region from pursuing expensive re-
forms or making necessary public investments. 
There is thus a risk of political deadlock as the 
next round of elections approaches (2018 for 
municipal and 2019 for regional, federal and  
European elections). 
Finally, Belgium will have to deal with  
increasing inequality and social tensions.  
The country’s health care system is today one 
of the planet’s best and most accessible. But the 
objective of reducing the costs of social security 
will reduce its generosity. Similarly, the pension 
system has allowed for broad early-retirement 
benefits, with this practice becoming the norm  
at very high cost for the Belgian economy.  
Reforms on this front have been necessary for 
decades. Current efforts have certainly moved 
in the right direction, but have simultaneously 
stoked social tensions. Racial divisions have  
also widened since the terror attacks in Bel- 
gium and the rest of Europe. Anti-terror and  
anti-crime policies are an obvious necessity,  
but must be accompanied by significantly im-
proved integration policies. Some of these ef-
forts must start at the primary-school level or 
even before. However, education policies have 
been delegated to the subnational authorities, 
producing very unequal outcomes. For exam-
ple, Flanders fares well in international rank-
ings, whereas the French-speaking community 
fares very badly (in part due to a larger propor-
tion of socioeconomically deprived groups within 
this population).
Unemployment and poverty rates remain 
stubbornly high in Brussels, a city that attracts  
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Micael Castanheira
 Benoît Rihoux
 Nils C. Bandelow
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formance and the impact of increased economic 
growth in Europe. As a result, labor force  
participation and employment rates increased 
noticeably reaching record levels for the last  
25 years. These positive developments notwith-
standing, Bulgaria still faces serious challenges 
in terms of improving skills levels, innovation 
capacity and productivity. The country contin-
ues to lag severely in both public and private  
research and innovation funding. Other serious 
problems include the relatively low-skilled labor 
force, and the economic exclusion of people with 
low educational attainment and some minority 
groups. Three main challenges in this area re-
main, namely reform of the education sector to 
produce a more adequate skills base; negative 
demographic trends which, given the existing 
health care and pension systems, continue  
to squeeze the labor market; and the need  
to further increase labor-market flexibility. 
Recent years saw minor changes in electoral 
law and some attempts to reform the judiciary. 
In 2016, voting became obligatory, although the 
Executive Summary
The election of the opposition candidate for 
president, Rumen Radev, in November 2016 led 
to the resignation of the center-right Borissov 
government and early parliamentary elections  
in March 2017. However, Boyko Borissov’s  
Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 
(GERB) managed to win the parliamentary elec-
tions, while the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 
came second – more than five percentage points 
behind GERB. In April 2017, Borissov formed his 
third government, this time in coalition with the 
United Patriots – a formation of three extreme 
nationalist and xenophobic parties. The United 
Patriots’ electoral success is largely attributa-
ble to the hostile public reaction to the relatively 
small number of refugees residing in Bulgaria 
and failure of integration policies.
During the second and third Borissov gov-
ernments, economic performance improved due 
to the restoration of fiscal control, increased 
labor market flexibility, improved export per-
Bulgaria
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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governments were coalitions, which could have 
provided explicit coalition agreements precisely 
detailing policy coordination and responsibilities, 
Borissov and his key coalition partners chose to 
proceed in an informal manner without explicit 
agreements. This remains the case with the 2017 
government coalition between GERB and the ex-
treme United Patriots. Despite the lack of a clear 
coalition agreement, the United Patriots, at least 
as part of the government, have behaved more 
moderately than initially expected. 
The RIA framework was enhanced in 2016, 
even though initial evaluations of its first few 
months of implementation indicate only limited 
progress in strengthening impact assessments. 
Slow starts notwithstanding, the existence and 
operation of the independent Fiscal Council and 
the RIA framework promise better-informed 
legislation. The necessity for Bulgaria to formu-
late priorities and take a leadership position with 
respect to the EU agenda due to Bulgaria’s up-
coming Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union in the first half of 2018 may boost 
strategic planning and coordination capacity 
within government.
Internationally, Bulgaria continues to  
behave reactively on issues ranging from inter-
national financial stability to climate change,  
international democratic assistance and migra- 
tion. Even though migration is an important 
initial sanction for non-compliance was largely 
symbolic and later declared unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Court. Constitutional amend-
ments to the structure of the Supreme Judicial 
Council were adopted and the election of a new 
council in 2017 promises improvements to the 
judicial system, especially with respect to judges’ 
career development and independence. Imple-
mentation of anti-corruption reforms has been 
slow and yielded little in the way of palpable 
change, with a newly introduced reform package 
awaiting parliamentary ratification in late 2017. 
Traditional media remains nontransparent in 
terms of ownership, and serves narrow business 
and political interests. Overall, media independ-
ence and performance continues to deteriorate. 
Under the Borissov governments, the scope for 
popular decision-making was expanded signif-
icantly, with national referendums taking place 
on several occasions. The November 2016 ref-
erendum almost passed the approval threshold 
for becoming obligatory for parliament.
The executive’s institutional capacity to coor- 
dinate and plan strategically is limited. While EU 
membership has increased strategic planning, 
interministerial coordination is weak and there  
is no mechanism for regularly monitoring insti-
tutional arrangements. The second and third  
Borissov governments paid little attention to ad-
dressing these issues. Even though both Borissov 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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of the prosecution service. Presently, there are 
illicit mechanisms within an unaccountable  
judiciary that allow individuals to acquire  
privilege, and political and economic influence.  
These mechanisms contribute to the capture 
of the prosecution service by special interests 
with a political agenda. Consequently, legitimate 
businesses and entrepreneurs do not compete  
on a level playing field. While the new Supreme  
Judicial Council, in office since September 2017, 
has been evaluated as containing many more 
reputable and professional people than before, 
the council still selected a representative of the 
old status quo as chair of the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court, despite needing to establish and 
protect judicial independence and professional-
ism through its rules and appointments.
A second important reform area is education. 
The exclusion of various – especially minor- 
ity – groups from adequate education and labor- 
market participation, and low basic literacy 
rates need to be addressed. The promotion of a 
skilled and flexible labor force remains a major 
challenge. The Ministry of Education has pre-
sented reform proposals that point in a desira-
ble direction, but they need to be implemented 
and supplemented by further reforms.
A third challenging area is the health care 
and pension systems. Negative demographic 
trends impose a substantial financial and  
political challenge on both social systems,  
making them financially unsustainable, easy 
 victims for political opportunism and a heavy 
burden on the economy. These weaknesses need 
to be addressed to improve their financial and 
social sustainability.
Fourth, despite visible improvements over 
the last decade, infrastructure must continue to 
be enhanced, especially at the regional level.
Politically, Bulgaria’s most significant chal-
lenge is the fragmentation of the political party 
system observed over the last two parliaments.  
In particular, the resurgence of nationalist  
and xenophobic parties increases the likelihood 
that parties and social groups opposing reform 
will prevent the formation of government major-
ities willing and able to address Bulgaria’s key  
challenges.
issue in domestic Bulgarian politics, the country 
remains incapable of formulating a concise and 
well-defined position. While it never obstructs 
measures aimed at developing the framework for 
international cooperation, it is also never among 
the drivers of international cooperation.
Key Challenges
Bulgaria’s party system over the last decade has 
been dominated by two parties of the center-left 
and center-right, with various configurations 
of smaller parties representing an increasingly 
fragmented political space around them. Govern-
ment majorities have been secured through the 
formation of coalitions. However, these coalitions 
have tended to be unstable, leading to three con-
secutive early elections in 2013, 2014 and 2017.
The potential for political instability repre-
sents a major challenge facing the country,  
since instability inevitably affects both the  
government’s ability to adopt a long-term per-
spective and the economy’s ability to sustain  
economic growth. The negative effects of the 
fluidity of the party system and the frequent 
changes in government have been partly mit-
igated by the fact that the country has had the 
same prime minister and the same party leading 
the ruling coalitions for most of the last decade. 
Increased governance experience of the prime 
minister and main government party may lead  
to improvements in the capacity of the govern-
ment to develop strategies, and coordinate and 
assess policies.
In the past, Bulgaria managed to generate 
rapid economic growth primarily by attracting 
foreign capital and adding previously unoccupied 
low-skilled labor to the workforce. Today, these 
mechanisms for generating economic growth 
are no longer available and Bulgaria needs to 
strengthen its internal growth drivers. While 
economic growth over the 2015–2017 period has 
been relatively strong, and economic activity and 
employment have reached record levels since the 
beginning of the current transition, the potential 
of key economic drivers – such as raising skills 
levels, innovation capacity, productivity and pol-
icy effectiveness – remains a serious challenge.
Judicial reform will be key to Bulgaria’s abil-
ity to meet these challenges, particularly reform 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org  Georgy Ganev, Maria Popova, Frank Bönker
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Canada
Country profile SGI 2018
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and 
Canada came into effect in 2017, and Canada has 
been renegotiating the terms of NAFTA since  
August 2017. The government has also revised 
national security laws to reign in the powers of 
security agencies and create an oversight com-
mittee to improve accountability. Balancing the 
needs of the country’s oil and gas sector against 
concerns for the environment, Prime Minister 
Trudeau worked with the provinces to establish  
a pan-Canadian framework for carbon pricing, 
energy efficiency and renewable energy strategies,  
while at the same time approving two highly 
contentious crude oil pipelines and expressing 
support for Keystone XL. The Liberals have also 
delivered on their promise to strengthen evi-
dence-based policymaking. The government has 
consulted with experts, making ample use of ad-
visory boards for policymaking, and created new 
departmental positions designed to incorporate 
evidence into the policymaking process. 
Executive Summary
Canada has been performing well eco- 
nomically, unemployment rates are at their 
lowest since 2008 and the government’s fiscal 
situation is strengthening. Two years into their 
mandate, the Liberals under Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau continue to implement an  
ambitious policy agenda involving additional  
tax dollars for innovation and infrastructure, 
pension reform and tax reductions for the  
middle classes, and support for oil projects  
balanced against action on climate change.  
With respect to SGI criteria, Canada continues  
to receive high scores on economy, taxes and 
budgets. The government continued to focus  
on fiscal stimulus, which seems to be having  
the desired effect. Stephen Poloz, governor of  
the Bank of Canada, recently credited the newly 
introduced Canada Child Benefit program with 
the country’s strong economic performance, 
which in turn has helped to keep budget deficits 
below projected levels. 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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Budget Officer to preform audits requested by 
members of parliament, a mechanism frequently 
used by opposition members of parliament to 
hold the government to account on policy deci-
sions. This restriction has put the public’s ability 
to properly scrutinize policy proposals in jeop-
ardy. The SGI indicators on accountability reflect 
this and will further decline in years to come if 
the Liberals remain on this path.
On the positive side, since its election,  
the government has renewed efforts to mend  
relationships between First Nations and indige-
nous groups. Canada finally adopted the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People. Following a recommendation of the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples report 
(1996), the ministry responsible for indigenous 
affairs was split into one department focused  
on facilitating a nation-to-nation relationship, 
and a second dedicated to providing quality 
public services to indigenous people across the 
country. These changes have been widely praised, 
but in view of the continued challenges experi-
enced by Canada’s indigenous groups, indigenous 
leaders and scholars have called for more mean-
ingful change rather than symbolic gestures. 
Halfway through their term, there is no 
doubt that the Liberals have made progress in 
several critical areas of sustainable governance. 
The vast majority of this progress came during 
Some glaring gaps between what the Liber- 
als pledged and what they have accomplished 
since taking power in 2015 remain, however. 
The largely rookie government started out  
with a host of new initiatives and bold reforms, 
but quickly learned that structural reforms often 
run into organizational and administrative obsta-
cles, do not happen overnight, and in any event 
tend to develop a life of their own. In early 2017, 
after months of public consultations, the Liberals 
abandoned one of their central election promises, 
namely changing the first-past-the-post elec-
toral system. Shortly after, they had to back down 
on parliamentary reform. Most recently, their 
planned overhaul of corporate taxation has en-
countered fierce opposition from small businesses 
and professionals, and may yet be abandoned. 
Although the Trudeau government tried to 
distance itself from the previous Conservative 
government in terms of transparency and ac-
countability, little headway has been made.  
Access to information requests have piled up 
and processing continues to be slow. A first at-
tempt at revamping access to information laws 
met with harsh criticism. Although the legisla-
tion would give the information commissioner 
the power to order the release of records, the re-
forms do not apply to the Prime Minister’s Of-
fice or other ministerial offices. The government 
also limited the powers of the Parliamentary 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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NAFTA talks are currently at an impasse and 
delays are expected due to what senior officials 
have called “significant conceptual gaps.” Pres-
ident Trump threatened to scrap NAFTA in the 
event that a deal is not reached. With the United 
States as Canada’s largest trading partner, a lot 
is at stake. 
Bill C-59 is the Liberals’ response to the con-
troversial Bill C-51 passed by the Conservatives. 
However, civil rights organizations have voiced 
their concerns about the excessive powers of se-
curity agencies and information sharing that will 
remain. It is unclear if the government is plan-
ning to revise the bill, but if the issues are not 
addressed the legislation is likely to be chal-
lenged as unconstitutional.
One of the aspects that set Trudeau apart 
from his predecessor in the election campaign 
was Trudeau’s pledge to lead a more open, trans-
parent and accountable government. However, 
despite significant changes in the day-to-day 
transparency of the Prime Minister’s Office and 
departmental mandates, the issue remains fun-
damentally unresolved. Planned legislation to  
reform access to information (Bill C-58) has  
been heavily criticized as “a step backward” and 
may undermine the government’s credibility  
regarding key issues. Similarly, after the Liber-
als formally abandoned electoral reform, advo-
cacy groups called on the Ethics Commissioner 
of Canada to rule on whether Prime Minister 
Trudeau’s decision violated ethics codes. A formal 
investigation into the matter would be damaging 
to the government’s image and public trust. 
Improving the well-being of First Nations  
in Canada remains a major challenge for the 
government. The Liberals reinstated previously 
frozen funding for First Nations, but it will be 
years before the effects of this are measurable. 
Many of the government’s promises remain un-
fulfilled, such as ending the boil water advisories 
on reserves by providing clean water within five 
years. Implementing the U.N. declaration will re-
quire substantial restructuring of departmental 
mandates to ensure that policymaking respects 
indigenous rights, which may not be desirable 
from the perspective of bureaucrats. 
Although the Liberals under Trudeau have 
moved forward in several areas of sustainable 
governance, there is still plenty of room for  
improvement as well as the potential to regress.  
2016, their first year in office, when there were 
notable gains in policy performance and exec-
utive capacity. Meanwhile, 2017 saw very lit-
tle movement in the SGI indicators, as many of 
the Liberals’ planned structural reforms have 
stalled or been abandoned. Instead, the govern-
ment seems to be shifting gear toward policies 
that deliver more immediate results.
Key Challenges
In its latest (October 2017) economic outlook, 
the IMF estimated that Canada’s GDP will grow 
3 percentage points in 2017, the highest of the 
G7 countries. Projections for 2018 are somewhat 
lower. Yet, at 2.1%, the IMF’s 2018 growth forecast 
for Canada is topped only by its forecast for the 
United States. Justin Trudeau and his cabinet can 
thus expect a solid economy for the second half of 
their term in office. Whether the situation south of 
the border is detrimental or beneficial to Canada 
has yet to be determined. On the one hand, trade 
with the United States will be negatively impacted 
if NAFTA renegotiations fail. On the other hand, 
a number of initiatives proposed by the Trudeau 
government, which are designed to attract invest-
ment and simplify the hiring of high-skilled for-
eign labor, will likely benefit from the Trump ad-
ministration’s protectionist stance. The country’s 
ability to absorb people from diverse cultures will 
help mitigate the growing gap in the prime work-
ing-age population, although it is important to 
note that recent immigrants do not fare as well in 
Canada’s job market as Canadian-born workers.
Many items on the government’s policy 
agenda are still pending and some may face  
serious obstacles. Two of the government’s sig-
nature projects, the Canada Infrastructure Bank 
and the Invest Canada Hub, are not yet up and 
running. The Canada Infrastructure Bank, which 
aims to attract private investment for public  
infrastructure, has been criticized for a lack of 
transparency and concerns were raised that it 
has the potential to increase overall costs to tax-
payers while privatizing the most high-return, 
low-risk infrastructure assets. There have been 
very few details released on the Invest in Canada 
Hub, but some worry it may not be able to attract 
substantial investment under excessive regula-
tory provisions. 
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in controversies over minor policy proposals. 
With two years left before the next election and 
the economy humming along strongly, the Lib-
erals should have enough time and resources to 
deliver on their more ambitious projects.
Initiatives that address overdue institutional re-
forms, which were once praised, have resulted in 
inadequate legislation or have been abandoned. 
Success will depend on whether economic policy 
ideas (particularly with respect to infrastructure 
investment and innovation) have the desired ef-
fect and whether the government can revisit in-
stitutional change without getting caught up  
Chile
Country profile SGI 2018
the return of democracy. But despite this sound 
macroeconomic performance, Chile is still fac- 
ing structural challenges which impede equal 
participation in economic growth and the  
active claim of social rights, especially by the 
more vulnerable population.
Strongly polarized political discourses and 
positions, which are still marked by an ideolog-
ical division inherited from the Cold War and 
Executive Summary
In accordance with the decision of the Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC), Chile left the 
group of countries eligible for Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) in October 2017. There is 
no doubt that this “graduation” reflects the eco-
nomic and social development the country has 
undertaken during the past two decades since 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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tives of important state institutions, inclu- 
ding the national tax authority, the police and  
the military, which have been evaluated in  
public opinion polls during the past twenty  
years as among the most trusted institutions. 
Political institutions have a bad reputation  
because it is widely known that many of the 
current influential political and economic ac-
tors are interrelated due to direct family bonds 
or business relations. Also, public officials tend 
to abuse their position by sharing high-level 
political and administrative posts only within 
this very limited oligarchic circle. The govern-
ment has responded to recent corruption scan-
dals by introducing more restrictive regulations 
on party and campaign-finance. Nevertheless, 
political disaffection is growing. Participation in 
the October 2016 communal elections dropped 
to a historical low of 35 %, a clear indication of 
widespread discontent among the Chilean popu-
lation, irrespective of their political background.
All these aspects explain the growing  
discontent with national politicians and politics 
in general, especially among the younger pop-
ulation and in middle-income households – a 
development that notably influenced the 2017 
presidential elections.
 Chile is a particularly heterogeneous coun-
try, yet economic and political power remains 
highly centralized in the capital Santiago.  
Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, in combi-
nation with high constitutional barriers to im-
plementing structural changes have impeded 
essential pension reforms and efforts to decen-
tralize. In addition, the country has not man-
aged to significantly reduce poverty levels or 
close the gap on income inequality.
The prevailing legacy of Augusto Pinochet’s 
military government must be taken into account 
in any evaluation of the country’s democracy 
and governance. Turbulence under the Salvador 
Allende government and subsequent military 
dictatorship led to a political culture that fa-
vors consensus and avoids conflict. Key actors 
and citizens generally tend to favor the status 
quo and harmony. Nevertheless, social tensions 
are rising in the OECD’s most neoliberal country. 
Official and unofficial strikes as well as protests 
lead to violence and police repression with rela-
tive frequency. Student protests of recent years 
appear to be have replaced by protests against 
the pension system, and the indigenous conflict 
in the country’s south has worsened.
Strongly agitated by several far-reaching 
corruption scandals that involved both right-
wing and left-wing politicians and parties, 
Chile’s traditional political camp pattern seems 
to have changed significantly for the first time 
since the return to democracy in 1990. Some  
serious cases of corruption involved representa-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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cially in the field of taxes, education and the  
binominal election system) might prove to serve 
as cornerstones for the country´s positive devel-
opment in the long run.
Key Challenges
Although Chile, an OECD member, has under-
gone a considerable and successful moderniza-
tion process in recent years, it continues to face 
serious challenges in closing the gap with more 
developed countries – as well as the gap between 
the rich and privileged and poor and margin-
alized sectors within the country. The Bachelet 
government has only partially succeeded in im-
plementing its ambitious political, economic and 
social reform agenda. A lack of consensus and 
financial resources (due to the downswing of the 
commodity prices which largely determine the 
country´s macroeconomic performance) holds 
back wider reform aspirations on tax, labor, 
pension, education and health care policies,  
as well as constitutional reforms.
Long-term challenges:
Political and strategic planning is undermined 
by a lack of state capacities and instruments to 
ensure policymaking has a medium- to long-
term perspective, especially in the case of so-
cial, economic and ethnic issues. A lack of polit-
ical and economic decentralization also hampers 
efficiency. Chile is one of the most centralized 
OECD countries despite its economic, geographic 
and ethnic diversity. Neither poverty rates nor 
socioeconomic disparities have been signifi-
cantly reduced. Chile remains one of the most 
unequal countries in the region and OECD.  
This has consequences for the whole social  
system, but the effects are particularly palpable 
in education, health care and pension policies.  
The lower-middle class is highly indebted and 
faces strong social pressure to consume. Many 
middle-income families struggle to maintain 
their living standards; if one wage earner loses a 
job or falls ill, families almost immediately have 
to significantly lower their living standard. The 
enormous gap between the quality of the poorly 
funded public education system (where per stu-
dent expenditure tends to be less than half the 
OECD average) and its expensive private coun-
terpart renders the elimination of structural 
Consequently, regional and local interests  
are often not sufficiently reflected in national  
policymaking. Also, unresolved ethnic conflicts 
often trigger a response by the state that,  
at times, fails to respect the civil and political 
rights of ethnic minorities (e.g., the Mapuche). 
In addition, certain forms of political discrimi-
nation inherited from the military dictator- 
ship remain. For example, convicts with a prison  
sentence exceeding three years are barred from 
voting. Furthermore, convicts with less severe 
sentences and individuals in custody are de  
facto excluded from suffrage as institutional 
structures do not provide the necessary inter- 
nal procedures to guarantee their constitutional 
right to participate in elections.
The downside of Chile’s relatively stable  
political system has been low citizen participa- 
tion in politics. The country lacks mechanisms 
of direct democracy and citizen participation 
that could promote citizens’ interests as well as 
public (vertical) accountability. Even the media 
is unable to fulfill its role as the fourth estate. 
Chile’s oligopolistic media system shows strong 
biases in the expression and depiction of var-
ious political, social and economic positions. 
This constrains pluralistic public debate, espe-
cially on highly ideological topics such as eco-
nomic inequality and the country’s military past. 
Nevertheless, both the audit office and congres-
sional control over the government work quite 
well (horizontal accountability).
Although Chile’s economy and gross in- 
come per capita have consistently grown over 
the last decade, the country remains extremely  
dependent on copper exports. Consequently, 
Chile is highly vulnerable to instability in this 
commodity’s international price. Also, poverty 
rates and wealth inequality did not show signif-
icant changes during the period under review. 
According to the Gini index, Chile’s degree of 
income inequality is among the most extreme  
in Latin America.
In general terms, the government under 
President Michelle Bachelet has continued to 
pursue its reform ambitions. However, several 
reform needs have not been thoroughly addressed 
and implemented reforms have often had to be 
significantly scaled back in order to win con-
gressional approval. Nevertheless, the reforms 
that have been successfully introduced (espe-
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of citizens and members of the parliament  
(Convención Constituyente mixta), an elected 
constituent assembly (Asamblea Constituyente) 
or a plebiscite to let citizens choose between one 
of the previously mentioned options.
poverty and socioeconomic disparities much 
more difficult. Additionally, the private educa-
tion system is largely controlled by economic 
and political elites, both in government and the 
opposition. In this context, the effect of educa-
tion reform, especially the end of state-subsi-
dies for private and profit-oriented educational 
institutions within the primary and secondary 
education, will be shown in the medium term.
Short- and middle-term challenges:
In the general election of November 2017  
(beyond the review period), former president  
Sebastián Piñera received the highest number 
of votes in the first round (36.6 %) and won 
the runoff for the presidency (54.6 %). During 
the new congressional period 2018-2022, Chile 
Vamos, the coalition of four center-right parties 
that he leads, will hold 46 % of the mandates in 
the lower chamber and 44 % of the mandates in 
the upper chamber. Due to the impact of gender 
quotas, the share of women has significantly  
increased in both chambers: 22.5 % of deputies 
and 26 % of senators.
In his electoral campaign and particularly 
during the runoff, Piñera pursued a moderate 
course that even considered the extension of fee-
free education, a demand closely associated with 
the political left. At the same time, he was able 
to mobilize votes against his opponent Alejandro 
Guillier, arguing that a Guillier-led government 
would lead Chile down a dangerous path similar 
to that observed in Venezuela (“Chilezuela”). 
Since he will lack an absolute majority in 
congress and widespread social demands call  
for a stronger and more centralized state role, 
some convergence to the center will be needed 
to get support for political initiatives. A series 
of economic and labor reforms are expected in 
order to put Chile on the path to growth. Chile 
Vamos’ proposal includes lowering corporate  
tax rates. 
In addition to other ongoing reforms,  
the newly elected parliament will have to make 
decisions regarding the proper institutional 
mechanism for the constitutional reform process 
initiated by the outgoing Bachelet government, 
since the constitution does not foresee any crite-
ria for reform or replacement. Procedural options 
which are being discussed include a bicameral 
parliamentary commission (Comisión Bicam-
eral), a mixed constituent convention consisting 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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 Martin Thunert
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Despite initial fears, the economic fallout  
of the Agrokor crisis has remained limited.  
The Croatian economy kept growing by about  
3 % of real GDP in 2017. The strong growth con-
tributed to a further decline in the unemploy-
ment rate and helped to bring down the fiscal 
deficit. However, the Agrokor crisis had a nega-
tive effect on the government’s willingness and  
ability to adopt much-needed policy and insti- 
tutional reforms. After a comprehensive tax  
reform in late 2016, which had been prepared by 
Minister of Finance Marić already under the pre-
vious government, the government largely failed 
to carry out other reforms. The pending reform 
of school curricula has regained momentum only 
since autumn 2017. As it stands, pilot projects for 
the implementation of the reform in 3 %-5 % of 
schools will not begin before fall 2018. The only 
step taken so far has been to make computer sci-
ence, which has so far been an elective subject, 
a compulsory course in the 5th and 6th grade 
of elementary schools. Little progress was also 
Executive Summary
Having won the parliamentary election in Sep-
tember 2016, the center-right HDZ (Croatian 
Democratic Union) held power throughout the 
observed period, with Andrej Plenković as Cro-
atia’s new prime minister. HDZ first formed a 
center-right coalition government with the cen-
trist party MOST (Bridge), which mustered a very 
solid majority in the Sabor (Croatian parliament). 
The two parties fell out with each other in May 
2017, when a crisis hit Agrokor, Croatia’s biggest 
company, and when MOST insisted that Finance 
Minister Zdravko Marić be removed from office 
(as he had been employed in Agrokor before 
joining the government). A new coalition was 
thus formed in June 2017, when representatives 
of the center-left HNS (Croatian Peoples Party) 
entered the Plenković government, securing it a 
paper-thin parliamentary majority. This led to a 
split in HNS; some of its members of parliament, 
like former foreign minister Vesna Pusić, left the 
party and founded a new, liberal party Glas.
Croatia
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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Key Challenges
For a number of years, Croatia has failed to  
find a proper way of coping with the fundamen-
tal challenges that have a crucial effect on the 
country’s socioeconomic development. Due to 
the lack of adequate answers that had character-
ized almost all of Croatia’s successive govern-
ments since the beginning of the EU accession 
negotiations in 2005, the country is significantly 
lagging behind most of the Central and Eastern 
European EU member states. This has created a 
strong feeling of hopelessness, manifesting in 
the markedly high emigration rates attaining 
alarming proportions in some parts of the coun-
try (e.g., in Slavonia). 
The first set of policy challenges the Plenk-
ović government will have to face includes  
sustaining the fiscal discipline and the initial 
successes in the reduction of budget deficit and 
public debt. However, targeted public expendi-
ture reduction policies, very important for any 
lasting sustainability of the fiscal achievements, 
are not even in sight. Indeed, the government 
decided to substantially increase the funds allo-
cated for some public expenditure items such  
as disbursements for Homeland War veterans.  
The next question within fiscal issues is related 
to new fiscal sources that could contribute sub-
stantially to the sustainability of the public  
made with the reforms of public administration 
initiated under the previous governments.
In political terms, the Agrokor crisis has once 
again demonstrated the co-mingling of economic 
and political interests in Croatia. Despite various 
announcement, the two Plenković governments 
have done little to improve the quality of democ-
racy. They have left the large differences in the 
number of voters per constituency, a fundamental 
lack of the electoral system in Croatia, untouched, 
have failed to adopt the promised new media 
strategy and have continued to exert substantial 
influence on the media. Attempts at a further re-
form of the judiciary by Ante Šprlje, the MOST 
nominated minister of justice in the first Plenk-
ović government, were abandoned after his dis-
missal and the change in the governing coalition 
in May 2017. In the period of review, a number 
of acquittals of prominent accused have demon-
strated the Croatian court’s lack of effectiveness 
and independence. While the main anti-corrup-
tion office, the USKOK (Ured za Suzbijanje  
Korupcije i Organiziranog Kriminala, Croatian 
State Prosecutor’s Office for the Suppression of 
Organized Crime and Corruption), and the par-
liament’s commission for the conflict of interests 
have been quite active in opening and investigat-
ing cases, the courts have often failed to sanction 
corruption, be it because of outside pressure or 
simply a lack of competence.
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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ment model. The continuation of education  
reform is also long overdue. The implementation 
of the fundamental reform of the school curric-
ula that has been prepared since 2014 and was 
further delayed, should become a reform priority. 
In order to address these policy challenges, 
public governance needs to be improved. The re-
liance on academic expertise, interministerial 
coordination as well as the quality of regulatory 
impact assessment should be increased and the 
often-announced reform of public administra-
tion should eventually be implemented. As it 
stands, Croatian public administration is both 
highly centralized and fragmented at the same 
time, often with a blurred division of compe-
tences between the central authority and local 
authorities.
finance. This particularly refers to increasing  
the efficiency of drawing assistance from EU 
funds– something that places Croatia far be-
hind the comparable countries – and to a much 
more successful sale of the government property.  
The latter one is of particular importance, given 
the fact that the government gave up the intro-
duction of the property tax.
The second set of policy challenges has to 
do with Croatia’s unfavorable business environ-
ment.  High administrative expenses and quasi 
taxation, the huge number and the slowing issu-
ing of permits required for running business,  
inefficient judicial system with lengthy legal 
proceedings and a huge backlog of unsolved 
cases and the still inadequate condition of land 
register are important reasons for the rather  
low competitiveness of Croatian enterprises.  
The steps undertaken in this area in late 2016 
and in 2017 were more than insufficient; most of 
the announced steps were never implemented or 
implemented only partially.
The third set of challenges concerns the labor 
market and pension policy. Although the un-
employment rate continued to drop, numerous 
structural weaknesses have remained. The key 
challenges here concern the development of the 
measures required for a mid-term increase of 
the activity rate of Croatia’s working-age popu-
lation, which is still among the lowest in the EU. 
An additional problem here is the fact that the 
country’s working-age population has been  
decreasing because of a negative population 
growth and a very high population drain due  
to economic emigration. Also, the system still 
offers the possibility of early retirement, the 
percentage of disability pensions is very high  
and so is the share of privileged pensions  
(more than 20 %), with the war veterans’ pen-
sions accounting for most of the latter ones. 
The fourth set of challenges concerns some 
fundamental public services. In the health care 
system, the continued huge losses of this mon-
ey-losing system are periodically covered by 
special transfers from the state budget funds 
earmarked for covering the health care system 
losses. Croatia therefore faces major challenges 
in increasing the efficiency of this system, which 
is to include the consolidation of the health care 
public procurement system, mergers of hospitals 
and finding a more efficient hospital-manage-
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Zdravko Petak
 William Bartlett
 Frank Bönker
111
Country profiles
Cyprus
Country profile SGI 2018
icy proposals for long overdue reforms. In ad-
dition to the obligation to pay back its debt, the 
MoU committed the government to develop sus-
tainable policies and structures. Financial indi-
cators showed sustained and better than fore-
cast performance in 2017. Nonetheless, the pace 
of systemic and structural reforms continued to 
be slower than planned. In addition, some policy 
decisions appeared to be guided primarily by po-
litical expediency, contradicting previous policy 
positions and fiscal principles.
Democratic processes and institutions  
continued to function satisfactorily, though  
several indicators (e.g., rule of law and access  
to information) revealed weaknesses that im-
pede Cyprus’s democracy. The administrative 
system remains slow to respond and inefficient, 
in part a consequence of measures pushed under 
the MoU. Democratic practices involving citi-
zen participation and consultation as well as the 
promotion of fundamental rights, such as equal-
ity, received little or no political consideration. 
Clientelistic relationships persist in Cyprian pol-
Executive Summary
Following Cyprus’s successful exit from its 
bailout agreement with international lenders, 
post-program surveillance by creditors contin-
ued into 2017. Strong fiscal policy performance 
was sustained and even improved upon. Favora-
ble conditions increased the vital flow of tourists 
and, thereby, income; the latter also assisted by 
growth in the construction sector. The danger  
of economic collapse that emerged in 2011 ap-
pears to have receded, nevertheless risks for the 
economy remain. The government must resolve 
deficiencies in the economy as well as imple-
ment reforms to the system and its structures.  
The broadly recognized need for greater strate-
gic planning and policy-implementation capaci-
ties has not received the necessary level of atten-
tion. Current reform efforts insufficiently focus 
on ending the unmeritocratic hiring system that 
continues to undermine state capacities.
A memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
with creditors led the government to design pol-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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improvements, measures and policies for the 
social inclusion of migrants and asylum seekers 
remain below international standards. The same 
holds true for environmental policies, where EU 
observes note a general failure to implement the 
law. Thus far the government has insisted on 
favoring land development at the expense of en-
vironmental conservation, placing Cyprus below 
EU standards on many environmental measures. 
In 2017, disagreements and confrontations 
persisted. Proposals by the executive for reforms 
were rejected by the parliament, causing further 
delays to the implementation of essential re-
form policies. The banking system, and economy 
more generally, continue to suffer, burdened by 
foreclosures and non-performing loans. The fu-
ture of quasi-governmental institutions pending 
privatization remains unclear. 
Favoritism in political appointments and po-
litically motivated interference with institutional 
functions remain challenges. At the same time, 
public sector reforms aimed at developing stra-
tegic-planning capacity, fiscal responsibility and 
stronger regulation appeared to have slowed or 
stalled. These deficits combine with a reluctance 
to comply with adopted rules and the absence of 
a coordinating body necessary for control. When 
action is taken, lack of policy skill and an effec-
tive administrative culture are obstacles to sus-
tainable results.
itics. As a result of legislation passed in 2015, 
for the first time, transparency in political party 
funding was effected, albeit with limitations. No 
final evaluation of this legislation is yet possible. 
Anti-corruption rhetoric coexisted with enforce-
ment, yielding new corruption prosecutions, but 
interference from government and political par-
ties continued. Despite the launch of an admin-
istrative court in 2016, the dispensing of justice 
remains unacceptably slow.
Progress has been made in implement- 
ing some new legal frameworks, including on 
banking system oversight. Fiscal performance 
and workforce unemployment were again bet- 
ter than forecasted. Unemployment in Septem-
ber 2017 was down to 10.3 % (2015: 15.9 %).  
The government abolished the immovable prop-
erty tax and opened a discussion on whether and 
how to re-establish salaries, pensions, benefits 
and family-support measures to previous lev-
els. A guaranteed minimum income and targeted 
measures have already mitigated the negative 
effects cuts have had on the living conditions of 
pensioners and other groups.
The overall share of persons at risk of  
poverty and social exclusion declined slightly 
in 2016. The rate increased for pensioners and 
declined slightly for immigrants (both EU and 
non-EU), the two most vulnerable groups,  
followed by single women over 65. Despite  
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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term and managing hydrocarbon issues as a  
medium-term target may be part of this re-
structuring of the economy.
As stressed by the European Commission  
in 2017, the tax system requires revision so that 
taxation increases equality. Solving challenges 
in tax collection and tax avoidance remain im-
perative. While the system should treat all per-
sons equitably, the fair reallocation of resources 
should be the system’s goal; adequate funding 
of family, pension, health care and other welfare 
policies would enhance social equity. A medi-
um-term target should aim at gradually return-
ing to a functioning welfare state, rather than 
simply reducing the risk of poverty.
A sustainable recovery is only viable through 
efficient policies promoting greater transpar-
ency and enhancing law enforcement’s ability 
confine the margins of discretion that make  
corruption possible. Efficient oversight of corpo-
rate governance through clear monitoring mech-
anisms is still needed. A proper evaluation of the 
implementation of the law on party and elections 
funding would further assist efforts to increase 
transparency. Transparency is urgently needed 
on most policies, including on media ownership 
and the criteria and procedures governing ap-
pointments to public bodies.
The attainment of these diverse goals will  
require the government to accelerate the de-
velopment of strategic-planning capacities and 
more effective policy implementation. For swift 
progress, governing bodies with clear mandates 
for coordination and coherent action are urgently 
required. Reforms of state structures and proce-
dures at the central and local government levels 
can only advance units with sufficient strategic 
capacity. A governing body with sufficient pow-
ers and resources to evaluate laws and policy 
proposals remains a critical objective.
Overcoming favoritism to place capable  
managers in key positions remains a major  
challenge. Plans to develop strategic-planning 
capacities, and ultimately broad-based sustaina-
bility, will only be successful when a meritocratic 
administrative culture prevails.
Key Challenges
The main challenges Cyprus faces today remain 
the same as those identified in the bailout agree-
ment. What is needed now though is increased 
resolve for change and willingness to comply 
with new policies. Policy actions aimed at pre-
venting another crisis must go beyond solving 
the economic crisis. Given the negative reper-
cussions of policy measures already taken, ad-
ditional remedies will require close monitor-
ing and repeated reassessment. Anticipating and, 
in some cases, addressing possible repercus-
sions will be necessary. The government must 
recognize that the current crisis extends beyond 
the economy. Improvements in performance on 
some indicators must not weaken the resolve to 
engage resolutely in structural and procedural 
reforms. Successfully implementing these re-
forms also requires avoiding a return to the gov-
ernment’s past administrative culture; what are 
needed now are sound goals and operational  
efficiency. Deepening respect for and enhancing 
fundamental democratic practices warrants  
administrative consolidation.
Within the financial sector, the government 
must solve longstanding challenges to reestab-
lish trust in the economy and increase the coun-
try’s international competitiveness. The effective 
settlement of non-performing loans would have 
positive effects on banks and the market.  
Clarifying policies on the privatization of qua-
si-governmental institutions also remains a  
necessity, to avoid their market value declining, 
which would harm stakeholders.
In the interest of sustainability, social and en-
vironmental policies must be radically reformed 
and considered holistically. The persistently  
excessive emphasis on business and financial  
interests should instead shift to favoring broader 
social benefits. The development of reliable infra-
structure – expanding public transportation and 
reducing the excessive use of private cars – would 
benefit the economy, environment and society. 
The economy must be restructured to reduce its 
reliance on deeply business-cycle-dependent sec-
tors; today’s tourism and construction successes 
should not distract from this need for change.  
The country’s economic success should be shifted 
to productive sectors, including research and in-
novation. Building planning capacity in the short 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Christophoros Christophorou, Heinz-Jürgen 
Axt, Roy Karadag
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seriously weakened – with only 7 % of the votes 
for ČSSD compared with 20 % in 2013 – and 
Babiš’s ANO emerged as the biggest party with 
30 % of the votes. 
Despite the tensions in the governing coali-
tion, the Sobotka government was able to fulfill  
a number of popular campaign promises.  
These achievements include the lowering of the 
fiscal deficit, raising of public sector salaries 
(particularly in health and education), increases 
in pensions and in the minimum wage, more  
police personnel and accelerated drawing of EU 
funds. However, the government failed to suc-
cessfully implement an education reform. While 
it succeeded in expanding public R&D funding, 
it has only taken initial steps toward realizing a 
newly announced strategy on economic devel-
opment. Despite accelerating economic growth 
in 2017, weaknesses will remain for the long 
term. Much of public investment is funded by EU 
structural funds; their extension beyond the end 
of the current funding period in 2020 is increas-
ingly questionable. The increasing volume of 
Executive Summary
From January 2014 to the parliamentary elec-
tions in October 2017, the Czech Republic was 
governed by a coalition government led by Prime 
Minister Bohuslav Sobotka of the Czech Social 
Democratic Party (ČSSD). Junior coalition part-
ners included the Movement of Dissatisfied  
Citizens (ANO), led by billionaire Andrej Babiš, 
and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL). Babiš 
served as deputy prime minister and minister 
of finance. Tensions in the coalition grew as 
ANO began to outperform ČSSD in opinion polls 
and won the 2016 regional elections. Following a 
fraud investigation by the European Anti-Fraud 
Office and the Czech police and the publication 
of evidence he used his media businesses against 
political rivals, Babiš was dismissed in May 2017. 
The public perception of Babiš’s dismissal was 
generally ambivalent. Public support for the 
prime minister’s ČSSD continued to slump,  
leading to Sobotka’s resignation as party chair. 
Elections in October 2017 left the political left  
Czech Republic
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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Since the shift from indirect to direct presi-
dential elections in January 2013, the institutional 
structures of governing in the Czech Republic 
have undergone no major changes. The Sobotka 
goverment sought to improve its strategic ca-
pacity by bringing in more expert advice and in-
creasing public consultation. There remains very 
little interministerial cooperation, especially 
across party lines. The Czech parliament has the 
means to exercise substantial control over the 
government. It has a separate audit office that 
monitors public bodies and the implementation 
of its recommendations. An ombuds office in-
vestigates complaints against public institutions 
but has no powers beyond publishing its find-
ings. The internal structures of the main politi-
cal parties allow for both the election of leaders 
and members of principal bodies, but the internal 
debate is limited and divisions became evident 
in 2017. The appearance of new political forces – 
such as Okamura’s Freedom and Direct Democ-
racy and the Czech Pirate Party, which both took 
11% of the vote in 2017 – make it even less clear 
what real power ordinary members may have.
Key Challenges
The parliamentary elections in October 2017 have 
made the formation of a new and stable govern-
R&D funding, mostly redirected into applied  
research, fails to generate competitive and in-
novative output, while underfunded primary re-
search is undergoing an increasing brain drain. 
A shortage of skilled labor hampers the transi-
tion to a more innovative economy, but Czech 
society remains opposed to integrating migrants. 
Though the number of refugees remained small, 
mainstream politicians, including President 
Zeman, Deputy Prime Minister Babiš, Minister 
of Interior Chovanec, and the radical right leader 
Okamura, aroused fears of a threat to national 
security, values, and identity posed by migrants 
(including Muslims) and a unified Europe.  
Amplified by the media, this discourse under-
mined any discussion about the country’s interna-
tional responsibility. Notwithstanding, the Czech 
Republic continued to comply with the Dublin III 
framework and resumed accepting refugees. 
The 2017 parliamentary elections were the 
first held under the new party and campaign  
finance rules. To run for office, Babiš was re-
quired to divest his property and media, which 
he transferred into two blind funds, albeit con-
trolled by long-term Agrofert employees, his 
wife and adult children. These measures aimed 
at strengthening media independence and plu-
ralism as well as reducing corruption. Their ef-
fectiveness will be tested by what occurs after 
Babiš’s victory in the elections. 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
Policy Performance Democracy
Sweden
Norway
Denmark
 Iceland
 Czech Republic
 Latvia
Mexico
Turkey
Greece
8.16
7.77
7.72
6.37
6.29
6.29
6.17
4.78
4.74
4.52
1
2
3
16
17
17
39
40
41
1
2
3
19
20
21
39
40
41
Sweden
Finland
Norway
 Austria
 Czech Republic
 Netherlands
Mexico
Hungary
Turkey
9.19
9.15
8.93
7.36
7.31
7.30
7.05
4.67
3.50
2.96
Ra
nk
in
g
Ra
nk
in
g
SGI AverageSGI Average
Governance
1
2
3
26
27
28
39
40
41
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
 Japan
 Czech Republic
 Malta
Croatia
Romania
Cyprus
8.39
8.36
8.27
6.31
6.14
6.04
5.85
4.75
4.64
4.47
Ra
nk
in
g
SGI Average
116
Sustainable Governance Indicators
tion. There is also a need for increased support in 
the development of a highly skilled labor force, 
including on enabling a harmonious balance be-
tween work and family life and creating a more 
welcoming atmosphere for immigrants. This lat-
ter aim has become more difficult as reactions 
to the refugee crisis have strengthened those 
groups, represented across the political spectrum, 
opposed to the idea of a multicultural society. 
Government spending as a share of GDP is 
below levels seen in other, richer EU member 
countries. A major difference in the Czech Re-
public is the low level of direct taxation, particu-
larly personal income tax. This limits the finan-
cial support for policy areas such as education, 
R&D and environmental protection after 2020, 
when EU structural funding will end.
The Czech Republic’s aging population will 
pose a challenge for the pension and health sys-
tems in the future. Attempts by previous gov-
ernments to increase charges and the reliance on 
private providers have failed to win public trust. 
An open discussion is needed to reach some  
degree of consensus on how to finance higher 
pension spending, raise the pension age and 
cover higher health care spending.
In respect to European integration, the coun-
try risks remaining marginalized on the periph-
ery, alongside its increasingly illiberal peers 
Hungary and Poland. Populist calls for “defend-
ing the national interests against Brussels” (in-
cluding calls for “Czexit”) are counterproductive 
domestically and internationally. Internally, they 
present a distorted vision of the future relation-
ship between the Czech Republic and European 
Union. Internationally, the Czech Republic does 
not present itself as a reliable partner to the EU, 
which jeopardizes foreign investment on which 
the country depends.
ment difficult. While Babiš’s ANO secured by  
far the highest share of votes, it has lacked coa-
lition partners as most other parties committed 
in their campaigns to not build a coalition with 
ANO. The large fragmentation of the Czech par-
liament – where the second strongest party,  
the right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS)  
obtained a mere 11 % of seats – has further  
complicated the forging of a new coalition.  
Given the Czech president’s substantial role in 
the appointment of governments, the uncertain 
outcome of the presidential elections in January 
2018 has further added to the challenges. 
Babiš’s vision of populist technocratic ef-
ficiency – limiting parliamentary deliberation, 
abolishing the Senate and strategic demobili-
zation – will not provide a basis for solving the 
country’s economic and social problems. A gov-
ernment led by Babiš would risk progress on an-
ti-corruption and strengthening media freedom 
and pluralism. 
The long-term sustainability of economic 
growth remains problematic. With inward FDI 
declining, an increasingly important source of 
growth has been EU structural funds. Multi-
nationals have continued to locate lower val-
ue-added activities in the Czech Republic, but 
there is already a significant shift underway of 
activities that rely on less-skilled labor to even 
lower wage countries. Without innovation and 
structural change, this pattern of growth will 
not bring income levels up to those in wealthier 
EU member states and leaves the Czech Republic 
vulnerable to economic downturns.
Diversification and support for startups in 
ICT and higher added-value sectors could im-
prove the chances for future growth (wage 
growth as well as overall economic growth).  
A secure economic future also depends on rais- 
ing the quality of R&D output and sustainable  
financial support from both domestic firms and 
foreign investors. Despite increasing financial 
support for R&D, technological advances still de-
pend overwhelmingly on what foreign companies 
choose to bring into the country. The volume of 
funding for applied research is not reflected in 
the innovative output.
The country’s educational system requires 
further reform and investment, including finan-
cial incentives to attract and retain top gradu-
ates and strengthen teacher training and reten-
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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icy debates focus on increasing labor supply,  
integrating immigrants and the provision of 
welfare services (e.g., education, and social and 
health care).
In an attempt to strengthen the incentive 
structure, and boost labor supply and employ-
ment, both the previous and present govern-
ments have had strong reform agendas. These 
agendas have aimed to overhaul the structure 
and design of the social safety net (e.g., pen-
sions, early retirement, social assistance and 
disability pensions), labor market policies and 
the tax system. Higher labor supply and employ-
ment is an objective in itself, but also improves 
public finances through both lower government 
spending and higher tax revenue. This reform 
strategy obtained broad support in comparison to 
alternative strategies involving tax increases or 
spending cuts. The reforms will ensure the fiscal 
sustainability of current welfare arrangements. 
Denmark is among the frontrunners in terms of 
addressing the challenges to fiscal sustainability 
arising from an aging population. 
Executive Summary
Democracy functions well, and governance is 
credible and transparent in Denmark. Public 
trust in government and public administration is 
high. Comparatively, Denmark is extraordinary 
for having achieved a relatively strong economic 
performance (e.g., as measured by per capita in-
come), but also a relatively equal distribution of 
income and low poverty rates. The Danish wel-
fare state is extensive both in terms of service 
provision and the social safety net. Though this 
translates into a high tax burden. Overall, Den-
mark has shown that it is possible to combine 
an extensive welfare state with a well-function-
ing economy.
The economy has now fully recovered from 
the Great Recession. Current levels of activity 
and unemployment are close to their structural 
levels, and public debate is increasingly focus-
ing on possible bottlenecks in the labor market. 
Key macroeconomic indicators are favorable and 
perform comparatively well. Key economic pol-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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European Union), to restrict access to welfare 
payments.
Finally, Denmark’s engagement in interna-
tional politics remains a controversial issue.  
This debate applies to foreign policy in general, 
and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
in particular. As these earlier military operations 
were being phased out, Denmark joined the in-
ternational coalition against the so-called Islamic 
State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. The country’s posi-
tion vis-à-vis the European Union also remains a 
contested issue. It is an implicit political arrange-
ment that all essential EU decisions are put to a 
referendum. A December 2015 referendum con-
firmed the Danish opt-out position on justice and 
home affairs. A special agreement on Danish co-
operation with Europol was reached in April 2017.
Key Challenges
Having a small and open economy, Denmark has 
a long tradition of meeting the challenges posed 
by international integration and globalization, 
and has shown a capacity to enact needed re-
forms to reconcile an extensive welfare state 
with a well-functioning economy. Compara-
tively, Denmark is favorably positioned with  
regard to adaptability and the enactment of  
political reforms to address challenges, despite 
sometimes delaying and deferring such re-
forms. A tradition of open dialog, cooperation 
All of the previously mentioned reforms were 
based on work by parliamentary commissions, 
an important policy instrument in a country with 
a strong consensus tradition that has mostly 
been governed by minority governments. Even 
so, the reform of the country’s unemployment 
insurance scheme has been controversial and  
has again been reformed following proposals 
from a commission.
The country’s significant strengths notwith-
standing, several issues are high on the politi-
cal agenda. First, Denmark ranks among the top 
OECD countries with regard to educational ex-
penditure, but scores lower on various indicators 
of educational performance. Recently, this led to 
educational reforms that increased curricular  
demands and improved teacher training. Second, 
the public sector (mainly municipalities) has ex-
perienced increased strain in relation to service 
provision. Many citizens have found that stand-
ards lag behind their expectations, but tight fi-
nances have made it difficult to improve services.
Third, immigration and the integration of 
immigrants remains controversial. The gen-
eral trend, with broad parliamentary support, 
has been toward increasingly strict immigration 
rules and further tightening is currently being 
considered. Moreover, the new Liberal govern-
ment reformed social assistance for immigrants, 
introducing differentiated levels of social assis-
tance depending on the period of residence  
(applying for migrants coming from outside  
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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Denmark’s independence and prevent the coun-
try’s marginalization in international forums. 
As a result, the Danish debate on the European 
Union has always been somewhat fragmented 
and not always comprehensible to foreign  
observers. A case in point are the four Danish 
opt-outs included in the Maastricht Treaty.  
European Monetary Union membership remains 
a very delicate subject since the referendum in 
2000. Denmark is not a member, but pursues  
a tight, fixed exchange rate policy to the euro.  
This peg has been very credible, as reflected in a 
very small (and in some periods negative) interest 
rate spread. Denmark is, in this sense, a shadow 
member of the euro zone, although it is not  
directly represented in the supranational execu-
tive bodies. The recent referendum on justice and 
home affairs cooperation confirmed Denmark’s 
“sideline” participation in EU cooperation.
Overall, both the previous and current gov-
ernments have set ambitious strategic targets. 
Various policy plans signal a political awareness 
of the country’s structural problems. Dealing 
with these challenges is a work in progress.
and broad-based reform goals contribute to the 
country’s adaptability. Trust between different 
actors and societal groups, often referred to as 
“social capital,” has also been an important  
factor. However, to remain among the leading 
industrialized nations, Denmark must continue 
to monitor its policies and institutions. Addi-
tional changes and reforms will be necessary.
The following briefly lists areas of crucial 
importance to Denmark and outlines where  
policy initiatives are needed: 
First, the government must address possible 
bottlenecks in the labor market, and address the 
challenges presented by technological changes 
(e.g., automatization) and globalization. This has 
revitalized the debate on whether the education 
system is sufficiently equipped to supply the 
type and quality of education needed by the  
private sector.
Second, due to low productivity growth in the 
private sector, the economy’s growth potential is 
an issue. In addition, given the relative size of the 
public sector, improving government efficiency 
and productivity will be an important task. 
Third, although comparatively inequality is 
low and social cohesion is high, Danish society  
is trending toward more disparity and inequality. 
A particular challenge involves the integration of 
immigrants and other marginalized groups into 
the labor market, which is often difficult due to 
insufficient job qualifications.
Fourth, while the long-term financial  
viability of the welfare state despite an aging 
population has largely been ensured by a recent 
series of reforms, fiscal challenges remain due to 
increasing demands on welfare services in gen-
eral and health care in particular. In the design 
of welfare policies, it is important to balance 
concerns for equality and social insurance with 
incentives for education and work. The hallmark 
of Danish society has been its balance between 
low inequality and an extensive public sector, 
and a well-functioning economy with high-in-
come levels. Reconciling these objectives remains 
an ongoing challenge.
Fifth, Denmark, with its small yet open soci-
ety, has a long tradition of being an active par-
ticipant and partner in international political  
cooperation. At the same time, there is a strong 
desire within society to establish “arm’s length 
distance” over certain issues, both to underline 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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abled persons and workers with low or outdated 
skills. However, increasing labor shortages and 
high taxes on labor continue to thwart produc-
tivity and, more generally, economic growth.  
Debates around reducing employers’ tax bur- 
dens are, for the first time, being embedded  
into larger political debates on social insurance 
system reform. 
Estonia’s welfare system is based on the Bis-
marckian principle of social insurance funds, 
which faces mounting debt due to population 
aging. The government proposes to transfer 
more tax revenues to social insurance in order 
to cover health expenditures for pensioners and 
employees with atypical contracts. Reducing the 
long waiting lists for specialized medical care is 
another priority of planned reforms.
One major accomplishment of government 
has been an income tax reform. Proportionality 
has been preserved, but a regressive tax exemp-
tion will be introduced in 2018. This will have 
a far-reaching impact on the labor market and 
welfare of households as the additional income 
Executive Summary
In many respects, Estonia has proven success-
ful in building a sustainable democracy. Among 
the 41 countries in the SGI, Estonia ranks 8th in 
policy performance and democracy and 18th in 
governance. As a result of a change in the gov-
ernment coalition in November 2016, the period 
currently under study (November 2016 – Novem-
ber 2017) includes major adjustments in several 
policy areas impacting social inclusion. After 12 
years of government coalitions dominated by the 
neoliberal Reform Party, a center-left govern-
ment led by the Center Party has been installed. 
This new government has prioritized policies 
aiming to secure the financial sustainability of 
the welfare system and increase social inclusion. 
The economy has recovered from the reces-
sion, a fact evidenced by the high employment 
level (matched by low unemployment) and an 
annual economic growth rate of about 4 %.  
Ongoing reforms aim to extend employment by 
facilitating the labor market participation of dis-
Estonia
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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progress on gender equality and LGBT rights has 
remained limited.
Key Challenges
Estonia is recognized internationally as main-
taining a balanced budget and low govern-
ment debt. The tax system is straightforward and 
transparent and the overall tax burden positions 
around the OECD average. The sitting govern-
ment has offered several proposals to diversify 
revenues and increase the vertical equity of the 
tax system. While the 2017 income tax reform 
aligns to these targets, recently introduced re-
gressive tax exemptions also impact higher in-
come groups and may alter employment patterns 
and labor contracts. Consequently, the budgetary 
and social outcomes of this tax reform must  
be vigilantly monitored and, where necessary,  
misuses and negative spillovers addressed.  
Likewise, the government plan to detach public 
pensions from previous earnings requires me-
ticulous consideration to ensure that employees’ 
incentives remain optimal. The recent sharp in-
crease in the excise tax demonstrated that, in a 
small open economy, tax hikes can reduce, rather 
than increase, revenues. Thus, a systemic and 
comprehensive approach to tax system reform 
remains crucial.
gained by low earners will decrease income  
inequality, which has been comparatively high. 
Further antipoverty measures implemented in 
2017 include an increase in child benefits for 
large families and an additional allowance for 
single-person elderly households. 
In governance, there has been little pro- 
gress in terms of policy innovation, quality  
management and pursuing holistic approaches. 
Nonetheless, the negative trends of previous 
years, including a preoccupation with fine tuning 
and incrementalism, lack of transparency, and 
poor public communication have been halted. 
Even more importantly, a prolonged reform of 
local government has finally accomplished the 
prescribed municipal mergers, with the first 
local elections in the new municipalities held  
in October 2017. In these elections, voting rights 
were extended to 16- and 17-year-olds. How-
ever, the turnout (just 53 %) was among the  
lowest in Estonia’s history, a reflection of the 
challenging municipality mergers. 
Democracy is well established and secure in 
Estonia. The party financing system is contin-
uously improving, largely thanks to persistent 
media attention and public interest. Corruption 
among high-level public officials, however,  
remains somewhat of a challenge and must be 
redressed through additional regulation as well 
as public awareness campaigns. Also, social  
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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clarification of the tasks of local government as 
well as guarantees of adequate funding and fos-
tering of citizen involvement in local governance. 
The improvement of citizens’ quality of life must 
be prioritized over economizing.
Beyond recalibrating the tax system,  
Estonia must move from policy deliberations to  
tangible action with regard to building a knowl-
edge-based economy. Current innovation pol-
icy focuses on leading enterprises, remaining 
largely detached from the rest of the economy. 
Policymakers must expand research, develop-
ment, and innovation (RDI) measures to include 
small- and medium-sized enterprises and tra-
ditional sectors of the economy (e.g., oil shale), 
enabling RDI to contribute to structural reforms. 
Furthermore, RDI within universities must be 
adequately financed and better linked to the 
country’s economic and social priorities.
The institutional framework for governance 
is well established and stable. Consequently,  
policymakers may focus on developing executive 
capacity by firmly following democratic princi-
ples of checks and balances and public account-
ability. However, the executive branch tends to 
overproduce strategies (a failure of coordination) 
and analyses, with the latter too often not con-
sidered in decision-making. To overcome this 
fragmentation and excessive reporting, the gov-
ernment should consider four strategies. First,  
it should merge the numerous small-scale strat-
egies into the national 30-year strategy (i.e., 
Sustainable Estonia 21). Second, improved coor-
dination between ministries as well as between 
the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and line min-
istries is required. Third, citizens’ and advocacy 
groups should be given a much broader role in 
policy evaluation, including in the appraisal of 
regulatory impact assessment results.  
Fourth, instead of commissioning exhaustive  
explanatory analytical reports, the government 
should promote open data and encourage sec-
ondary analysis. Although Estonia is regarded  
as a forerunner in e-governance, the pace of  
innovation has slowed; reforms are often chaotic 
or fail completely (e.g., the Social Protection  
Information System). To improve this situation, 
a ministry with a clear and broad responsibility 
for advancing e-governance is required. 
Contemporary governance requires appro-
priate capacities both locally and internationally. 
Estonia has made impressive gains in the latter 
(evidenced by the Estonian EU Presidency in  
the second half of 2017) but not in the former. 
The process of municipal mergers, finalized in 
the fall of 2017, must be complemented by a 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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Finland
Country profile SGI 2018
duced in 2012 now enables citizens to propose 
legislative reforms online.
While Finland’s economy in past years has 
numbered among the most stable in Europe, 
its recent standing has been less favorable. 
The economy has been in a recession for sev-
eral years, public debt is increasing and the labor 
market continues to shrink. Recent developments 
suggest a turnaround for the better. Optimistic 
forecasts notwithstanding, unemployment,  
particularly among youth, is alarmingly high.
Public attitudes toward immigrants have 
hardened in recent years. The main political par-
ties have hesitated to challenge this shift in part 
because of growing support in recent years for 
the populist and anti-immigration Finns Party 
(formerly referred to in English as the True Finns 
party). However, public support for the party has 
radically diminished under the current govern-
ment. Attitudes toward the Swedish-speaking 
minority have also hardened, despite Finland’s 
official bilingualism and constitutional protec-
tions. The present vivid and largely uncontrolled 
Executive Summary
Finland’s mature system of governance allows 
stakeholders to identify problems, formulate 
solutions and advance social well-being, earn-
ing the Nordic country top marks in interna-
tional rankings. Freedom House has repeatedly 
awarded Finland the highest ranking worldwide 
on political liberties and civil rights. Since 2008, 
the country has also on several occasions topped 
Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom 
Index; in the 2017 ranking, Finland places 3rd, 
after Norway and Sweden. After a 2008 scan-
dal concerning party and electoral campaign  
financing, Finland dropped from the top posi-
tion in global anti-corruption rankings. In 2017, 
the country ranks 3rd on Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Legisla-
tion requiring the disclosure of donations to can-
didates and parties has been introduced. Modest 
electoral system reforms introduced in 2012 have 
improved the proportionality of the system.  
Additionally, a participatory mechanism intro-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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ment, in part by amalgamating local govern-
ment services, has met with resistance within 
local administrations and among the public,  
ultimately leading to a compromise solution 
with no clear prospect of success. Also, belea-
guered by disputes over environmental princi-
ples and ongoing problems with mining sites, 
Finland’s environmental management and pol-
icy framework is less effective than expected.
Beyond reforms targeting a reorganization  
of regional government, health care, and social 
services, no other large-scale institutional  
reforms enhancing governance and decision- 
making have been undertaken during the assess-
ment period. A earnings-related pension reform 
addressing the financial sustainability of statu-
tory pension provision came into force in January 
2017. The government has retained much of its 
system of program management and strength-
ened its strategic-planning procedures. The lack 
of additional large-scale reforms does not nec-
essarily evince a failing of government but may 
rather underscore the quality and comprehen-
siveness of the existing system. The economic 
and governance challenges facing Finland  
today are surmountable, though many of these  
challenges are rooted in problems beyond the 
government’s control. The effects of European 
and global economic and political crises present 
challenges to the economy and have under- 
inflow of refugees and asylum-seekers into  
Europe has helped to generate a deeper under-
standing of the need to adopt a more generous 
and responsible immigration policy. 
Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s government 
(2011 to 2014) featured a broad coalition of six 
parties. Following the withdrawal of two parties 
from the governing coalition and cabinet re-
shuffles in 2014, a new government under Prime 
Minister Alexander Stubb took charge until par-
liamentary elections in spring 2015. Following 
these elections, a three-party (Centre Party,  
National Coalition Party and Finns Party) govern-
ment under Prime Minister Juha Sipilä was in-
stalled in late May 2015, commanding 124 of the 
200 seats in parliament. In summer 2017, a split 
within the Finns Party became evident; a more 
moderate group of MPs formed Blue Reform, 
commanding five ministerial chairs while repre-
senting only about two percent of the electorate. 
Developments under Sipilä have been far 
less than encouraging. As tensions across gov-
ernment departments have persisted, the lead-
ership has appeared rudderless. Most notably, 
the government and labor market organizations 
have been battling over the direction of eco-
nomic policy. A recent reform designed to in-
troduce business practices into higher education 
has largely failed. Meanwhile, the central gov-
ernment’s attempts to restructure local govern-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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initiatives are non-binding; parliament retains 
the right to reject any initiative.
National security, internal as well as exter- 
nal, and foreign policy present substantial chal-
lenges for Finland. Given Russia’s political and 
military intervention in Ukraine as well as the 
deteriorating relationship between Russia and  
EU member states, concerns about Finland’s 
proximity to Russia have increased pressure on 
the government to form alliances with interna-
tional partners. Political and public attitudes  
toward EU and NATO membership, which were 
increasingly critical before the recent security 
crises, are now more favorable. Current constitu-
tional arrangements divide responsibility for for-
eign affairs (excluding those related to the EU) 
between the president and government. The in-
distinct basis for this duality as well as the active 
foreign policy leadership assumed by President 
Sauli Niinistö creates uncertainty about doctrine 
and policy both abroad and domestically.
The long-term increase in the longevity and 
the stagnating fertility rates of Finland’s popula-
tion create a strong demand for migrant workers. 
This economic demand, however, conflicts with 
negative public attitudes toward immigration, 
represented and exacerbated in particular by the 
Finns Party. As evident in recent polls, however, 
the fractured party is now losing ground and  
will likely face defeat in upcoming elections. 
Nonetheless, the party’s previous capacity to 
rapidly garner support has left the major parties 
hesitant to pursue policy initiatives that would 
significantly increase immigration. Still, at the 
time of writing, the massive inflow of refugees 
and asylum-seekers to Europe and, to a lesser 
extent, to Finland, appears to have had a moder-
ating effect on public opinion.
The government’s executive capacity remains 
strong. The programmatic framework works rea-
sonably well and forms the basis for strategic 
planning and implementation. Strategic govern-
ance is also promoted by effective interministe-
rial coordination, the government office’s ability 
to independently monitor and evaluate policies, 
and the evident oversight capacities of cabinet 
committees and working groups. Interest asso-
ciations and civil society groups are widely con-
sulted when legislation is drafted. Notwithstand-
ing, the executive capacity of local governments 
is undermined by inadequate funding. Reforms 
mined public sympathy for EU values and  
the EU’s political agenda. Still, recent security 
developments, most notably numerous obtrusive 
displays of Russian military and political power, 
have generated a palpable rise in pro-EU and 
pro-NATO attitudes among the public.
Key Challenges
Although Finland’s political system has long 
represented a model polity, current trends  
regarding democracy are less encouraging.  
Overall, public faith and trust in Finland’s dem-
ocratic institutions have weakened, evidenced by 
relatively low electoral turnouts and declining 
membership in political parties. Survey data  
indicates that public trust in central political  
institutions such as parliament and government 
can certainly be improved. These lower levels  
of participation and institutional trust result in 
part from the instability of recent governments.  
This instability has been due to the necessity of 
coalition governments (made up of several polit-
ical parties) to achieve a working parliamentary 
majority. The broad and unstable nature of such 
governments undermines government accounta-
bility and transparency as well as limits the pub-
lic’s ability to fully understand and engage with 
the processes of policymaking. Expectations  
that the three-party composition of the present 
Sipilä government would result in a more effi-
cient and transparent governance style have not 
been met. Instead, tension and a lack of direction 
characterize everyday politics within the cab-
inet; even more so in the wake of the summer 
2017 split within one of the government parties 
(i.e., the populist Finns Party). Innovative meas-
ures and political engineering will be required to 
reverse the erosion of democratic participation. 
Revitalizing representative democracy in Finland 
will require the input of new participatory insti-
tutions (e.g., binding referendums). Some pro-
gress has been made in this respect. A relatively 
new mechanism, the so-called citizens’ initia-
tive, obliges parliament to debate any petition 
that receives at least 50,000 signatures. As of 
the time of writing, several initiatives have un-
dergone or are awaiting parliamentary consid-
eration. Notwithstanding, while this mechanism 
marks a step in the right direction, the citizens’ 
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size-fits-all policy solution; rather, any suc-
cessful solution must draw upon combinations 
of policies rooted in a division of responsibilities 
between local and central governments.
intended to amalgamate and restructure local 
government administrations have had mixed 
success. Importantly, plans to restructure ad-
ministrative boundaries have not sufficiently 
taken into account the impact this will have on 
the constitutionally protected rights of Finland’s 
Swedish-speaking population. Generally, there 
appears to be a lack of appreciation for the  
contextual nature of the public-policy challenges 
that now confront Finland. There is no one- 
France
Country profile SGI 2018
tional system has been weakened by the rise of 
populist parties: primarily the National Front but 
also the radical left led by Mélenchon, which ad-
vocates a strange mixture of statist economic 
proposals and libertarian political choices.  
Both populist manifestations express a deep  
distrust between segments of the population 
and the political class. In the wake of President 
Trump’s election in the United States and of the 
Executive Summary
France enjoys solid institutions of gover- 
nance – the most stable, consensual and effi- 
cient period over the past 200 years, marked  
only occasionally by dubious constitutional  
experiments. Yet, the country has struggled to 
effectively address the challenges associated with 
Europeanization and globalization. The institu-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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tial election, leaving the Socialist Party divided 
and directionless. The open primaries organized 
in January 2017 left the floor to the most rad-
ical elements of the party, contributing to the 
elimination of the reformist candidate (the for-
mer prime minister, Valls) and to the selection 
of a leftist candidate (Benoît Hamon). Hamon’s 
leadership proved to be deprived of charisma 
and unable to reunify the Socialist Party. On the 
right side of the political spectrum, the land-
slide victory of François Fillon, who presented 
a strongly conservative program, and the very 
high turnout at the open primary organized by 
the Républicains and the centrists in Novem-
ber 2016 (4.4 million voters) seemed to indi-
cate the certainty of Fillon’s victory. However, 
paying for a political scandal related to the hir-
ing of his wife and children with public money, 
Fillon only came third in the first round of the 
presidential election and was eliminated, leav-
ing the floor to two different outsiders and chal-
lengers to the traditional parties of government. 
On the one hand, Marine Le Pen, the anti-im-
migration, anti-globalization, anti-EU, populist 
candidate; on the other, the improbable winner 
of the first round, Emmanuel Macron, who was 
both challenging the traditional political left/
right cleavage, and suggesting a new cleavage 
between progressive, liberal pro-Europeans and 
autarkic, reactionary nationalists. It was difficult 
Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, there 
were fears that Marine Le Pen might be the win-
ner of a polarized presidential election in France, 
which has raised serious doubts about the coun-
try’s capacity for systemic reforms. 
Coming to power in 2012, President Hollande 
initially attempted to reverse his predecessor’s 
reforms, but further economic collapse soon led 
to a U-turn, and the adoption of supply-side re-
forms and more budgetary discipline. Deep divi-
sion within the Socialist Party and the govern-
ment combined with the president’s confused 
communication style and lack of clear commit-
ment to policies discredited the government.  
As a result, the potential political benefits of 
these limited but important reforms (i.e., labor 
market reforms, business tax cuts, liberaliza-
tion measures and budgetary consolidation) 
have been marred. Overall, the policy changes 
were steps in the right direction, but insufficient 
to meet future challenges. The characteristic gap 
between real (if limited) change and immobile 
concepts, and between liberal reforms and the 
traditional statist interventionist discourse  
persisted under President Hollande. As a result,  
the Socialist Party was deeply divided between 
social-democrat reformists and leftist radicals. 
The division was so deep and the popular-
ity of President Hollande so low that Hollande 
renounced his candidacy for the 2017 presiden-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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the credibility to convince his EU partners of his 
vision. Macron enjoys a strong majority in the 
National Assembly and the institutions of the 
Fifth Republic offer effective instruments for 
achieving deep reform. The problems lie else-
where: how to convince a reluctant and vola-
tile public that the new government will make 
the right policy choices? Given the absence of a 
strong political opposition, social protest will be 
the main obstacle that the new government will 
likely face over the coming years.
France has to tackle four major challenges.
The first one is political. The entire party 
system has to be reconstructed after the 2017 
political earthquake. While this destructive phase 
has permitted Macron to sweep away the old po-
litical forces to the advantage of his new move-
ment, it has also contributed to the weakening of 
the traditional mediatory institutions which will 
have to be rebuilt. This is also true for the pres-
ident’s movement, La République en Marche, 
which will have to transform itself into a party 
capable of fulfilling a mediatory role. The time 
horizon is short. The renewal of political forces 
has to be achieved before the next presidential 
election in 2022.
The second challenge is financial, budget-
ary and economic. The diagnosis is well-known: 
public deficits and debt must be drastically re-
duced, fiscal pressure lowered, and unemploy-
ment addressed with drastic policy changes.  
The task is daunting. However, two factors might 
help. The first one is linked to the overall eco-
nomic improvement in the European Union and 
worldwide. This will help the government to  
respect EU rules on budget deficits, which in  
recent years France has repeatedly broken,  
and hopefully stabilize public debt. It will also 
absorb some of the unavoidable economic and 
social costs of reform. The other factor is Ma-
cron’s commitment to an ambitious reform 
agenda. For the time being, the government has 
proceeded with speed and energy, leaving little 
space for opposition. The key issue will be the 
government’s capacity to pursue its policy 
choices in the years to come. The disconnection 
between the (short-term) political agenda and 
the (medium- to long-term) economic agenda 
is a crucial component of the equation. Indeed, 
there are not many more savings to be expected 
if structural reforms are not adopted and imple-
to conceive of more antagonistic proposals for 
France’s future political and policy choices. 
The final choice was clear but at the same 
time pointed to the fragmentation of public 
opinion (populist votes, abstention). However, 
the strength of the new president lies in his  
reform program, which he presented to voters 
during the electoral campaign. Once elected  
and with a strong parliamentary majority,  
the new president has a mandate for reforming 
the country. Since he has taken office, the new 
president has shown his clear commitment to 
his pro-EU, liberal-reform agenda. He bene-
fits from a strong parliamentary majority and 
a deeply divided, crisis-shaken opposition (the 
traditional socialist and conservative parties are 
fragmented, the National Front is in deep disar-
ray and split, and the radical left led by Mélen-
chon is isolated). The division within and the 
weakness of the unions have undermined resist-
ance to Macron’s labor-market reforms, and his 
pro-European and pro-business policies proceed 
undisturbed for the time being. 
This successful start is supported by the im-
provement of the European and global economic 
outlook as well as by the first effects of some re-
forms adopted during the Hollande presidency. 
Contrary to what could be feared at the end 
of 2016 when the future of the country looked 
rather bleak (unemployment, debt, terrorism, 
populist challenges), a new optimism supports 
the new majority. Many problems have still to  
be faced but there is the political will and the 
capacity to tackle them.
Key Challenges
France is at a crossroads. The collapse of  
the traditional party system following the 2017 
presidential election and the political earthquake 
triggered by Macron’s election open radically 
new perspectives. The challenges now are not so 
much “what to do?” but rather “will the presi-
dent and his majority be capable of fulfilling the 
promises they have made?” 
Macron has insisted that the European  
Union should be more efficient, integrated and 
protective, but that France should first do its 
“homework.” He knows that only a strong and 
successful French reform agenda will give him 
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coordinated style of governance. The good news  
is that the newly elected president is fully and 
explicitly committed to this reform agenda.
mented. Education, professional training and  
industrial reconstruction are some of the many 
sectors that need to be restructured in order to 
achieve more substantial benefits.
The third challenge is related to the over- 
all structure of the bureaucracy and public  
sector. Both are comparatively inflated and  
inefficient. The approach to tackling unem-
ployment by increasing public sector em-
ployment (in particular at the local level) has 
failed, and has considerably lowered the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of public service pro-
vision. Similarly, the introduction of a more 
competitive framework for some public sec-
tors (such as trans-portation) has repeat-
edly been postponed. Trimming redundant 
or inefficient administrations, revising poli-
cies that benefit vested interests, and simplify-
ing the complex multi-layered territorial sys-
tem (“millefeuille”) will be necessary reforms. 
However, such reforms will likely produce pro-
test and discontent in the short-term, while 
only proving beneficial much later. 
A fourth major challenge concerns the  
intertwined issues of security, immigration  
and integration. The traditional French model, 
based on an open policy toward immigrants  
acquiring French nationality and on the princi-
ple of equality of all citizens regardless of eth-
nic origins or religion, has lost its integrative 
power over the last 30 years. The former key in-
struments of the integration process (education, 
work, religion, political parties and trade unions) 
are no longer effective, while the recent terrorist 
attacks have further weakened integration pro-
cesses. This challenge requires multifaceted pol-
icy solutions in areas including security, urban 
development, and education and job training, 
with a primary focus on employment opportuni-
ties for the most marginalized citizens. What is 
at stake is the country’s political and social co-
hesion, and common national values and rules. 
Unfortunately, the present situation is charac-
terized by an identity crisis, an ethnic divide,  
the exclusion of migrants and political frustra-
tions which have, in part, benefited extremist 
political candidates and parties.
France needs courageous policies that  
include clear (even if unpopular) choices,  
frankness when explaining the challenges,  
more social dialog, and a more streamlined and 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Yves Mény
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 Reimut Zohlnhöfer
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ernment adopts a more long-term approach to 
overall policymaking. 
An important event within the review pe- 
riod was the federal election in September 2017. 
The election changed the German party system. 
Not only did six parties enter parliament but  
also the main parties lost significantly, namely 
the bourgeois Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
and its Bavarian sister Christian Social Union, 
CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).  
The CDU/CSU dropped from 41.5 % in the 2013 
elections to 32.9 %, while the SPD declined from 
25.7 % to 20.5 %. Consequently, both the CDU/
CSU and SPD lost their dominant position within 
the German party system. The 2017 election was 
the SPD’s worst result and the CDU/CSU’s sec-
ond worst result in the post-war period. All other 
parties gained votes, albeit for some the gains 
were marginal. The Greens won 8.9 %, a gain of 
0.55 percentage points, while the Left Party won 
9.2 %, a gain of 0.6 percentage points. The Free 
Democrats (FDP) re-entered parliament with 
10.7 %, a gain of 5.9 percentage points. In ad-
Executive Summary
This year’s report points toward the somewhat 
ambiguous performance of German policymak-
ing. On the one hand, the economy, labor mar-
ket, welfare system and public finances are doing 
extremely well, and excel by international com-
parison. Even with respect to the topic of refugee 
immigration and integration, the situation seems 
to have been brought under control, at least ac-
cording to some positive feedback from interna-
tional organizations on the integration measures 
that Germany has initiated. On the other hand, 
there is a growing sense of complacency on the 
part of German politicians and voters. Because of 
the excellent current governance and social se-
curity conditions the immediate pressure for re-
form has receded over recent years. For the time 
being, lower reform ambitions and the larger 
generosity to satisfy short-term political de-
mands have not produced measurable economic 
or financial damage. However, it is crucial for 
the long-run perspective that the incoming gov-
Germany
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of social exclusion. However, the current  
employment boom has further reduced long-
term unemployment and reduced the level of  
irregular employment. On the challenge of  
refugee integration, observers from international 
organizations still diagnose problems, such as 
insufficient coordination of relevant stakeholders. 
Though they also acknowledge that Germany has 
reacted quickly and created an environment that 
is conducive for the successful labor market inte-
gration of refugees. Highly salient incidents like 
Islamic terrorism, xenophobic attacks by right-
wing radicals or the G20 Hamburg summit riots 
by left-wing extremists have undermined pop-
ular perceptions concerning public safety even 
though the objective crime data does not indicate 
a dramatic increase in criminal incidents.
Germany continues to do very well in terms 
of the quality of democracy. Of course, German 
democracy is affected by international trends 
like the continuing decline in market share for 
high-quality print media, which safeguard public 
access to information. But these trends are much 
less pronounced in Germany compared to other 
countries. The public broadcasting system con-
tinues to reach a decent proportion of the popu-
lation, and provide largely high-quality and in-
dependent coverage of political developments. 
Though this has recently been questioned in some 
instances. The rule of law and the independence 
dition, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 
12.6 % of the vote, considerably higher than the 
5 % threshold, and entered the federal parlia-
ment for the first time. The Bundestag now hosts 
a strong right-populist party that includes some 
right-extremist positions. In the eastern part of 
Germany, the two main parties lost more votes 
compared to the western part, and the smaller 
parties on the left and right of the party spec-
trum won more votes pointing to a continuing 
political division within the country.
At the time of writing, the composition of the 
new government remains uncertain. Whichever 
parties form the new government, the election 
results indicate a somewhat shrinking consen-
sus on fundamental policies in Germany. Though 
this is not yet as dramatic as in other European 
countries in terms of populists’ voting shares.
Regarding policy performance, the 2017  
situation was characterized by a very favorable 
picture in terms of key indicators ranging from 
high economic growth (above 2 %), falling un-
employment rates and a surprisingly high pub-
lic budget surplus. With this tailwind, Germany 
could also keep or even increase its engagement 
for the provision of national or global public 
goods in the field of R&D, education or develop-
ment aid. On social and distributive issues, the 
situation remains controversial with the usual 
left-right disputes on the extent and tendencies 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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nomic and financial situation by increasing  
government and social security spending,  
while lowering taxes and introducing a wave of 
new regulations. This policy approach is hardly 
viable over the longer run, among other things, 
because of the effects of an aging population 
on economic growth, and increased pressure on 
health care and pension spending. Therefore,  
a responsible and realistic policy approach with a 
long-term perspective must develop appropriate 
answers regarding the following policy fields.
Pension policy: The system continues to  
benefit from a favorable relationship between 
the active population (still comprising the baby 
boomer generation) and pensioners. In the  
coming years, with the retirement of the baby 
boomers and as a consequence of increasing life 
expectancy, the dependency ratio will quickly 
rise. Political parties have remained largely  
silent on the issue of how to react and keep the 
system (and contribution rates) stable. The only 
consensus seems to relate to benefit increases for 
parents, workers with particularly long-working 
histories and measures for fighting poverty  
in retirement. Expert recommendations for a 
further increase in the statutory pension age 
have regularly been rejected by Germany’s main 
political parties.
Health and old-age care system: The social 
security systems for health and old-age care  
are characterized by even larger pressures on 
spending. Demographic change, and increasing 
societal expectations regarding the quality of 
services and medical progress have meant that 
demand for higher spending is almost unlimited. 
Over recent years, governments could impress 
voters by regularly increasing benefit levels as 
the employment boom provided the necessary  
finances. In the coming years and decades, with 
the shrinking active population, the imbalance 
between spending demand and available finances 
will increase dramatically. Current political pro-
grams are completely silent on how to contain 
this pressure.
Tax policy: With respect to the tax policy  
debate, German politics seems to be character-
ized by a neglect of constraining factors related 
to increasing international competition. With the 
far-reaching Trump tax reform, a new wave of 
global corporate tax competition may have  
commenced. In Europe, the United Kingdom  
of the judiciary is strongly backed both by political 
actors’ and voters’ respect for these institutions. 
The indicators for governance capacities  
continue to show a less convincing positioning 
compared to the two other SGI pillars. Overall,  
the governmental system’s steering capabilities 
are constrained by a lack of strategic planning, 
which is exemplified by the relatively weak role 
of strategic policy units. Moreover, coordination 
processes in multiparty governments are often 
dominated by informal institutions like the coali-
tion committees where “party politicization” un-
dermines strategic planning and often leads to a 
lack of consistent communication. Expert evalua-
tions and impact analyses play an important role, 
and are regularly executed with good methodo-
logical standards and impartiality. However, there 
is considerable scope for improvement to develop 
strategic policy conclusions from deeper insights.
Summing up, this year’s report confirms 
Germany’s current successful governance  
performance. However, it raises concerns that 
political myopia and the lack of strategic fore-
sight might undermine the German growth  
story over the next decade.
Key Challenges
Key challenges for the next government are 
manifold. To begin with, the short-term chal-
lenge will be to create a new and stable coalition 
government, able to generate a coherent govern-
mental program that guides politics and policies 
over the next years.
For this next German government, it is of 
crucial importance that it does not lose sight 
of the medium- and long-term tasks that Ger-
many faces. It may appear paradoxical, but this 
risk has risen with the country’s highly success-
ful economic and financial performance over re-
cent years. Exceptional circumstances like the 
record low levels of government interest rates in 
combination with strong economic growth and 
the employment boom have considerably sof-
tened short-term budget constraints. The conse-
quences of which were clearly visible in the last 
election campaign and will also impact the on-
going negotiations for a new coalition govern-
ment. Politicians of all parties assume that they 
can extrapolate the current highly favorable eco-
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have been exceptionally high in recent years and 
the short-run outlook for 2018 remains bullish. 
However, far-reaching policy mistakes that en-
danger the long-run sustainability of economies 
are typically made in good times.
(to compensate for the consequences of Brexit) 
and France (as Macron wants to push French 
competitiveness) plan to make their systems 
more competitive. Without a reaction, Germany 
will find itself with the highest business tax  
burden of any major industrial country. 
European reforms: Another major challenge 
for Germany relates to the European reform  
debate. Europe is urgently waiting for the next 
German government to develop a constructive 
strategy for how to reform Europe and the euro 
zone in order to increase resilience to crises and 
promote citizen trust in the union. Germany has 
to find the right balance between defending its 
self-interests (e.g., preventing a strategy of 
fiscal exploitation with massive transfers from 
northern to southern and eastern Europe) and 
constructive solidarity. 
Refugee policies: Another major challenge  
involves refugee and immigration policy. After a 
dramatic 2015, refugee numbers have decreased 
considerably. However, this policy field still 
poses highly complicated questions concerning 
how to foster integration and steer immigration. 
The refugee issue has split society. The rise of 
several right-wing protest movements and  
the success of an anti-migration party, the AfD, 
indicates that part of the population is deeply 
distrustful of Germany’s political, economic and 
media elites. While the right-wing anti-immi-
gration positions still constitute only a minority, 
they are particularly present in the eastern part 
of the country, pointing to a divide that persists 
more than 25 years after unification. The next 
government must build on the last grand coali-
tion’s effort to promote a successful integration 
policy and develop – together with Germany’s 
EU partners –workable strategies to keep migra-
tion flows at manageable levels (i.e., levels that 
do not overstretch popular support or undermine 
financial sustainability).
Climate policy: The radical exit from nuclear 
power in combination with Germany’s ambition 
to be a front-runner in climate policies poses 
complicated policy trade-offs. One of the con-
tentious issues is the timeframe for closing down 
coal-fired power plants. 
Germany is economically and financially in 
a very good situation. The country recovered 
more quickly than many other countries from 
the global financial crisis. Economic growth rates 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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2017, Greece successfully sold € 3 billion in five-
year bonds at a relatively low interest-rate of 
4.6 %. The bond issue was so oversubscribed that 
the country could have borrowed € 6.5 billion, 
more than twice the desired amount. 
Negotiations between the coalition govern-
ment, consisting of the radical-left party (Syr-
iza) and the far-right party Independent Greeks 
(ANEL), on the one hand, and the country’s 
lenders, on the other hand, continued. The sec-
ond review of the adjustment program was com-
pleted – with considerable delay – in June 2017 
paving the way for the disbursement of the third 
tranche of financial assistance (€ 8.5 billion) that 
was used to cover Greece’s current financing 
needs and arrears clearing. 
The country’s economy is expected to grow in 
2017 by 1.7 % after stagnation in 2016 (-0.2 %). 
Capital controls, imposed on the banks in July 
2015 when the government announced a referen-
dum, were not lifted in the period under review 
and are still in place. The Greek banking system 
still faces risks, as non-performing loans are a 
Executive Summary
During the period under review, Greece’s politi-
cal and economic environment grew less volatile, 
while domestic and foreign observers recorded 
signs of timid economic growth. In relation to 
2015–2016, the government appeared far more 
willing to introduce and, to a lesser extent, imple-
ment reforms, and welcome foreign investment. 
These developments were encouraged by a 
positive international milieu. Business confi-
dence in Europe, as measured by Eurostat, is at 
its highest point for over a decade. 
However, Greece continues to be the only  
European country that has yet to reach the stage 
of economic recovery. Nevertheless, there are 
some reasons for optimism. In spring 2017, the 
government concluded a € 1.2 billion deal with a 
consortium led by the German company Fraport, 
which involved 14 of the country’s regional air-
ports. This is the biggest privatization venture  
so far under Greece’s international bailouts.  
Following the conclusion of the deal, in July 
Greece
Country profile SGI 2018
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further reform efforts. Such efforts, however,  
are necessary if Greece wants to change its model 
of production, currently based on domestic con-
sumption and the provision of services to tourists.
Key Challenges
Late in the summer of 2017, after long delays, 
Greece was able to conclude the Second Review 
of the Third Economic Adjustment Program.  
Over the next 12 months, Greece must first com-
plete the Third Review of the same program.  
The government must implement a number of 
reforms that will enable Greece to exit the sev-
en-year long close monitoring of the economy. 
Notably, in August 2018, when the current Third 
Economic Adjustment Program officially ends, 
Greece is expected to seek further financing  
by drawing funds on international markets. 
However, the IMF, having approved in principle 
a largely symbolic cash injection for the country, 
has repeated its long-standing warning that 
Greece’s debt remains unsustainable.
Thus, the prospects of the Greek economy  
remain uncertain, as loans on international  
markets incur higher interest rates than the  
rates granted to Greece by its lenders. Meanwhile, 
the growth of the Greek economy is meager, 
while large foreign private investments are not  
major constraint. Yet, between 2016 and 2017, 
the government continued to privatize the trans-
port sector and sell-off state-owned property. 
At the same time, it continued to delay the im-
plementation of agreements it had signed with 
private investors concerning the exploitation of 
gold mines in northern Greece and urban devel-
opment of the east coast of Athens. 
The OECD projects GDP growth to rise to 
2.3 % in 2018 and then moderate to 2 % in 2019. 
So, Greece’s economy is projected to grow again, 
and the recovery is expected to strengthen as  
investment rebounds and private consumption 
rises. The labor market is also recovering though 
high unemployment remains a problem.
The Syriza-ANEL government allocated fund-
ing for social assistance and began the imple-
mentation of a new social safety net, the Social 
Income of Solidarity. However, the government 
raised taxes and social security contributions 
to an unprecedented degree, which will hit the 
middle strata and professionals particularly 
hard, while it made little progress in fighting tax 
evasion. Economists argue that these measures 
have negatively influenced investment and job 
creation. 
Finally, in the period under review, the gov-
ernment did not give up on its drive to control the 
media and influence the judicial system. Mean-
while, the weak state administration hampered 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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supporters to the public sector usually on  
temporary contracts, as it has been unable to  
finance large-scale hiring. It has also offered the 
poorer strata one-off social welfare transfers.  
In the traditional patronage manner, cash trans-
fers were selectively channeled to favored inter-
est groups, such as employees of state-owned 
enterprises and pensioners. It was only in early 
2017 that the government at last established a 
social safety net for the poor. This unbalanced 
mix of patronage politics and social policy  
transfers needs to be re-assessed.
Over the next 12 months, policy challenges 
and debates will center on issues of economic 
growth, policy stability and redistribution.
forthcoming, as the Syriza-ANEL coalition, being 
ideologically hostile to foreign capital, has given 
mixed signals to foreign entrepreneurs. Domestic 
investment was discouraged as the government 
suddenly and dramatically raised taxes and social 
security contributions. Thus, a better balance  
between taxation and business incentives must 
be attained.
In view of the above, the most important 
challenge for Greece will be to avoid a new sudden 
economic crisis, resulting from further govern-
ment indecisiveness, a banking crisis or a sudden 
call for a snap elections (a decision which rests 
exclusively in the hands of the prime minister).
There are many open questions waiting to 
be addressed before the next general election 
(which, barring a sudden decision by the prime 
minister, are expected to take place in mid-
2019). Open questions include restoring stability 
in education, public order and the administra- 
tion of justice. In other words, sectors in which 
the Syriza-ANEL coalition government has ex-
perimented with rolling back reforms which  
had been affected before the government was 
formed (i.e., before January 2015). Since 2015, 
frequent education reforms have been announced, 
the government has been unable to impose law 
and order in the center of several major cities 
(e.g., Athens and Thessaloniki), and the adminis-
tration of the judicial system has further declined 
(very slow and disputable functioning of courts). 
However, the two major challenges that lie  
ahead are the health of the banking system and 
the future of pensions. Non-performing loans 
continue to be a major impediment for the  
financing of the economy and their shrinking 
will become a major issue in the forthcoming 
months with a political cost that the current or 
the next government will need to bear. The Bank 
of Greece plans to start stress tests for the coun-
try’s four systemic banks in late February 2018. 
Under the Third Bailout, pension payments, 
which had been cut by 40 % since the start of the 
crisis, will be cut by a further 18 % from 2019. 
This will be a necessary measure but also a major 
political challenge for any government.
Unfortunately, while nominally interested  
in alleviating the suffering of victims of the  
economic crisis, the Syriza-ANEL government 
has resorted to traditional, pre-crisis patronage 
practices. The government has recruited party 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos
 Asteris Huliaras
 Roy Karadag
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to weaken the opposition while undermining  
the remaining checks and balances. It has  
limited the opposition’s access to the public by 
restricting opposition parties’ use of billboards, 
which had played an important role in the 
2010 and 2014 election campaigns. It has fur-
ther tightened its control over the media, as the 
last four remaining regional dailies were bought 
by oligarchs close to Fidesz in July 2017; it has 
massively campaigned against independent,  
foreign-funded NGOs and introduced a new law 
that makes their work more difficult; and it has 
sought to close the Central European University 
(CEU), which is not only the country’s most 
prestigious institute of higher education but is 
also a stronghold of independent thinking.  
The assault on NGOs and the CEU has been part 
of a massive campaign, marked by anti-Semi-
tism, against the Hungarian-American million-
aire-philanthropist George Soros. As a center-
piece of Fidesz’s election campaign, these efforts 
have been closely linked to Fidesz’s ongoing  
anti-refugee and EU rhetoric.
Executive Summary
Hungary has been governed by Viktor Orbán 
and his Fidesz party since 2010. In the April 
2014 parliamentary elections, the govern- 
ment succeeded in maintaining its two-thirds 
majority – despite receiving 600,000 fewer 
votes than in 2010 – which allowed Orbán to  
be elected prime minister for the third time.  
Following a number of lost by-elections,  
the government lost its two-thirds majority in 
February 2015. In the period under review, the 
third Orbán government continued its disman-
tling of checks and balances and its “refeudal-
ization” of the economy and society. With the 
April 2018 parliamentary elections approaching, 
the government’s agenda has increasingly been 
shaped by electoral considerations. 
Throughout the period under review,  
the Orbán government has continued to hollow  
out the institutions of democracy. It has demon-
strated little trust in the soft power of its huge 
propaganda industry and has stepped up efforts 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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on family affairs. In October 2017, in a  
campaign-driven move, it also appointed two 
new ministers, János Süli for the Paks-2 new 
nuclear station and Lajos Kósa for the Modern 
Cities Program, thereby continuing the govern-
ment’s proclivity to create top-level positions 
for its allies. While Orbán back in 2010 empha-
sized the need for small government, the third 
Orbán government in fall of 2017 consisted of 
178 ministers, state secretaries and deputy state 
secretaries, twice the number of the Bajnai gov-
ernment in 2010. At the same time, policymak-
ing has continued to suffer from over-central- 
ization, hasty decisions and the renunciation  
of public consultation and external advice.
Due to the fact that the Hungarian institu-
tions meant to counterbalance the power of the 
government – such as the Constitutional Court, 
the media and the president of Hungary – have 
failed to fulfill their mandates, the EU is the last 
remaining veto player. Indeed, as the EU has  
repeatedly made a point of highlighting corrup-
tion, administrative shortcomings and illegal 
practices in the Hungarian government, Brus-
sels is unsurprisingly increasingly attacked as 
an enemy in the eyes of the Orbán government. 
On October 23, 2017, an important national hol-
iday, Orbán held a campaign speech in which he 
began by drawing a parallel between the former 
“homo sovieticus” and the “homo brusselicus” 
Hungary’s political system, economy and  
society have been linked by pervasive corruption 
and a special variant of crony capitalism.  
Hungarian society has increasingly taken on the 
features of a proto-feudal system in which the 
supporters of the regime benefit from corruption 
and nepotism. Economic policy has been charac-
terized by an increasing “re-nationalization” of 
the economy and a “re-feudalization” of public 
procurement. In the war among the oligarchs, 
Lajos Simicska and Zoltán Speder have lost to 
Lőrinc Mészáros, István Garancsi and István Ti-
borcz (Orbán’s son-in- law). The Orbán govern-
ment’s decisions are largely meant to provide 
investments and business opportunities for this 
network. As a result, the recovery of the Hun-
garian economy since 2013 has been strongly 
based on the influx of resources from European 
funds and on investment in stones rather than 
brains. Given the fact that the education and  
R&I systems have been subject to chronic under-
financing, political control and dubious organ-
izational reform and that the shortage of quali-
fied labor is growing, Hungary’s medium-term 
economic perspectives look bleak. 
In the period under review, the Orbán  
government adopted a number of institutional 
reforms. To underline its reform commitment,  
it created a new Competitiveness Council and 
announced the creation of a cabinet committee 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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general orientation in a quickly changing world. 
Add Fidesz’s media dominance and the lack of a 
convincing opposition candidate, and these fears 
have made it relatively easy for Fidesz to play the 
claviature of xenophobism. 
Still, a Globsec survey in late 2017 found that 
the overwhelming majority of Hungarians sup-
ports liberal democracy (79 %) and favor staying 
in the EU (71 %). The democratic opposition tried 
to capitalize on this sentiment by formulating 
the issue at stake in the parliamentary elections 
as “Europe vs. Orbán,” though without success. 
The key challenge of the future is to bring this 
support to the forefront and to diminish the in-
fluence of right-wing populism in the country. 
In this process, the government will not be of 
help, but rather the target.
as a historical burden of Hungary and closed by 
stating that “true Hungarians” would vote for 
Fidesz. In its confrontation with the EU, Fidesz 
has focused primarily on two ongoing infringe-
ment processes in political matters and the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice’s refusal of Hungary’s 
attempt to sue the EU on the issue of refugee  
allocation to demonstrate its commitment to  
an alleged fight for freedom. These campaigns,  
together with several other anti-EU measures 
have deepened the conflict between the Hungar-
ian government and the European Commission 
and the broad majority of EU members states. 
Even within the European Peoples Party,  
the patience with Orbán has worn thin.
Key Challenges
Although the parliamentary elections of April 
2018 fell outside the period under review, it is 
worth noting that Viktor Orbán’s victory in  
the election marked an unexpected landslide.  
With 134 seats in the 199-seat parliament, Fidesz 
has regained the two-thirds majority it had lost 
in February 2015, thereby demoralizing the op-
position even further. The strong position of the 
fourth Orbán government means that democracy 
in Hungary will continue to erode, pervasive  
corruption will undermine both democracy and 
economic growth, societal polarization will con-
tinue, the rift between liberal Budapest and the 
more traditional countryside will grow, qualified 
young people will continue to emigrate in high 
numbers and that the conflicts within the EU,  
not only over the issue of migration, will increase. 
On the surface, Fidesz’ strong showing is 
largely based on the party’s tough position on 
refugees. When trying to explain the electoral 
success of Viktor Orbán and his party, however, 
one has to dig deeper and address broader fears 
in Hungarian society. In the World Happiness 
Report 2017, Hungary ranked only 75th out of 
155 countries. This habitus is not new. Pessi-
mism and a great extent of “dystopia,” a neg-
ative future image, have always between a for-
matting power of Hungarian political culture. 
Many citizens have been exhausted by the ups 
and downs of the last decades; others fear that 
any changes might put the recent increases in 
wages and wealth at risk; some have lost their 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Attila Ágh
 Jürgen Dieringer
 Frank Bönker
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ficial Facebook page of Bright Future, the party 
explained: “The leadership of Bright Future 
has decided to end cooperation with the gov-
ernment of (Prime Minister) Bjarni Benedikts-
son. The reason for the split is a serious breach 
of trust within the government.” Here, they 
were referring to news, which had broken ear-
lier that evening, that the prime minister’s fa-
ther had provided a recommendation letter of 
“restored honor” for a man convicted of having 
raped his stepdaughter almost daily for 12 years. 
Benediktsson, despite having been informed 
about this by the minister of justice in July 2017, 
kept this matter to himself until a parliamentary 
committee compelled the ministry to release this 
information to the press. A new election was an-
nounced on 28 October 2017 since no new coa-
lition cabinet was on the cards. Parliament was 
dissolved and the second parliamentary election 
in one year took place. The election campaign 
had hardly started when the former prime min-
ister, Sigmundur D. Gunnlaugsson, who had re-
signed in spring 2016 in the wake of the Panama 
Executive Summary
In January 2017, ten weeks after the October 2016 
parliamentary elections, a three-party coalition 
government was formed. The most successful 
party in the elections, the Independence Party  
(21 seats), led a coalition with Regeneration 
(seven seats) and Bright Future (four seats).  
This meant that the government coalition held 
only 32 out of 63 parliamentary seats, a bare 
minimum for a parliamentary majority. Since 
Regeneration was more or less a liberal break- 
out from the Independence Party and Bright  
Future defined themselves as a centrist liberal 
party, this coalition government can be regarded 
as a right-wing government. This coalition was 
formed following a long government crisis with 
several false starts and failed attempts to build 
a new coalition government. After only eight 
months in power, this coalition collapsed when 
Bright Future announced that they were end-
ing their coalition with the Independence Party. 
In a two-sentence statement, posted on the of-
Iceland
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
Overall 2018 Performance
6.80
6.80
6.555.15
7.087.16 3
2
4
10
9
8
7
6
5
SGI 2018SGI 2015 SGI 2017SGI 2014 SGI 2016SGI 2011
Development over time
   Quality of Democracy
   Executive Capacity
   Executive Accountability
   Environmental Policies
   Social Policies
   Economic Policies
   OECD/ EU Average
141
Country profiles
In the 28 October 2017 parliamentary elec-
tion, the government coalition lost dramatically, 
losing 12 of its 32 seats and winding up with only 
20 out of 63 parliamentary seats. The Independ-
ence Party lost five seats, Regeneration lost three 
seats and Bright Future was wiped out winning 
only 1.2 % of votes. The Centre Party and Flokkur 
Fólksins (the People’s Party) won seats in par-
liament for the first time. The Centre Party won 
11 % of the vote and seven seats, and the People’s 
Party won 7 % of the vote and four seats. The So-
cial Democrats recovered somewhat from their 
heavy loss in 2016, going from 5.7 % of the vote 
to 12.1 % and from three seats to seven. The Pro-
gressive Party managed to keep their loss of sup-
port down to less than 1 percentage point and 
kept their eight seats from 2016, even if many 
party members, and one sitting member of  
parliament and former minister followed Gun-
nlaugsson to the new Centre Party. The Left-
Green Movement went from 15.9 % to 16.9 % and 
remained the second largest party. Finally, the 
Pirate Party suffered a significant loss, falling 
from 14.5 % in 2016 to 9.2 % of the vote, losing 
four of their 10 seats. So, the political landscape 
changed significantly between 2016 and 2017.  
For the first time, eight parties won seats in par-
liament. The largest party in parliament, the In-
dependence Party with 25 % of the votes and 16 
seats, has never been so small – the party’s sec-
Papers scandal, broke away from the Progres-
sive Party. In October 2017, he established a 
new political party, the Center Party (Miðflok-
kurinn). Various Progressive Party members 
left and joined the new party. This was the  
first time in Iceland’s history that both tradi-
tional parties, the Independence Party and the 
Progressive Party, were split at election time. 
A significant infringement of media freedom 
took place in October 2017, two weeks before the 
elections, when the Reykjavík Sheriff’s Depart-
ment issued a gag order on the newspaper Stun-
din. The order prohibited Stundin from covering 
leaked documents that outlined dubious financial 
transactions involving the prime minister, Bjarni 
Benediktsson, the chairman of the Independence 
Party, during the 2008 financial crash. The gag 
order and the questions raised by the coverage of 
Stundin reignited a debate about the corrosive ef-
fects of money in Icelandic politics, unequal justice 
and the value of a free press. OSCE expressed con-
cern about the gag order which bars Stundin and 
its partners at investigative journalism outfit Rey-
kjavík Media from further reporting on the leaked 
documents, including emails, from the windup 
committee of Glitnir bank. Recent judicial ver-
dicts in cases concerning freedoms of expression 
seem to make it unlikely that the gag order will 
be upheld by the Reykjavík District Court in early 
2018 or by the Supreme Court. Yet, time will tell. 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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labor market has agreed to join the SALEK agree-
ment. The likelihood that the remaining 30 % 
will agree to join is low. 
A further challenge will involve strengthen-
ing the health care system, which has been under 
severe financial strain since the 2008 financial 
crash. Before the 2016 election and again in 2017, 
every political party promised to pay more atten-
tion to restoring health care provision to its ear-
lier standing. 
Another major challenge concerns the dra-
matic rise in tourism in Iceland in the post-col-
lapse period, especially following the volcanic 
eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in 2010. Between 
2010 and 2016, the total number of tourists vis-
iting Iceland rose by 370 % from 0.5 million to 
1.8 million. This has had a dramatic impact on 
the national economy as tourism has become the 
most important earner of foreign exchange, sur-
passing the fisheries and aluminum industries’ 
combined foreign exchange earnings. Iceland 
needs more and better infrastructure, including 
roads and airports, and public services, such as 
police and health care, to accommodate the huge 
increase in tourism. Furthermore, an analysis is 
needed of the expected environmental effects of 
this increase. There are indications that the in-
flux of tourists will continue in part because oil 
prices and air fares will likely remain low over 
the next few years. 
Yet another challenge concerns the future of 
the banking system, which failed so spectacu-
larly in 2008. Governments since the financial 
crash have not outlined a strategy for the future 
ownership and organization of Iceland’s banking 
system, including the division between domes-
tic and foreign, and between public and private 
ownership. Furthermore, there are no discern-
ible plans for introducing foreign competition 
into Iceland’s protected retail banking system, 
a unique phenomenon in Europe. The problem 
is not confined to the banks because oligopolis-
tic market structures are a hallmark of Iceland’s 
economy. With several major industries domi-
nated by three or four local firms (e.g., oil,  
insurance and construction), Iceland needs  
more foreign competition. 
Last but not least, the unresolved question  
of the new constitution hangs over Iceland like 
the sword of Democles. In a democratic state, 
parliament cannot under any circumstances  
ond worst election result ever, second only to 
the 2009 election held immediately after the  
financial crash. There was neither a clear left  
or right swing in the elections. The right, the In-
dependence Party and Regeneration, went from 
a total of 28 seats to 20 and the two left-wing 
parties went from 13 to 18 seats. Centrist par-
ties gained ground, so the coalition question is 
almost as unclear as in 2016. However, the out-
going opposition parties, the Left-Green Move-
ment, Progressive Party, Social Democrats and 
Pirate Party, obtained the smallest possible ma-
jority of 32 seats. At the time of writing, in early 
November 2017, they have started formal negoti-
ations on building a government coalition, led by 
the chairman of the Left-Green Movement,  
Katrín Jakobsdóttir.
Another significant development during  
2017 was the successful and almost complete  
removal of the capital controls imposed under 
IMF supervision as an emergency measure fol-
lowing the financial crash of 2008. Having first 
been delayed and then implemented in stages, 
the relaxation of controls was not accompanied 
by a depreciation of the króna or by a sudden 
outflow of capital. Even so, Iceland remains vul-
nerable to future swings in capital flows and the 
exchange rate of the króna, the world’s smallest 
free-floating sovereign currency.
Key Challenges
Iceland’s next government, which is yet to be 
formed following the elections in October 2017, 
will face several key challenges. 
Labor market prospects are unclear. Many 
agreements from 2015 to 2016 will expire be-
tween 2017 and 2019, including 39 in the sec- 
ond half of 2017, 84 in 2018 and 142 in 2019.  
The majority will expire between December 2018 
and March 2019. The outcome of these labor 
market agreements will be important for future 
agreements. The SALEK agreement between  
employers’ associations and trade unions aimed 
to introduce a Nordic-style framework for ne- 
gotiating wages and settle recent labor market  
disputes, the latter of which had led to wide-
spread strikes and threats of inflation. But state 
employees and teachers have never signed the 
agreement. Consequently, roughly 70 % of the 
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Varadakar and Noonan’s successor became Pas-
chal Donohoe. Despite this change in leadership, 
the Confidence and Supply agreement between 
the Fine Gael party and the main opposition 
party, Fianna Fáil, negotiated after the 2016 
General Election, remained in place. This em-
powered Donohoe, who assumed the dual roles 
ship are the common and perpetual property of 
the nation,” a provision supported by 83 % of the 
voters in the 2012 referendum. The result of the 
parliamentary elections in October 2017 did not 
offer a clear path forward. What happens next 
depends on what kind of coalition emerges and 
how long it will last.
Executive Summary
The year 2017 was marked by a major change in 
the political leadership of Ireland. In June 2017, 
both the Taoiseach (prime minister), Enda 
Kenny, and the Minister for Finance, Michael 
Noonan, resigned. Kenny was replaced by Leo 
permit itself to disregard the unequivocal results 
of a constitutional referendum. After the con-
stitutional referendum called by parliament in 
2012, in which voters gave their strong support 
to a constitutional bill drafted by the nationally 
elected Constitutional Council, parliament has 
failed to move toward ratification, undermining 
Iceland’s democracy. The reason for this politi-
cal failure is, first and foremost, the unwilling-
ness of the Independence Party to accept the new 
constitution’s declaration that “Iceland’s nat-
ural resources which are not in private owner-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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in 2017. In 2017, Ireland had the lowest infla-
tion in the EU. Part of the catalyst for the re-
cently very positive non-inflationary environ-
ment has been the weakness of pound sterling 
(GBP) caused by the challenges associated with 
Brexit. The appreciation in the euro relative to 
pound sterling has enabled goods price inflation 
to remain persistently negative in Ireland, help-
ing counterbalance higher prices for services.
Consistent with the underlying growth of the 
economy there has been considerable improve-
ment in Ireland’s overall debt position and, conse-
quently, the country’s international credit ratings. 
During the Irish economic crisis, government debt 
reached a high 120 % of GDP in 2012. In 2016, it 
had fallen to 75 % of GDP against a euro zone av-
erage of 89.2 %. This improvement continued in 
2017 with the debt-to-GDP ratio falling to 66 %.
In the case of Ireland, it may be more ac-
curate to use a more relevant denominator for 
debt, namely the Modified Gross National In-
come (GNI*). GNI* more accurately reflects the 
income standards of Irish residents than GDP. 
It differs from standard GNI in that it excludes, 
inter alia, the depreciation of foreign-owned, 
but Irish resident capital assets (chiefly intellec-
tual property and aircraft leasing assets) and the 
undistributed profits of firms that have re-dom-
iciled in Ireland. The debt/GNI* ratio was 160 % 
in 2012. It fell to 102 % in 2016, indicating that 
of Minister for Finance and Minister for Public 
Expenditure and Reform, to introduce the 2018 
Budget on 10 October 2017.
In 2017, the Irish economy once again  
recorded very strong economic performance.  
The major indicators – GDP, consumption ex-
penditure, investment expenditure, exports and 
employment – were strongly positive. GDP grew 
by over 5 % in 2017, similar to the 5.1 % growth 
rate of 2016. Employment greatly benefited from 
this strong expansionary economic phase with 
unemployment falling from 7.9 % in 2016 to 
6.2 % in 2017. Unemployment, which stood at 
15 % in 2012, has fallen and is expected to fall 
further to 5.4 % in 2018. The main drivers of this 
impressive economic performance are consump-
tion and investment expenditure. These factors 
are a stark contrast to the 2015 “leprechaun” 
growth statistics, which were artificially inflated 
by alterations to statistical reporting procedures 
as well as the on-shoring effects of multina-
tional corporations transferring intangible as-
sets to Ireland and the increase in aircraft leas-
ing by companies in the International Financial 
Services Center. Uncharacteristically, this recent 
economic growth has taken place within an in-
flation free environment. Over the last three 
years, the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) moved from zero inflation (2015) to neg-
ative inflation (-0.2 %) in 2016 and to just 0.3 % 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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the services sector, particularly with law and ac-
counting firms. The construction industry has 
also benefited from the increased demand for 
new factories, offices and housing. Ireland’s low 
12.5 % corporate tax rate has been a key factor in 
attracting MNCs to Ireland. However, the recent 
reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate from 35 % 
to 21 % appears to reduce the incentive for mul-
tinational companies to base in Ireland. It may 
therefore reduce the flow of new U.S. multina-
tional investment into Ireland, though there are 
many other factors such as geographic proxim-
ity to other EU countries, the multiplicity of dou-
ble taxation arrangements between Ireland and 
other countries, the availability of a young Eng-
lish speaking labor force, and Ireland’s member-
ship in the euro zone that will continue to en-
courage MNCs to come to Ireland. 
At the EU level, Ireland must react to increas-
ing pressure for greater transparency regard-
ing the tax agreements between MNCs and its 
national tax authorities. On 30 August 2016, the 
EU’s Competition Commission found that Apple 
had unfairly benefited from selective treatment 
by Ireland’s tax revenue commissioners in 1991 
and 2007. This case has been appealed by both 
Apple and the Irish government. If both Apple 
and the Irish government lose their appeals,  
the Irish government will face the embarrass-
ment of having to accept $ 13 billion of unpaid 
taxes from Apple. Should this scenario arise 
and the Irish government accepts these unpaid 
taxes, it will face a flurry of actions from other 
EU countries who will contend that the revenues 
from these taxes should be transferred to them.
These diverse challenges must now be ad-
dressed by a minority government. On 6 May 
2016, Taoiseach Enda Kenny formed the first  
minority government since 1997. This Fine 
Gael-led minority government replaced the Fine 
Gael-Labour Party coalition government that had 
taken office in March 2011. Public debate around 
the 2011 general election had focused on the four 
crises that had enveloped the economy between 
2008 and 2011, namely the property market 
crash, banking collapse, fiscal downturn, and fi-
nancial crisis. In the 2011 general election, a dis-
satisfied electorate had voted against Fianna Fáil 
and its coalition partners, and in favor of Fine 
Gael and the Labour Party. Together Fine Gael 
and the Labour Party won 113 out of 166 (68 %) 
there has been a considerable improvement in 
the Irish debt burden. Nevertheless, the burden 
of debt faced by domestic residents remains high 
when the activities of the multinationals are  
removed from the national income statistics.
Overall, Ireland’s improved economic perfor-
mance is attributable to sound policy decisions 
and favorable external conditions, including 
strong growth in the U.S. economy, a return  
to growth in the euro zone, the persistence of 
historically low interest rates, and a strong  
inflow of foreign direct investment.
Key Challenges
Against the background of impressive macro-
economic performance, the Republic of Ireland 
continues to face the Scylla of Britain’s with-
drawal from the EU and the Charybdis of poten-
tial reforms to the corporate tax code in both the 
United States and EU.
Ireland is the only EU country to share a land 
border with the UK. The dangers posed by a hard 
Brexit are twofold. At the political level, a hard 
Brexit would lead to the re-imposition of a land 
border that had de facto disappeared under the EU 
in recent decades. The reintroduction of this land 
border could significantly undermine a peace pro-
cess still in progress. Economically, the implica-
tions of a hard Brexit are equally serious as the UK 
accounts for a significant share of Ireland’s exter-
nal trade. The bare trade statistics (14% of Irish 
exports go to the UK) appear to suggest that Ire-
land’s dependence on the UK has been greatly  
reduced in recent years. However, this decline is 
largely the result of strong growth in high tech 
and pharmaceutical exports from Ireland to coun-
tries other than the UK. The UK still accounts for 
over 40% of Ireland’s agricultural exports, with 
more than 50% of beef and pork, and 84% of 
poultry exports destined for the UK.
The eventual scale of this economic chal-
lenge will depend on how multinational corpo-
rations currently based in Ireland respond to the 
reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate. Though 
multinational corporations (MNCs) employ only 
200,000 out of a total workforce of 2 million in 
Ireland, their activities have a significant influ-
ence on the overall performance of the econ-
omy. These MNCs have sizable interlinkages with 
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developments, 45 % of Israeli citizens – with  
this group skewed toward left-wing Jewish  
voters and Arab Israelis – believe that Israel’s 
democratic system is in serious danger. Many 
Executive Summary
The quality of Israeli democracy appeared to decline 
over the course of the review period. Given recent 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
(2 seats). The 2016 general election was charac-
terized by a high level of party system fragmen-
tation with historically low levels of support for 
the three largest parties. The combined propor-
tion of votes won by Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil and 
the Labour Party dropped to 56 % from a long-
term average of 84 %. The current minority gov-
ernment operates on a knife edge; there is the 
possibility that another general election will be 
called over the coming year.
parliamentary seats, the largest majority of any 
Irish government.
During the 2016 general election, the Fine 
Gael-Labour Party coalition, having campaigned 
under the slogan “let’s keep the recovery going,” 
lost a combined 57 seats. Fine Gael lost 27 seats, 
while the Labour Party lost 30 seats. Fianna Fáil, 
the bête noire of the electorate in the 2011 gen-
eral election, regained 25 seats and Sinn Féin,  
an Irish republican party, increased its number of 
seats to 23. The election also marked the further 
rise in the number of independents (23 seats) 
and marginal parties, including the Anti-Aus-
terity Alliance–People Before Profit (6 seats), 
the Social Democrats (3 seats), and the Greens 
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the number of poor people and poor working 
families remains high. A more detailed obser-
vation indicates that the number of poor fami-
lies declined, while the overall number of poor 
people increased. Poverty rates remain high es-
pecially among the elderly, Ultra-orthodox and 
Arab citizens. The government has made some 
efforts to address this issue, for example, by in-
creasing the minimum wage in the Minimum 
Wage law, following an agreement between the 
Histadrut Labor Federation and business leaders.
 In the area of environmental policy, Israel 
has demonstrated significant progress, for in-
stance by ratifying the Paris climate agreement 
and making investments in emissions reduc-
tions. However, environmental organizations 
have accused the government of inactivity in  
investigating several recent ecological disasters, 
including a massive influx of acidic water that 
polluted Ashalim Creek in 2017.
With regard to executive capacity, the Israeli 
government has continued make efforts to re-
duce the regulatory burden. However, despite a 
2014 decision to implement a new regulatory  
impact assessment (RIA) model, RIA reports are 
rarely published – indeed, in 2017, only seven 
reports were published. The policy-implementa-
tion rate has improved to more than 70 %, after 
several years of low implementation rates.
decisions made by the current government have 
been seen as undermining the democratic rules of 
the game. Among the Knesset’s most controversial 
recent legislative measures have been a law re-
quiring NGOs to disclose foreign funding sources 
and the Settlement Regularization Law, which ad-
dresses land privately owned by Palestinians. 
Additionally, several top Israeli political of-
ficials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Net-
anyahu, have been involved in corruption cases. 
Despite Israel’s improvement in Transparency 
International’s 2016 Corruption Perceptions 
Index, a majority of the general public believes 
that Israel is a corrupt country. According to the 
2017 Israeli Democracy Index, Israeli citizens 
show a considerable degree of distrust in Israel’s 
leadership and institutions. The level of trust in 
the government, the Knesset and political parties 
was very low, with 30 % of Israeli citizens trust-
ing the government, 26 % trusting the Knesset 
and only 15 % trusting political parties. 
Economic policies in recent years have not 
changed dramatically. Israel has continued to 
show strength in key economic indicators such 
as GDP growth, the employment rate and the  
inflation rate, although the rising cost of living, 
high poverty rates and inequality remain key  
issues for many Israeli citizens. 
With regard to social policies, the number of 
employed people increased in 2017; however,  
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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commissioner for six months, though this  
figure is the most senior official in the govern-
ment administration, and plays a crucial role in 
managing the 80,000 government employees. 
Other top officials have also left the Civil Service 
in recent years. Separately, the government  
approved a new jobs law, allowing ministry  
directors-general to appoint their deputies  
without tender. The Israeli government should 
be actively encouraged to strengthen the Civil 
Service’s human resources, rather than under-
mining administrative professionalization.
Key Challenges
Overall, Israel performs well in some spheres, 
but poorly in others. In the period under review, 
public trust in Israel’s democratic institutions 
has weakened. Although the declining level of 
trust in political institutions is not unique to  
Israel, the current government’s recent attempts 
to weaken the gatekeepers of Israeli democracy, 
especially the media, the Supreme Court and the 
police, are seen as a real democratic danger.  
In this context, virtually every action and entity 
in the public sphere is viewed through a political 
lens. In light of these developments, the current 
Israeli government should act more responsibly 
and with greater respect for fundamental demo-
cratic practices, strengthening the gatekeepers  
of Israeli democracy rather than undermining 
their activities and status. 
The second main challenge is related to the 
high level of poverty in Israel. For several years, 
Israel has had the highest poverty rates in the 
OECD. According to the National Insurance In-
stitute, approximately 1.8 million Israelis were 
living in poverty in 2016. Disadvantaged groups 
such as Israeli Arabs, elderly persons and Haredi 
(ultra-Orthodox) populations experience high-
er-than-average poverty rates. In line with OECD 
poverty-reduction recommendations, Israel 
should increase education funding for Haredi and 
Israeli Arab schools and increase the basic pen-
sion rate without creating work disincentives. 
A third, serious challenge is the rising cost of 
living, including rising housing-market prices. 
Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon promised to 
combat cost increases during the 2015 election 
campaign, and as minister he has tried to make 
a mark through reductions in home prices, food 
costs and bank fees. However, while some of 
these plans have moved in a positive direction, 
others can be regarded primarily as electioneer-
ing tactics. Long-term, genuinely strategic plans 
should instead be made. Lowering home prices is 
also important to the financial system, as credit 
for construction and residences comprises more 
than half of all non-financial-sector private  
sector loans. 
Fourth, the Israeli government should 
strengthen its weakened Civil Service, and work 
to improve staffers’ capacities. As of December 
2017, Israel had had no permanent Civil Service 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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 Roy Karadag
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European Commission on budgetary policies,  
in contrast to Renzi’s more aggressive approach. 
A few months before the upcoming national 
elections (to be held in the spring of 2018),  
the political landscape is characterized by three 
political poles: the center-left Democratic Party 
(Partito Democratico), the anti-establishment 
Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle), 
and a fragmented center-right coalition in 
which Berlusconi (Forza Italia) and Salvini 
(Lega) are competing for the leadership. As the 
new electoral system is largely proportional,  
the probability of any of these three political 
poles winning a majority in both chambers of 
parliament is low. Forming a coalition able to 
command a majority in the next parliament will 
be far from easy. At present, the Five Star Move-
ment has said it would reject any coalition with 
the other parties. Meanwhile, internal dissen-
sions within and between the center-right and 
center-left will make the formation of a grand 
coalition difficult. Political uncertainty is once 
again on the rise. 
Executive Summary
In recent years, Italy has experienced one of  
its most serious economic crises, which has 
negatively affected industry, employment and 
government budgets. National and interna-
tional confidence in the economy have been  
seriously damaged and are yet to fully recover. 
Increased immigration with refugees arriving 
from Africa, and a major earthquake in 2016 
have added new challenges. Recent governments 
have faced a difficult dilemma of pursuing  
fiscal stabilization or promoting economic  
recovery. The Monti government’s strong  
austerity measures, which included deep public  
expenditure cuts and a substantial reform of 
the pension system, were followed by the Renzi 
government’s more expansionary policies.  
Yet, the current Gentiloni cabinet has tried  
to achieve a delicate balance between fiscal  
sustainability (and respect for EU rules) and 
promoting economic development. Gentiloni  
has adopted a more cooperative style with the 
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The government has also had to deal with  
a serious regional banking crisis. With the  
European Commission’s agreement, the gov-
ernment invested heavily in stabilizing the re-
gional banking sector. This response has made 
a positive contribution to the economic climate 
and ensured the availability of loans within the 
economy. The government should continue  
to promote the rationalization of the banking 
system to make it more efficient and robust. 
The reform of public administration initi- 
ated under the Renzi government has been  
continued by the current government. However, 
not enough progress has been made. The quality 
and efficiency of public administration is still far 
from satisfactory. Civil service recruitment at all 
levels needs quicker and more selective. At the  
same time, a rigorous performance evaluation 
process must be fully implemented for senior 
civil servants. The efficiency and speed of  
judicial procedures must also be significantly 
improved and the evaluation of the quality of  
judicial work must be stricter. 
Corruption continues to be a key factor un-
dermining the quality of public administration. 
It distorts public service provision and economic 
activity and inhibits modernization. The govern-
ment has made important progress in address-
ing this problem but must continue its efforts. 
The strong personalization of leadership 
that prevailed under the Renzi government pro-
duced mixed effects. On the one hand, it ena-
bled the government to embrace an ambitious 
reform agenda, which included constitutional, 
labor market, tax and public administration  
reforms. On the other hand, it placed the prime 
minister at the center of every political battle. 
The defeat of the Renzi government in the  
constitutional reform referendum persuaded  
the new prime minister, Gentiloni, to adopt a 
more collegial style. 
The Gentiloni government has fundamen-
tally maintained the economic priorities of  
the previous government, namely promoting 
economic growth and addressing high unem-
ployment. This has meant continuing a mildly 
expansionary approach to fiscal policy, although 
the current government has also paid close  
attention to fiscal sustainability. This approach 
is justifiable in the short term in view of the dif-
ficult economic conditions. Yet, the high level  
of public debt, which leaves the economy vul-
nerable to external financial shocks, will require 
a more aggressive policy of fiscal consolida- 
tion in the near future. A bolder approach to  
the spending review process should be adopted 
with the twin purpose of cutting waste and  
enhancing the efficiency of state bureaucracy. 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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State institutions need significant reform. 
After the failure of the 2016 referendum on the 
excessively broad constitutional reform and the 
strong personalization around the former prime 
minister, Matteo Renzi, the need to improve cru-
cial mechanisms of governance remains. The re-
cently approved electoral reform will further 
fragment parliament. To counterbalance this  
effect, the next government coalition (following 
the 2018 elections) should concentrate on  
defining a well-selected and clearly agreed gov-
ernment program. The government should also 
carefully define mechanisms for resolving inter-
nal conflicts. The parliament should improve its 
procedural rules to discourage the further frag-
mentation of parliamentary groups and make 
decision-making more efficient. 
Special attention should be given to improv-
ing the organization of the Prime Minister’s  
Office (PMO). The PMO should become a more  
effective tool for steering and coordinating the 
decision-making process of the cabinet. The con-
tinuing accumulation of heterogeneous functions 
in this office should be discouraged, as it exac-
erbates the lack of coordination between minis-
tries. The lack of coordination has meant that or-
dinary policies are inefficiently implemented and 
poorly resourced, and extraordinary policies are 
well endowed and often free from normal rules. 
Non-strategic functions should be transferred 
from the PMO to other government bodies,  
so that the PMO can focus on important policy-
making issues. More opportunities for independ-
ent experts and open consultations to improve 
the quality of policymaking should be encouraged. 
Greater emphasis should be given to strategic and 
innovative policymaking approaches, rather than 
the traditional, conservative approaches.
The relationship between central and local 
governments has yet to find a satisfactory equi-
librium. Central government has largely failed to 
control local and regional government spending. 
Yet, central government has simultaneously  
reduced the range of independent revenue 
sources available to local governments. This has 
increased local government dependency, while 
encouraging irresponsible behavior. The legis-
lative role of regions, in the past excessively ex-
tended, must be more focused on regional issues. 
A more sustainable balance between local govern-
ment autonomy and responsibility must be found.
The relationship between central govern-
ment and local authorities has not found a  
satisfactory equilibrium. A clearer division of  
responsibilities is required, while sufficient 
funds must be made available to local authori-
ties to fulfill their functions and mechanisms  
of accountability must be improved. 
Since the end of 2014, the economy has 
slowly begun to recover, but remains below 
pre-crisis levels. Further economic moderni- 
zation and liberalization is required, while re-
cent labor, social and industrial reforms are  
only just beginning to affect economic growth. 
The recent economic and financial crises 
have exposed failings in family and social pol-
icies. Italy has an aging population and very low 
birthrate, which current policies are failing to 
address. Fiscal support for families with children 
is still too low. Similarly, measures to improve 
gender equality in the work place, and recon-
cile work and family life are weak. Poverty also 
needs to be a much more important priority.
A significant proportion of the political elite 
and public now believe that Italy must adopt a 
more active role within the European Union.  
To achieve this, an assertive leadership is  
necessary, but the government must also gain 
greater credibility in the European Union by 
fully respecting commitments made by previous 
governments. It must also avoid courting  
public skepticism regarding supranational in-
tegration. The respective development of these 
tendencies will be key to shaping Italy’s role in 
the European Union.
Key Challenges
Italy suffered severely from a long period of 
economic and financial crises. However, Italy’s 
recent economic recovery can build on strong 
family bonds, high household savings rates, 
the resilience of small businesses, several 
strong manufacturing sectors and the qual- 
ity of some public institutions, including the 
Presidency of the Republic and the central  
bank (Banca d’Italia). At the same, the eco-
nomic and financial crises have exposed seri-
ous weaknesses across the public and private 
sectors, which must be addressed to ensure 
economic sustainability.
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quality of life, economic growth, the tourism  
industry, a sustainable agricultural sector and 
foreign investment.
The education system should be a higher  
priority, despite the austerity agenda. More flex-
ibility and openness in the education system is 
necessary for the system to respond to chang-
ing societal needs. After years of severe budget 
cuts, universities and research centers need to be 
given the resources to recruit young people and 
qualified foreigners. A higher skilled workforce 
complemented by a knowledge-based, innova-
tive economy would increase economic compet-
itiveness.
Italy should participate more actively in EU 
and international spaces. While already lead-
ing some EU operations, Italy should look to 
build closer and more cooperative relationships 
with neighboring countries, identifying common 
agendas rather than focusing on narrow national 
interests. This would allow Italy to more effec-
tively exploit its geopolitical potential.
Further democratization and fresh leader-
ship, complemented by tighter regulation  
of party organizations, is required to rebuild  
public trust in the established political parties.  
New legal rules should be adopted to promote 
internal democracy within political parties.  
In addition, a transition in political culture away 
from excessive personalization and competitive 
rhetoric toward pragmatism and international-
ism is needed.
Public administration requires a fundamen-
tal restructuring, clearly defined central and 
local government powers, and substantial reform 
of recruitment procedures, particularly for sen-
ior civil servants. Careful performance evaluation 
processes for all levels of public administration 
and greater accountability for senior civil serv-
ants should be a priority. The judiciary should  
be actively encouraged to accept reforms that  
increase its professional quality and ability to 
ensure timely justice. A less politicized judiciary 
should be enforced.
Economic policymaking needs to promote  
a more dynamic and growth-oriented economy. 
This will require further economic liberalization, 
and the curtailing of monopolistic and oligopolis-
tic power. In addition, business regulation should 
be simplified to enable traditional and emergent 
businesses to co-exist. Meanwhile, fiscal expan-
sion, designed to ease pressure on production 
and employment, must be balanced against  
fiscal sustainability. Small businesses need  
more support in accessing credit, and should be  
encouraged to grow and diversify. Government, 
business associations and trade unions should 
share the responsibility for achieving these 
goals, which will require an economic culture  
of cooperation and pragmatism.
As immigrants form an increasingly large 
proportion of the workforce, the management of 
immigration, and the effective integration and 
protection of immigrants’ rights must receive 
greater attention. Proposed legislation address-
ing the issue of access to citizenship for immi-
grants should define a realistic path toward citi-
zenship for immigrants to facilitate integration.
Better cooperation between public authorities 
and private organizations is necessary for the 
improved management of natural resources and 
cultural heritage. Natural resources and cultural 
heritage are important to improving people’s 
Full report available at 
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During its first years in power, the Abe  
cabinet focused on a major economic-stimulus 
program (“Abenomics” and its “Three Arrows”) 
that included an aggressive course of monetary 
easing and additional deficit spending. While the 
short-term effects of this unprecedented policy 
gamble were positive, consumption and invest-
ment levels have remained anemic, leading to 
a weak but prolonged recovery. This has led to 
a positive inflation rate, but without producing 
a definitive upswing. Long-term prospects for 
improvement still depend on serious structural 
reforms, the so-called third arrow of Abenom-
ics; however, these reforms have yet to emerge, 
despite some progress related to better condi-
tions for working women, for example. 
Since 2015, a second policy round consisting 
of three new “arrows” – this time referring to a 
strong economy, better child care and improved 
social security – has further deflected attention 
from institutional reforms. Apart from social- 
policy measures reacting to the emergence of 
serious distributional concerns, the focus on a 
Executive Summary
After years of short-lived cabinets, the 2012 gen-
eral election led to a stable coalition between the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Komeito 
that has lasted since, creating a space for deci-
sive political action in Japan rarely seen in re-
cent decades. The Lower House snap election in 
October 2017 confirmed the governing coalition, 
which following the election held two-thirds 
majorities in both chambers. Despite the election 
results, however, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe re-
mains unpopular among many voters. While this 
is in part because of his goal to change the con-
stitution, other factors include the delays in im-
plementing his socioeconomic reform agenda 
and his administration’s inability either to 
achieve a robust economic upturn or effectively 
address the issues of precarious employment  
and unequal income distribution. These still- 
unsolved problems continue to lead to old-age 
poverty and unstable jobs for large numbers of 
people, especially among the young generation. 
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security legislation in 2015 despite considera- 
ble opposition, providing the basis for a more 
proactive security strategy. With the neces- 
sary supermajorities in parliament in place,  
Abe seems determined to push ahead with his 
plans to achieve a revision by 2020, despite the 
widespread unpopularity of this move. 
With respect to the quality of democracy,  
the courts and the major media remain of only 
limited effectiveness in terms of providing checks 
on the government. However, high-level courts 
have become somewhat more restless. Addition-
ally, social-media criticism has grown and civil 
society organizations have become more active 
following the catastrophes of 3/11 and the contro-
versy over the introduction of the security laws, 
but to date this has had only very limited impact 
on public policy. The recent passage of the state 
secrets law and attempts to sideline progressive 
voices within the established media are worrying, 
and concerns about press freedom and civil liber-
ties have been mounting. Japan is now at the bot-
tom of G-7 in terms of press-freedom ratings. 
The parliamentary opposition effectively lacks 
the ability to launch initiatives vis-à-vis the  
government. The governing coalition’s superma-
jorities in parliament severely impede the oppo-
sition’s capacity to exercise effective oversight.
The LDP-led government has quite success-
fully sought to steer from the center, for in-
“strong economy,” which has involved an  
emphasis on productivity, small enterprises,  
regional economies and selected industries,  
has tended to evoke conventional concepts of  
industrial policy, which are of dubious value in 
today’s global economic environment. Moreover, 
the stimulus power of the unconventional mone-
tary easing seems to have reached its limits, and 
is no longer able to trigger the desired sustained 
upturn of expectations and economic activity.
Time is running out in Japan to initiate a 
strong economic upturn. In parallel, the poten-
tial for destabilizing junctures is growing, with 
trust in institutions remaining very low, and the 
population among the most pessimistic in the 
OECD world.
With regard to international policy, U.S. 
President Trump’s decision not to ratify the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the esca- 
lation in U.S.-North Korean tensions have  
created a difficult situation for Japan. Tensions 
with China and South Korea have been reduced 
to some extent, and Japan seems more willing  
to accept Chinese leadership on some regional 
issues, for instance in matters related to the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
Constitutional reform, the government’s 
second major stated policy priority, has been 
met with considerable resistance. Nevertheless, 
the government successfully introduced new  
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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The window in which genuine progress can 
be made is closing, as macroeconomic stimulus 
has its limits. The administration has pushed  
the central bank further toward activist policy, 
promised to increase government expenditures, 
and earmarked expected consumption-tax in-
creases for further public spending instead of 
debt reduction, all moves that increase the  
danger that the public finances will be pushed 
into unsustainability.
In the field of foreign and security policy,  
it will be very tricky for the LDP to balance its as-
sertive reformulation of security laws and possi-
ble further moves toward constitutional change 
with these policies’ potential negative effects on 
(regional) foreign relations. The limited popular 
support for this policy direction will only further 
exacerbate these hurdles. While Japan has en-
joyed a good start with the current U.S. president, 
and while the dangers of even more protectionism 
globally seem somewhat reduced, this does not 
diminish concerns about other challenges such as 
the specter of a nuclear arms race in the region 
and increasing tensions with a resurgent China.
The ruling coalition’s comfortable super- 
majorities in both chambers of parliament pro-
vide the government with both opportunity and 
challenges. They seem to give the government 
the necessary leverage to push through reforms,  
but also strengthen the position of parliamentary 
vested interests that oppose a disruption of the 
comfortable status quo.
It will be risky for the government to pursue 
its two major priorities, economic and constitu-
tional reform, at the same time, since the recent 
past indicates that the coalition’s remaining po-
litical capital may not suffice to accomplish both. 
Without a return to a strong economy, constitu-
tional change will not create a more self-assured 
Japanese state. Thus, socioeconomic reform 
should take precedence. In this regard, the gov-
ernment will need to strengthen alliances with 
interest groups that support the reform move-
ment. This may include Japan’s globally-ori-
ented business sector, which has little interest  
in seeing its home market further weakened.
Courts, the media (including social media) 
and civil society movements should seek to im-
prove their capacities to monitor and oversee the 
government. The government should not view 
media criticism as an obstacle to the fulfillment 
stance by strengthening the Cabinet Office and 
its secretariat, and centralizing discussion fora 
for cross-cutting strategic issues. However,  
tensions between the core executive and line 
ministries (and their constituencies) remain, 
and have contributed to delayed reforms in  
several policy areas.
Key Challenges
Japan provides a high standard of living and safe 
living conditions for more than 120 million peo-
ple. Despite major problems such as a rapidly 
aging population and an inadequate integration 
of women into its workforce, it has remained one 
of the leading economies in the world, and its 
rate of per capita economic growth is in line with 
that in the United States or the European Union. 
Notably, however, disposable incomes have risen 
little in recent years, and real consumption per 
capita has been flat. In a country that was once 
hailed as the epitome of equitable growth, a new 
precariat has emerged, with 40 % of the labor 
force working in nonregular positions.
If stability is to be achieved, the Abenomics 
program’s short-term expansionary measures 
must be followed by serious structural reforms. 
Vital policy objectives include the significant re-
duction of protectionist agricultural provisions, 
the creation of a more liberal labor-market re-
gime, the provision of effective support for 
well-educated women, the establishment of 
a more liberal immigration policy with corre-
sponding integration policies, the development 
of a convincing energy policy in line with the 
2015 Paris Agreement, and the introduction of 
better-targeted social-policy reforms. 
Some progress has been made, for instance  
in the area of free-trade promotion, but more has 
to be achieved, and swiftly. For example, labor- 
policy reform bills were delayed during the re-
view period because of the snap elections in 2017, 
while even the draft measures appeared to place 
insufficient priority on distributional outcomes.
The resistance to restarting nuclear reac- 
tors among the public, regional governments  
and even the court system should lead the gov-
ernment to rethink its strategy and seek a more 
acceptable energy policy that conforms with the 
2015 Paris Agreement goals.
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The difficult search for country-level solu-
tions should be combined with policy experiments 
at other levels. The post-2014 introduction of new 
special economic zones is a welcome step, but this 
strategy should be both bolder and broader.
of its ambitions, but as a corrective in an open 
and democratic society that works to improve the 
fit between government plans and popular aspi-
rations and concerns. 
As of this date, the parliament does not  
provide effective governmental checks and bal-
ances. Parliamentarians need to make better use 
of their resources to develop alternative legisla-
tive initiatives.
reducing the tax burden on low-wage earners.  
Ambitious education reforms have been announced, 
but their successful implementation remains far  
from guaranteed given the vocal opposition from 
teachers and local government authorities. A much 
needed supplementary allocation to the health 
care budget has been passed for 2018. Overdue re-
forms of the health care system remain fraught 
with controversy as current drafts appear to pri-
oritize tax collection over access to health care. 
Executive Summary
Latvia’s economy has rebounded; GDP growth in 
2017 once again placed it among the fastest grow-
ing economies in Europe. This has created fiscal 
space to shift focus to policy challenges neglected 
in the past, including social inequalities and in-
come disparities as well as poor health and educa-
tion outcomes. A recent reform package has shifted 
the tax system toward a progressive income tax, 
Latvia
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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failed to establish its authority among the numer-
ous voices in government decision-making, with 
the result that PKC analyses are often overlooked in 
favor of political expediency. Latvia’s governance 
system is increasingly open to evidence-based pol-
icymaking and external advice. While underfunded, 
the participation of academic experts and NGOs in 
policy development is increasingly the norm. 
The parliament (Saeima) faces serious chal-
lenges in exercising executive oversight. In 2017, 
parliament established a parliamentary research 
unit. Its initial mandate, however, is quite nar-
row; it will provide several research products per 
year, defined and agreed upon via a collaborative 
process conducted during the preceding year. 
The limited scope of this mandate will prevent 
the research unit from having an impact on  
day-to-day legislative decision-making. 
Though Latvia has a stable democratic frame-
work that protects civil rights, political liberties, 
and democratic institutions, most citizens do not 
trust the government and are reluctant to parti- 
cipate politically. Only 15 % of respondents to a  
recent public opinion poll agreed that they could 
influence decision-making, while a negligible 
percentage stated that they engage directly in 
party politics. The government faces challenges 
in building trust, limiting the performance of the 
democratic system. Several reforms are necessary 
to improve governance, including protecting the 
The increasingly unpredictable international 
climate poses a continuing threat to domestic se-
curity. Latvia will meet its NATO defense spend-
ing goal of 2 % of GDP in 2018. Contradictory 
pro-EU and pro-Russian narratives have been 
exacerbated by a lack of independent local media 
and tensions within Latvia’s bilingual population. 
The slow post-factum unveiling of Russian inter-
ference in European and United States elections 
raises questions of how Latvia will mitigate po-
tential interference in its own elections in 2018. 
Latvia joined the OECD in 2016. Reforms  
advocated by the OECD are being implemented, 
including on improving the management of state-
owned enterprises, ensuring political non-inter-
ference, and separating the state’s management 
and regulatory functions. While frameworks for 
the management of state-owned enterprises and 
for insolvency procedures have been improved, 
implementation remains a challenge. The Foreign 
Investors Council has identified issues under-
mining the foreign investment climate, includ-
ing a lack of legal certainty in court decisions and 
tax policy and demographic challenges to Latvia’s 
long-term immigration policy.
The government has significant strategic  
capacities. The Cross-Sectoral Coordination  
Centre (PKC) offers regular, quality assessments 
that feed into the day-to-day decision-making 
processes of government. However, the PKC has 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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quality and reach of public broadcasting will 
be key to addressing the contradictory pro-EU, 
pro-Russian media narratives that are circulat-
ing. The government should take advantage of 
the fiscal space generated by a growing econ-
omy to consolidate the financial independence of 
public broadcasting by providing resources that 
are not subject to annual budget shifts. With ad-
equate funding, these reforms could free public 
broadcasting from relying on advertising reve-
nue. Recent election interference by Russia in the 
United States and Europe raises the specter of 
similar interference in Latvia, where information 
warfare is common. The government must equip 
itself to mitigate the threat that this presents for 
the 2018 national elections. 
The establishment of a parliamentary re-
search unit in 2017 is a welcome step toward  
improving the parliament’s capacity for execu-
tive oversight. Unfortunately, the initial mandate 
for the research unit will have limited impact on 
day-to-day legislative decision-making. The re-
search unit should be given a broader mandate, 
one that enables it to bring evidence-based anal-
ysis into the work of parliamentary committees.
Government decision-making processes are 
well managed, transparent and allow for stake-
holder input. The practice of fast-tracking policy 
proposals undermines this process; further efforts 
should be made to reduce the use of fast-tracking. 
The Cross-Sectoral Coordination Centre (PKC) is 
well placed to support strategic planning in the 
new medium-term budget framework and to 
keep the government focused on long-term goals. 
However, the PKC must focus on building its  
informal authority within the decision-making 
process so that its analyses can counteract the 
pull toward political expediency. 
The government should continue to create 
space for constructive civic engagement by build-
ing on innovative public engagement platforms 
already launched and channeling financial support 
to NGOs that engage in the policy process.  
While the government has offered significant sup-
port to some social partners, most NGOs remain 
dependent on rapidly declining foreign funding 
as local funding has not filled the shortfall.
independence of public broadcasting and rebuild-
ing a solid anti-corruption institution.
Key Challenges
The government has proven to be capable of  
focused and determined policy development.  
The growing economy presents opportunities to 
realign tax burdens and focus on long-term driv-
ers of economic performance and growth, such as 
education and innovation. It also permits a focus 
on long-neglected policy challenges, such as re-
ducing social inequalities. Encouraging steps 
have been taken. The government must now fol-
low through on measures shifting the tax burden 
away from low-wage earners, improving health 
care access and quality, and reforming education. 
The needs in these challenges are enormous,  
but must be balanced with fiscal prudence. 
If social inequality remains unaddressed, 
public trust will continue to slip, risking a fur-
ther rise in emigration. The mismatch of skills 
in the Latvian labor market has created high 
unemployment coupled with a qualified labor 
shortage. Negative demographic trends will ex-
acerbate this situation in the future. The govern-
ment should focus on policies that mitigate labor 
shortages, such as remigration incentives and 
immigration policies specifically targeted to fill 
particular highly skilled labor needs.
The government should continue to address 
barriers to economic development, such as the 
slow court system, inadequate insolvency proce-
dures and corruption. Policies adopted in prepa-
ration for OECD membership should be followed 
through to successful implementation. With the 
2017 change in leadership at the Corruption Pre-
vention and Combating Bureau (KNAB), there is 
now the opportunity for a long overdue reposi-
tioning and overhaul of the institution.
Given international tensions stemming  
from Russia’s activities, Latvia must fulfil its 
NATO defense commitments as well as mitigate 
the economic effects of the sanctions imposed 
on Russia by the European Union. The approved 
budget allocation to meet Latvia’s NATO de-
fense spending commitments starting in 2018 
is a welcome development. However, resilience 
in the face of a hybrid war requires other types 
of spending. Strengthening the independence, 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org  Vita Anda Terauda, Daunis Auers, Detlef Jahn
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Lithuania
Country profile SGI 2018
results lagging behind those of economic  
and environmental policies. Some observers at-
tribute this to EU transition and integration pro-
cesses, which have primarily focused on political, 
economic and administrative issues. The coun-
try’s formal governance arrangements are well 
designed. However, these arrangements do not  
always function to their full potential. There are 
significant gaps in policy implementation and 
the use of impact-assessment processes for  
important policy decisions, while societal con-
sultation remains underdeveloped. Across most 
sustainable governance criteria, little has 
changed during the review period. 
The establishment of a new coalition  
government was the most significant devel-
opment during the review period. The Lithua-
nian Farmers and Greens Union won 56 out of 
141 seats, and became the largest parliamentary 
party, although many of its faction members are 
not party members. The union is jointly led by 
Ramūnas Karbauskis, an industrial farmer and 
large landowner, and Saulius Skvernelis, a for-
Executive Summary
Formal democracy is well developed in Lithua-
nia. Participation rights, electoral competition 
and the rule of law are generally respected by the 
Lithuanian authorities. However, substantive  
democracy suffers from several weaknesses.  
Despite some recent improvements, party financ-
ing is not sufficiently monitored or audited, and 
campaign-financing legislation is not subject to 
adequate enforcement. In addition, discrimina-
tion continues to be evident, sometimes signif-
icantly so. Most importantly, corruption is not 
sufficiently contained in Lithuania. Anti-corrup-
tion legislation is well developed, but the public 
sector continues to offer opportunities for abuses 
of power and the enforcement of anti-corruption 
laws remains insufficient. 
Lithuanian policymakers have sought to  
establish and maintain social, economic and  
environmental conditions that promote citizens’ 
well-being. However, the country’s policy  
performance remains mixed, with social-policy 
Overall 2018 Performance
8.12
6.64
7.147.65
5.756.01 3
2
4
10
9
8
7
6
5
SGI 2018SGI 2015 SGI 2017SGI 2014 SGI 2016
Development over time
   Quality of Democracy
   Executive Capacity
   Executive Accountability
   Environmental Policies
   Social Policies
   Economic Policies
   OECD/ EU Average
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
160
Sustainable Governance Indicators
ate several of these pledges. In its first year,  
the main policy decisions adopted by the new 
government included reform of the state-owned 
forestry companies, largely motivated and  
legitimized by the need to implement OECD  
recommendations required to join the organiza-
tion, and the revised Labor Code. Considerable 
attention was also allocated to measures to re-
duce the availability of alcohol. However, many 
other reforms that were included in the govern-
ment program (e.g., higher education, public ad-
ministration, tax and pension reforms) are still 
in the preparatory stages of development, while 
reform of the forestry companies is likely to ex-
perience substantial resistance during the pro-
cess of implementation. It should be noted that 
other state-owned enterprises like Lithuanian 
Railways, which have long been suspected of 
non-transparent practices, have also been re-
formed. The introduction of these reforms can  
be attributed to the skilled leadership of Rokas  
Masiulis, minister of transport and formerly 
minister of energy in the previous government,  
the prime minister and the president, and the 
ability of government to undertake reforms 
without the need for parliamentary approval. 
In terms of economic development, the econ-
omy continued to perform positively through 
2015 and 2016. After the shock of the 2008  
financial and economic crises, the economy  
mer police chief and interior minister in the 2012 
to 2016 government. In December 2016, the Lith-
uanian Farmers and Greens Union, and the Social 
Democratic Party of Lithuania formed a coalition 
government with a parliamentary majority of 73 
out of 141 parliamentary seats. However, in au-
tumn 2017, the coalition became a minority  
government following the break-up of the Social 
Democratic Party of Lithuania.
During the election campaign the Lithuanian 
Farmers and Greens pledged to form a techno-
cratic government. Consequently, only one out 
of 14 initial government ministers was a member 
of the union, while two ministers were members 
of the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania and  
11 ministers were officially independent. Saulius 
Skvernelis led the Lithuanian Farmers and 
Greens Union during the election campaign,  
but without formally joining the party. Skver- 
nelis subsequently became the new prime min-
ister. Despite this arrangement, a few elected 
politicians from the Lithuanian Farmers and 
Greens Union have announced government pol-
icy pledges, which include introducing a state 
monopoly on alcohol sales, establishing a state-
owned bank and transferring social-security 
contributions from second-pillar private  
pension funds to the state social security  
fund. However, the new government program,  
approved in December 2016, failed to substanti-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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Overall, executive capacity and accountability 
have remained largely similar. Lithuania contin-
ued its preparations for joining the OECD, which 
has been the main motivating factor behind re-
forms to state-owned enterprises and regulatory 
policies. Another related positive development is 
the depoliticization of executive civil service ap-
pointments and the professionalization of man-
agement in state-owned enterprises. However, 
power and authority remain centralized. Citizens 
and other external stakeholders rarely engage in 
the processes of government. Despite numerous 
electoral pledges to undertake cost-benefit anal-
yses, most major reforms are not accompanied 
by substantive impact assessments and stake-
holder consultations. In particular, the initiatives 
of members of parliament continue to be poorly 
prepared and lack proper impact assessments.
Key Challenges
Following the recent party leadership election, 
the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania voted to 
leave the ruling coalition. However, most mem-
bers of the party’s parliamentary group decided 
to stay in the coalition. One minister delegated 
by the Social Democratic Party resigned from the 
cabinet, while two other ministers decided to con-
tinue their work in the government. Although the 
Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union is expected 
to continue cooperating with eight former Social 
Democratic Party members of parliament,  
the current government is balanced on the verge 
of a minority government. To remain in power, 
the government will require political backing  
from other parliamentary groups, which will 
complicate the implementation of the government 
program, especially the adoption of structural re-
forms. However, the adoption of the 2018 budget 
indicates that the current minority government 
arrangement is able to gather enough parliamen-
tary support for major political decisions.  
This might change if some political actors decide 
to shift their position with a view to the forthcom-
ing presidential elections in 2019, but it is possi-
ble that this situation could continue until the next 
scheduled parliamentary elections in 2020. 
To address key policy priorities (e.g., educa-
tion, innovation, taxation and pension reforms), 
consensus between the government, president 
returned to growth in 2010 following fiscal con-
solidation, a recovery in the global economy and 
increasing domestic demand. Lithuania has since 
numbered among the fastest-growing economies 
in the European Union with real GDP growth 
around 3 %, despite the negative effects of sanc-
tions imposed by Russia on exports from the  
European Union. Though the economic growth 
rate dropped to 1.7 % in 2015 due to a drop in  
exports to Russia, economic activity picked up in 
2016 reaching 2.3 % growth and is projected to 
increase to 3.8 % in 2017. However, inflation has 
become a major public concern.
In 2016, labor market outcomes improved  
due to economic growth and a declining working- 
age population. Unemployment decreased from 
10.7 % in 2014 to 8.1 % in 2016 and is projected  
to decline further. The two main issues affect-
ing the labor market are the mismatch between 
the supply of and demand for skilled labor, and 
the decreasing pool of labor due to emigration 
and declining numbers of graduates entering the 
labor market. However, despite these changes, 
unemployment rates remain high among low-
skilled workers and the number of people at risk 
of social exclusion remains high. The share of the 
population at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
declined from 30.8 % in 2013 to 27.3 % in 2014, 
but increased to 29.3 % in 2015. Moreover, the 
country continues to compare relatively poorly in 
terms of life expectancy at birth. A low birthrate, 
emigration to richer EU member states and rel-
atively low immigration continue to present sig-
nificant demographic challenges. These demo-
graphic challenges are likely to negatively affect 
economic growth and the pension system, and 
increase pressure to restructure the education, 
health care and public administration systems. 
In 2016, the parliament approved a new “social 
model,” which provides for the liberalization of 
labor market relations and the development of a 
more sustainable state social-insurance system. 
Implementation of the new social model began 
in mid-2017 after the new government revised 
the initial proposal to better balance labor market 
flexibility and employee protections.
Under the 2012 to 2016 and current govern-
ments, there was significant continuity in the 
country’s governance arrangements, although 
meetings of the State Progress Council and the 
Sunset Commission were discontinued in 2016. 
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sector should also be continued. Given the declin-
ing population, the size of the country’s public 
administration needs to be reduced (in terms of 
the number of public administration institutions 
and staff employed) and made more efficient. 
Although Lithuania’s public finances are 
solid, fiscal challenges are set to become more 
difficult in the medium term due to the declin-
ing population and increasing dependency ratios. 
The complex causes of structural unemployment, 
persistent emigration, rising poverty and social 
exclusion should be urgently addressed. A mix  
of government interventions is needed to miti-
gate these social problems, including general  
improvements to the business environment,  
effective active labor-market measures, an in-
crease in the flexibility of labor-market regula-
tion, improvements in education and training, 
cash-based social assistance, and other social 
services targeted at vulnerable groups. The gov-
ernment’s new “social model,” which contains 
proposals to liberalize labor relations and im-
prove the sustainability of the social-insurance 
system, entered into force in mid-2017. 
The European Union’s 2014 to 2020 finan-
cial-assistance program for Lithuania is ex-
pected to total about € 13 billion. The key goal of 
the program is to promote economic competi-
tiveness in Lithuania. However, funding should 
target economic sectors with high potential 
growth, while being careful not to distort mar-
kets or fund corruption. Better policy implemen-
tation in line with strategic priorities set out in, 
for example, Lithuania 2030 and the Partner-
ship Agreement with the European Commission 
(i.e., Europe 2020 strategy) would improve the 
effectiveness and sustainability of policy devel-
opments, and quality of governance. In addition, 
the Lithuanian authorities should improve the 
result-orientation of EU funds while maintaining 
a high rate of financial absorption.
Democracy and governance arrangements 
could be improved by strengthening some legisla-
tion (e.g., media-ownership transparency), while 
enforcing other legislation more strictly (e.g., anti- 
discrimination rules). Collaboration between cen-
tral government, local governments and civil so-
ciety actors could be improved by encouraging 
citizen participation, making wider use of existing 
impact assessment processes and stricter adher-
ence to the principle of proportionality.
and parliament is needed. The commitment to 
increase defense spending to 2 % of GDP by 2018 
demonstrates that consensus can be achieved in 
the context of geopolitical tensions. In addition, 
policy implementation and institutional  
reform must be given sufficient attention.  
The successful development of a new liquified 
natural gas terminal in Klaipėda, an electricity 
network linking Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, 
and the adoption of the euro in 2015 demonstrate 
the country’s capacity to complete major political 
projects. During the spring 2017 parliamentary 
session, the Skvernelis government was able to 
push through several important reforms (includ-
ing the adoption of a new labor code, optimiza-
tion of the network of state universities, merger 
of state-owned forestry companies and amend-
ments to the Alcohol Control Law). However, it is 
not clear if the current government will be able 
to sustain this reform momentum due to its  
diminished parliamentary majority following  
the split within the Social Democratic Party.
Key challenges to long-term economic  
competitiveness include negative demographic 
developments, labor-market deficiencies,  
persistently high emigration rates, rising lev-
els of poverty and social exclusion, inadequate 
physical infrastructure (particularly in the en-
ergy system), relatively high income tax rates, 
a large shadow economy, low energy efficiency 
(especially in buildings), low R&D spending,  
and weak innovation. To address these chal-
lenges, the new government should continue  
reforming the labor market, higher education 
sector, social-inclusion policy and energy sector.  
Furthermore, as a small and open economy  
dependent on exports, Lithuania is particularly 
sensitive to external shocks. To reduce the econ-
omy’s exposure to external shocks, the govern-
ment must improve the national regulatory  
environment and increase business flexibility  
to reorient market activities. The performance  
of the country’s schools and higher education in-
stitutions should be improved through structural 
reforms, a greater focus on results and institu-
tional capacity-building. For instance, poorly 
performing universities should be merged or 
closed, and the government’s limited resources 
distributed to the best performing universities to 
invest in R&D and improve the quality of study 
programs. The restructuring of the health care 
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Bank and the European Stability Mechanism as  
well as several European Commission services. 
Approximately 12,000 EU officials work in Lux-
embourg and key EU ministerial meetings are 
regularly hosted in the Grand Duchy. Luxem-
bourg also hosts the new European Public  
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).
Luxembourg’s economy is booming and 
profiting from an expanding EU and global 
economy. The attraction of new industries and 
businesses, public investments, and rising  
tion), improving policy delivery, and ensuring 
that senior appointments in the civil service and 
state-owned companies are not politicized.
Executive Summary
Luxembourg is a founding member of the United 
Nations (1945), NATO (1949), the European  
Coal and Steel Community (1950), the Euro-
pean Economic Community (1957) and OECD 
(1960). It is also one of the three capitals of the 
EU, along with Brussels and Strasbourg. It hosts 
several EU institutions, including the Secretariat 
of the European Parliament, the European Court 
of Justice, EUROSTAT, the European Investment 
Corruption in the health care sector, parlia-
ment, court system, police and local authori-
ties must be tackled by enforcing anti-corruption 
regulations more effectively. The profession-
alism of the civil service must be maintained, 
while integrating modern policymaking prac-
tices (e.g., strategic oversight, evidence-based 
policymaking and inter-institutional coordina-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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e-commerce. The economic growth of recent 
years has reduced the national debt to below the 
2012 level. Luxembourg had the second lowest 
gross national debt in Europe (behind Estonia) 
at 20.8 % in 2016, though it is projected to rise to 
22.8 % in 2020. In addition, public investments 
are presumed to increase by about 10 % in 2018.
The demographic development of the coun-
try differs from most other EU member states 
due to persistently high migration rates. Since 
2012, Luxembourg has had an exceptionally high 
annual population growth rate by EU standards 
(2.29 % in 2016). Another key driver of this  
dynamic population development is the average 
age of 39.2, again low by EU standards, although 
higher than in Ireland and Cyprus. Overall,  
the population is increasing, aging and becoming 
more heterogeneous. In July 2017, about 27 %  
of the workforce were Luxembourg nationals,  
while 42.6 % were so-called cross-border com-
muters. This situation guarantees Luxembourg 
high flexibility and short-term fluctuations in  
the labor market. For the cross-border labor 
market, commuters from within the Greater Re-
gion are crucial. A shortage of highly qualified 
personnel (e.g., in ICT) has a fundamental impact 
on the further sustainable development of the  
financial, service, research and health sectors.
In the last years, Luxembourg was forced 
to accept that some tax policies were untena-
domestic demand are fueling economic growth. 
Luxembourg City is one of three EU capitals and 
a key international financial center. The coun-
try offers extraordinary business conditions  
with an attractive tax environment, high private 
and public investments, strong GDP growth, 
high living standard, an outstanding social se-
curity system, low unemployment, and consist-
ently low central government debt. The coun-
try’s public administration is highly efficient 
and the overall economic outlook remains stable.
Luxembourg has experienced strong eco-
nomic growth and fiscal stability. This has  
provided public authorities the means to develop 
and maintain an outstanding welfare system 
over the last two decades, even as neighboring 
countries have reduced public welfare provision. 
Luxembourg’s welfare system includes generous 
insurance coverage, benefit schemes and public 
services. For example, health care provision has 
recently been expanded and the level of retire-
ment benefits exceeds Scandinavian standards.
After a 3.4 % GDP increase in 2017, the econ-
omy is projected to further strengthen to almost 
4.4 % in 2018. Consumer confidence, higher 
wages (+4 % in 2017), and high domestic con-
sumption and investment contributed to this 
major growth. Furthermore, in 2017 the unem-
ployment rate decreased to 6 % and tax arrears 
are compensating for reduced VAT revenue from 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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nancial sector. It will take time for recent efforts 
in tax transparency to restore Luxembourg’s tar-
nished reputation as a tax haven.
In 2016, Luxembourg invested 1.24 % of its 
GDP in R&D, less than the EU average and less 
than the government’s own target of more than 
2.03 % of GDP. The Luxembourg Cluster Initia-
tive, led by the national research agency Luxin-
novation, has identified seven economic sectors 
that will be essential for sustainable economic 
development. These sectors include health care 
and biotechnology, ICT, material technology, 
space technology, logistics, maritime activ-
ities, and emerging alternative investment 
funds (e.g., private-equity funds). There is 
broad consensus that to further drive economic 
growth, public investment in R&D must signif-
icantly increase and economic competitiveness 
must be improved.
Public investments and, in turn, the national 
debt are on the rise. The latter increased from 
22 % of GDP in 2015 to 23.5 % in 2017 and is 
projected to reach an all-time high € 1 billion in 
deficit in 2018. Despite the country’s strong GDP 
growth, general government debt will signifi-
cantly increase. Even though the current level  
of national debt is far below the EU average, 
further government expenditure must be moni-
tored closely and rising interest rates taken into 
account.
Luxembourg’s welfare system is one of the 
most substantial and comprehensive systems  
in the EU. While neighboring countries have  
reduced welfare provisions in recent years,  
Luxembourg has expanded its system over the 
past 30 years. Both the OECD and European 
Commission have warned that Luxembourg will 
need to reduce its generous welfare provision if 
the system is to remain sustainable, particularly 
its extensive support for early retirement,  
disability benefits and the health care sector.
Recent population growth has been driven  
by a modest decrease in the birth rate, a fall- 
ing death rate and increasing life expectancy. 
Luxembourg has also experienced a high rate  
of migration, with around 80% of its population 
growth resulting from migration. Since Octo-
ber 2017, more than 600,000 people are living in 
the Grand Duchy. After an all-time high of more 
than 11,000 new citizens in 2015, migration de-
creased slightly since 2016.
ble and that alternative sources of revenue need 
to be developed. Recent legislation, which came 
into force in 2017, requires financial institutions 
based in Luxembourg to provide information to 
U.S. authorities; this will likely have a dampen-
ing effect on the country’s financial sector.  
Notwithstanding, competitive individual and 
corporate tax rates and low indirect labor costs 
will continue to make Luxembourg an attractive 
base for international companies.
Luxembourg has generous, but cost-inten-
sive social and health care systems, which even 
exceed the level of coverage provided in Scandi-
navian countries. The welfare state has gradually 
expanded. Despite strong economic growth and 
low public debt, maintaining fiscal sustainabil- 
ity is increasingly important. Due to the econo-
my’s small size and openness to global markets, 
Luxembourg is particularly vulnerable to geopo-
litical instabilities. To ameliorate these risks,  
the government has increased public investment 
in the economy to stimulate domestic markets, 
attract additional private investment and pro-
mote innovation.
The government must identify framework 
conditions to promote innovations and synergies 
between public and private research, with more 
spin-offs and start-ups, including research and 
knowledge transfer. In this respect, Luxembourg 
must increase the number of researchers (2,647 
in 2015) and undertake necessary expenditures 
on competitive research and development (R&D), 
including more public-private partnerships to 
foster innovation.
Key Challenges
Economic diversification is the key challenge 
confronting Luxembourg. Addressing this  
challenge will necessitate exploiting innovative 
niche markets, promoting the digitization of the 
financial sector and adopting a new approach to 
publicizing Luxembourg as an international eco-
nomic hub. With respect to the financial sector, 
the government should focus on developing ICT 
synergies and exploring new financial technol-
ogy products and services.
The Luxembourg Leaks and Panama Papers 
scandals demonstrated the vulnerabilities of  
focusing economic activity excessively on the fi-
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of the country. In addition, untapped potential  
in digital technology must be mainstreamed in 
all business sectors and startups need more  
venture capital.
Overall, Luxembourg enjoys a compara- 
tively stable political system, high trade logis-
tics performance, excellent broadband coverage, 
a very competitive tax system, reasonable living 
costs (excluding housing costs), new financial 
technologies, innovative communication tech-
nologies and tremendous job growth. Alongside  
continuing policy weaknesses (e.g., education), 
these capacities must be mainstreamed towards 
technology-driven sustainable development.
Forecasts indicate that Luxembourg’s popu-
lation will increase to 1 million by 2060. Strong 
population growth will stabilize the social secu-
rity system, especially the public pension sys-
tem, but will also increase intergenerational and 
intercultural tensions. Luxembourg’s traditional 
corporatist philosophy has become increasingly 
universal and the country has been able to avoid 
enacting severe austerity policies. Nonetheless, 
minor changes to the pension system and gen-
eral employment rules need to be adopted.
Population growth is a challenge particularly 
for the booming centers of Nordstadt, Luxem-
bourg City and Esch/Beval. These cities will have 
to solve issues related to traffic congestion and 
the densification of living space, while ensuring 
a continued high standard of living for residents. 
The densification of living space is increasing  
the pressure on the limited number of rental 
properties and high real-estate prices. Major 
public investments are expected in the coming 
years, particularly in the areas of infrastructure,  
environment and housing.
The country’s most pressing environmental- 
policy challenges include improving water qual-
ity, avoiding water pollution through pesticide 
and fertilizer use and constructing wastewater  
treatment plants. Eutrophication is a serious 
problem and many water sources are at risk.
The education system poses another persistent 
challenge for Luxembourg. Its official trilingual 
nature presents difficulties to both nationals and 
foreigners. Moreover, the country’s PISA scores 
are lower than the OECD average. Over the past  
15 years, several school reforms have sought to fa- 
cilitate the integration of migrant children within 
this trilingual system by reducing the emphasis 
on language competency in the determination  
of school grades. Reforming the education system 
will be a key determinant in ensuring long-term 
economic competitiveness. As a result, the gov-
ernment is currently implementing secondary 
school reforms. To speed up business creation 
processes and facilitate business innovation,  
formal education and vocational training,  
combined with lifelong learning, must encour-
age entrepreneurship (especially in technical 
fields) by improving key competencies through 
non-formal and informal learning processes.
There remains room for improvement.  
The 4G cellular network still fails to cover 20 % 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Klaus Schneider
 Wolfgang Lorig
 Nils C. Bandelow
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The government is implementing recommen-
dations on migrant integration by introducing  
reception centers, allowing migrants to register 
for work and setting up an integration program.
In terms of good governance, new measures 
have been introduced to enhance accountability 
and transparency. Demands under the Freedom 
of Information Act have multiplied and the  
ombuds office has been granted new areas of 
competence. These measures have effectively 
ensured greater scrutiny of the government.  
For its part, the National Audit Office has become 
more proactive. Legislation intended to regulate 
and improve the transparency of political party 
funding has been enacted. Ministers and mem-
bers of parliament accused of breaching exist-
ing codes of ethics will become accountable to a 
Public Standards Office. One of the first acts of 
the current government was to remove statutes 
of limitations in cases of alleged corruption by 
politicians and senior officials. Also, legislation 
to increase efficiency within the judicial system 
has been introduced.
Executive Summary
Malta’s 2004 accession to the European Union 
(EU) acted as a catalyst for social, economic  
and political transformation. The EU’s liberal 
ethos propelled the 2011 introduction of divorce 
to one of the last bastions of catholic zealotry. 
Since 2013, the Maltese government has fueled 
this liberal current. Malta has considerably  
relaxed its censorship laws and extended rights  
to people with diverse gender identities and  
sexual orientations, including civil marriage. 
Recent legislation on domestic violence and  
reproductive rights have given practical expres-
sion to women’s right. The right to employment 
for disabled persons has also been codified,  
with employers penalized with fines for ignoring 
equality of opportunity laws. Since accession, 
Malta has extended maternity benefits and  
provided free child-care centers, enhanced  
pension rights and increased assistance for the 
elderly, upgraded health services, and embarked 
on a € 50 million social housing project.  
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clientelism have also become internationalized. 
Widespread clientelism and corrupt practices are 
not a new phenomenon, but access to greater 
resources make them more lucrative. Construc-
tion, the industry that traditionally drives the 
Maltese economy, has long been a nexus of  
corrupt practices; the economic boom and soar-
ing population, however, have increased the de-
mand for real estate, exacerbating the problem.  
The splitting of the Malta Environment and 
Planning Authority (MEPA) into two authorities 
has not helped, instead attracting enormous  
criticism. Angered environmental groups are 
concerned that this will threaten what remains 
of Malta’s “green lungs.” A drive to render key 
service providers (e.g., in energy and health care) 
sustainable has facilitated a government pro-
gram of privatization. While many stakeholders 
have been consulted, this process of privatization 
has been criticized for its lack of public consul-
tation, transparency and accountability. The re-
cent sale of several government hospitals to an 
international private health care provider is un-
dergoing parliamentary scrutiny. Evidence of 
mismanagement in the tendering process along 
with decision-makers sidestepping formal pro-
cedures is fueling this reexamination. 
Illustrations of this political corruption in-
clude the current investigation of a minister and 
the prime minister’s chief of staff for receiving 
Malta’s economy continues to thrive, record-
ing growth rates of up to 6 % annually – among 
the highest in the EU – and obtaining generally 
positive ratings from credit agencies. The result 
is an economy that has shifted from a significant 
public deficit to a first time surplus; the debt-
to-GDP ratio has been meaningfully reduced. 
Malta is experiencing an unprecedented upsurge 
in tourism, surpassing the two million inbound 
trips milestone in 2017. Despite implementing a 
hefty reduction in tariffs, the government also 
turned around the fortunes of the country’s sole 
energy provider, Enemalta, by attracting foreign 
investment and prompting greater efficiency 
within the corporation. Enemalta has transi-
tioned to a gas-fired power station and increased 
the use of solar energy technologies. 
Socioeconomic and political developments 
have transformed the Maltese landscape.  
Rising economic wealth is impacting popula-
tion and class structures as imported labor and 
refugee flows create a more diverse population. 
This has driven the expansion both of the mid-
dle class and a new underclass with little social 
capital. The four freedoms (i.e., free movement 
of goods, capital, services, and labor), open bor-
ders, and globalization have facilitated inter-
actions between the domestic and international 
economy, bringing in big business. In concert, 
inevitably corollary practices of patronage and 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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by the early elections in 2017. The electoral 
campaign provided an opportunity for all politi-
cal parties to promote further reforms, including 
an overhaul of the constitution. Talk on the need 
for institutional reform is widespread, but there 
is no consensus on how to go about it. The pres-
ent electoral system does not include a minimum 
national threshold for a party to send members 
to parliament. This has enabled the two major 
political parties to utilize patronage and clien- 
telism to retain their grip on power. Consequently, 
there is little faith that they will weaken their 
own political position by reforming the electoral 
system. Reform through a civil society compact 
is regarded as unwieldy. A third option is a coun-
cil of state composed of key stakeholders repre-
senting elites. To date, no process has been  
decided upon. Nevertheless, a public debate  
on the necessary changes has been ongoing. 
A piecemeal process to reform may prove to be 
the way forward. The public debate may generate 
consensus and provide principles which can be 
taken up by the government and opposition and 
implemented through parliament.
Whatever process is adopted, there is agree-
ment that the point of departure should be the 
shoring up of the separation of powers. Such 
a reform could counter the prevalent political 
model where a single party government retains 
a majority in parliament. Parliament has been 
strengthened by the introduction of the ombuds 
office and yearly increase of parliamentary com-
mittees as well as the empowering of the speak-
er’s office to draw up reform plans and oversee 
parliament’s budget. Nonetheless, Malta’s part-
time MPs continue to demonstrate a lack of ex-
pertise on many policy issues. MPs generally pri-
oritize their private careers over parliamentary 
business, lowering their contribution to govern-
ment and the public’s opinion of them. Espe-
cially over the last twenty years, this has given 
rise to a dangerous blurring of lines between 
many MPs’ private interests and public service. 
Overall, parliament contributes very little to pol-
icymaking in Malta. MPs should be transitioned 
to full time. Electoral reforms and the introduc-
tion of a minimum threshold are sorely needed 
to facilitate the entry into parliament of politi- 
cal parties representing minority interests. 
The two-party system has not encouraged a 
bipartisan approach. Instead, the winner-takes-
kickbacks from government business (revealed 
in the Panama Papers) as well as the car bomb 
murder of Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana 
Galizia, who had been working on a number 
of leads involving alleged government corrup-
tion. These events led to a European Parliament 
fact-finding mission in January 2018. Domesti-
cally, there is a growing intolerance of corrup-
tion; political maturity and economic wellbeing 
have increased the demand for democratic  
oversight. EU membership has meant multi- 
level governance – a power shift weakening the 
national executive, but strengthening oversight 
mechanisms and civil society.
In 2017, we also witnessed what may be  
the beginning of the party system fragmenting.  
Two MPs left the party of government, were 
reelected on the opposition party ticket and now 
sit in parliament under the newly constituted 
Democratic Party. For the first time in thirty 
years, three parties sit in parliament. Conflict in 
the main opposition party between liberal and 
conservative factions may lead to the fracture of 
the party and a new configuration of the party 
system. Despite the party of government main-
taining a sizable majority of seats in parliament, 
the recent disarray in the party system has  
witnessed a rise in private members’ bills and 
increased the tendency for MPs to ignore the 
party whip when voting on controversial issues.
Following allegations, strenuously denied, 
that the prime minister’s wife held a secret 
overseas bank account, the governing party 
called early national elections in 2017. The prime 
minister’s party was returned to power with the 
largest majority since independence. The results 
indicated public confidence in the government’s 
economic and social policies as well as liberal 
ethos. Notwithstanding, demands from the 
president, judiciary, ombudsman and opposition 
for the government to honor its pledge to begin 
a process of constitutional reform continue 
unabated. Such a reform would give birth to a 
second republic and could facilitate the drive  
for good governance.
Key Challenges
In 2016, several good governance reforms were 
introduced; this process, however, was cut short 
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sion Against Corruption must be better staffed, 
meet more frequently and ensure that all cases 
are satisfactorily concluded. The opposition par-
ty’s delay tactics in nominating members to the 
commission does not bode well. While accusa-
tions of corruption have been a common method 
of attacking the government of the day since 
1921, it is also evident that accusations made  
by opposition parties are rarely investigated, 
suggesting that there is no real commitment  
to fight corruption.
Recent reforms that decoupled the planning 
and environmental authorities must be reas-
sessed to ensure both authorities fully participate 
in decisions related to development planning  
and the protection of Malta’s natural habitats.
Measures to address the integration of mi-
grants have been drawn up and must now be 
implemented. In an island country the size of 
Malta, integration is a sine qua non for future 
stability.
Finally, Malta’s police force must be afforded 
the necessary competences and resources to  
fulfill their duty to secure the EU’s most south-
ern border. Malta’s economy is now heavy  
enmeshed in the international economy and,  
in consequence, is confronted with levels of  
international crime unprecedented for the small 
island country.
all approach has bred a destructive politics of 
division and mutual distrust. A shift from a 
two-party to a multi-party system may erode 
this us-against-them polarization. 
The government has adopted some recom-
mendations from the Bonello report it commis-
sioned to address shortcomings in the judici- 
ary. These have increased the efficiency of  
the judiciary. The recent creation of a judicial 
appointments committee is the first step to-
ward increasing the independence of the judi-
ciary. However, present reforms do not go far 
enough. A new process is needed for the selec-
tion of the chief justice. The role of the Attorney 
General has also come under scrutiny. The po-
sition’s dual role as legal counselor to the gov-
ernment and public prosecutor is no longer suit-
able and should be wielded separately. Also, the 
introduction of courses for lawyers pursuing the 
judicial track is long overdue and the nomination 
of court experts needs to be formalized. 
With regard to the executive and its civil  
service, the appointment of the Commissioner 
for Standards in Public Life, an office approved 
by parliament in 2016, remains urgently needed. 
Additionally, the ombuds office should be af-
forded the same powers as the audit office and 
given the remit to annually review the efficiency 
of government ministries and departments. 
When not implemented by the government,  
the recommendations of the ombuds office 
should be placed before parliament for further 
discussion. The long-standing practice of em-
ploying  political appointees in the public service 
must be reviewed as it undermines transparency 
and accountability. The parliamentary appoint-
ments committee, recently established to assist 
in the selection of ambassadors and commission 
heads, will strengthen consensual politics,  
but the procedure needs to be further developed.  
The recommendation that a council of state, 
composed of key stakeholders, should be in-
volved in the selection of heads of authorities, 
commissions and boards should be studied.  
Auditing the work of the executive and its civil 
service in procedures such as tendering could  
be further facilitated by an amelioration of the 
freedom of information act. There is also a need 
to establish an independent ethics committee 
to oversee the various ethics codes that regu-
late public servants. The Permanent Commis-
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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 César Colino
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relate to an extremely unequal distribution of 
social benefits and services among the popula-
tion, such as security and social opportunities. 
The resulting cleavages between geographic  
regions, rural and urban areas and social classes 
are among the most pressing barriers to further 
societal progress. In addition, uneven state  
capacity, both geographically and across policy 
sectors, often undermines the effective and  
coherent implementation of policies. 
Against this background, Mexico faced a se-
ries of major challenges in 2017. First, the secu-
rity situation further deteriorated, and the num-
ber of intentional homicides increased to the 
highest level ever recorded. In many instances, 
government action, which has often taken the 
form of increased militarization, has not only 
failed to be effective, but it has also made mat-
ters arguably worse. The most direct collateral 
damage of this violence has been to social cap-
ital, press freedom and secure property rights. 
Overall, Mexico is facing a status of state failure 
in parts of its territory.
Executive Summary
Considering Mexico’s experience with military 
and corporatist autocratic rule, the country has 
made significant progress over the last two dec-
ades with regard to electoral competition and 
its overall regulatory environment, including 
market-oriented reforms. Economic and polit-
ical elites, as well as an increasing share of the 
middle-class, are technically qualified and have 
knowledge on how best to organize the political, 
economic and social frameworks of their soci-
ety. Mexican policymakers at both the national 
and regional levels are well trained, internation-
ally experienced and often equipped with high-
level qualifications from Western universities. 
Mexico’s tertiary education system is increas-
ingly competitive internationally as are several 
major firms, including an increasing number in 
the manufacturing sector. 
At the same time, Mexico suffers from struc-
tural problems that are uncommon among most 
other OECD countries. These challenges mainly 
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would mean trading under the World Trade Or-
ganization’s tariffs, which would heavily hit the 
competitiveness of Mexican products in the U.S. 
market. Trump’s threat of withdrawing from 
NAFTA has severely depreciated the Mexican 
peso, partially explaining inflation levels above 
the central bank’s target. At this point, more than 
ever, it is urgent for Mexico to diversify its ex-
ports market and increase the number of policy 
tools available for the government to buffer the 
impact of international economic shocks. 
Finally, 2017 proved difficult for Mexicans  
as the country was hit by a number of natural 
disasters including three major earthquakes and 
two tropical storms. However, these crises re-
vealed, as in 1985, the potential of Mexican citi-
zens to organize and help each other, even in the 
absence of effective political leadership. A strong 
civil society, like the one Mexico has proven to 
have, is a necessary condition to face and over-
come the challenges faced by the country.
Key Challenges
Within the last generation, Mexico has made 
much progress with regard to competitive pol-
itics and macroeconomic stability. These major 
achievements were accompanied by an increase 
in educational attainment among economic and 
Second, the ambitious reform process,  
which the administration of President Peña 
Nieto launched at the beginning of its term,  
has stalled during its final years in office.  
While major reforms in key sectors such as  
education, energy, telecommunications and  
anti-corruption were approved, the adoption of 
secondary legislation required for implementa-
tion has fallen behind. As approval ratings for 
President Peña Nieto have dropped to unprece-
dented lows, it seems unlikely that the current 
government will be able to get the reform pro-
cess back on track in the time remaining before 
the federal elections of 2018. Throughout 2017,  
a series of high-level corruption scandals, some 
of them directly involving close presidential  
allies, contributed to growing social discontent, 
so that the government’s political capital is  
extremely limited. 
Third, Mexico has faced an increasingly  
adverse political and economic environment in-
ternationally. This has included lower oil prices, 
weak international trade growth and a deterio-
rating relationship with its Northern neighbor. 
Trump’s administration has continued its antag-
onistic rhetoric toward Mexico, and the renego-
tiation of North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) creates uncertainty for the country’s 
economic outlook. As of 2016, 81 % of Mexican 
exports went to the United States. Ending NAFTA 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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choices for citizens, so far enthusiasm has  
been limited and support for major parties has 
declined continuously in recent years. Since 
Mexico does not have a run-off election for the 
presidency, there is a substantial risk that who-
ever wins in a splintered field will take power 
without a strong mandate. Moreover, recent polls 
show that more than two-thirds of citizens ex-
pect negative campaigns and contested results. 
Internationally, the ongoing renegotiation of 
NAFTA will have profound implications not only 
for the future relationship between Mexico and 
the United States, but also for Mexico’s economic 
outlook. While there is a debate around the net 
effects of NAFTA in Mexico, there is an overall 
consensus on the potential costs of ending the 
treaty now. These include a decrease in the in-
ternational competitiveness of Mexican products 
as preferential tariffs are removed, and a gen-
eral weakening of the diplomatic relationship 
between the United States and Mexico. Such a 
weakening would have direct effects in key areas 
where bilateral coordination is necessary: migra-
tion and security.
In the short-term, a majority of Mexicans 
expect the relationship between the United States 
and Mexico to deteriorate further. In the long-
term, however, weaker ties to the United States 
might create opportunities for Mexico to diver-
sify its political and economic orientation toward 
other Latin Americas countries, the Asia Pacific 
and Europe. For realizing such potentials,  
however, the country must craft a coherent 
strategy, but also reach a consensus among  
political and economic elites on how to position 
the country in an increasingly multipolar world.
political elites as well as segments of the middle 
and lower classes. However, the benefits of  
economic and social modernization have been 
unevenly distributed: high disparities between 
regions and social groups remain. In this con-
text, the pace of economic development has been 
too slow in recent years. In addition, Mexico has 
experienced a serious deterioration in domestic 
security due to a failure in the rule of law,  
including systemic violence and corruption.  
The current government’s success in addressing 
these challenges has been mixed at best.
Early in its tenure, President Peña Nieto’s 
government had considerable success in collab-
orating with other parties in Congress to intro-
duce major reforms in the energy, education and 
telecommunications sectors that had long been 
on the political agenda. Moreover, the admin-
istration declared its commitment to improving 
transparency and combating corruption. As the 
term of the Nieto administration draws to a close 
ahead of the 2018 general elections, the results  
of this ambitious reform project are fairly  
sobering. On the one hand, major reform pro-
posals hit significant roadblocks during the  
implementation phase, and the adoption of re-
quired secondary legislation has stalled. On the 
other hand, the government has poorly handled 
major societal crises, such as the forced disap-
pearance and likely murder of 43 students and 
escalating violence. Its feckless response to sev-
eral high-level corruption scandals has called 
into question the government’s commitment to 
transparency and accountability. While the be-
ginning of Peña Nieto’s term in 2012 had been 
hailed as “Mexico’s moment,” widespread disil-
lusionment with political elites and uncertainty 
about the country’s future now predominate. 
Domestic as well as international develop-
ments are important for Mexico’s outlook for 
2018 and beyond. Domestically, Mexicans will 
head to the polls on 1 July 2018 to elect a new 
president, 500 members of the Chamber of  
Deputies and 128 senators, together with a large 
number of subnational officials, including nine 
governors. While there are still several months  
to go until the formal start of the campaign,  
the field of presidential contenders is crowded, 
with as many as eight candidates and several 
unlikely alliances between political groups.  
While the full line-up might suggest robust 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Jörg Faust
 Imke Harbers
 Zaira Razu
 Martin Thunert
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and administrative details, and the management 
of the judicial infrastructure.
Policy performance is average, but still  
satisfactory. Economic policies have been suc-
cessful over the last two years, especially in the 
budgetary and accounting spheres. Unemploy-
ment rates have diminished, although youth  
unemployment remains of particular concern.  
In 2015 and 2016, the government announced tax 
cuts intended to increase consumption spend-
ing, with the broader aim of strengthening eco-
nomic recovery. The Dutch are still doing well in 
most areas of social sustainability. The crisis in 
education has been acknowledged. Though pol-
icy interventions remain incremental, first steps 
toward needed system reform have been intro-
duced. Social-inclusion policies have failed to 
prevent more families from falling into poverty. 
In the realm of health policy, cost increases have 
been prevented, but the health care inspector- 
ate does not seem up to the task of monitoring 
and supervising a hybrid public-private health 
care system that lacks legitimacy. In the domain 
Executive Summary
The quality of democracy in the Netherlands re-
mains above average. However, the stability of 
the democratic system appears to be decreasing. 
Continuing economic and global political uncer-
tainties have produced an inward-looking and 
volatile electorate. Since late 2010, governments 
have no longer been assured of a solid majority 
in the bicameral States General. Since 2012, the 
Netherlands has been governed by a minority co-
alition cabinet (Rutte II) made up of ideological 
rivals, namely the conservative-liberal People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), and the 
Labor Party (PvdA). With its majorities varying 
on a case-by-case basis, the Rutte II cabinet has 
nevertheless been able to garner sufficient par-
liamentary support to pass an agenda of neolib-
eral legislative reforms softened by social-dem-
ocratic measures. Providing grounds for more 
serious concern, the political parties and govern-
ment bureaucracy have shown an increasing dis-
regard for rule-of-law requirements, legislative 
Netherlands
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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(e.g., in the court system generally, the manage-
ment of judges and access to the judiciary).
Recently, the influx of refugees and increased 
threat of terrorism have pushed the country’s 
political mood toward an inward-looking xeno-
phobia. In the realm of executive accountability, 
weak intra-party democracy and a lack of citizen 
policy knowledge are causes for concern. At the 
local level, there is some evidence that opportu-
nities for more inclusive participatory and delib-
erative policymaking are increasing.
Overall, Dutch politics and policies remain 
generally sustainable. However, some challenges 
have accumulated. For example, the government 
should seek to untangle policy deadlocks over at-
tempts to address socioeconomic inequalities, in-
tegrate citizens more deeply into the policy-mak-
ing process, set goals and priorities in the areas of 
environmental and energy policy, restructure poli-
cies, solve the looming policingand judicial system 
crises, and enhance local government and citizen 
participation in the implementation of policies.
Key Challenges
Three challenges affecting the sustainability of 
governance in the Netherlands remain insuffi-
ciently addressed: restructuring traditional state 
functions, the shift to a sustainable economy,  
 of integration, the refugee influx (although 
smaller than expected) and continued high un-
employment among immigrant young people are 
reasons for concern. Overall, almost all institu-
tions comprising public safety and security,  
and judicial branches of the Dutch government 
face substantial challenges and are under increas-
ing stress. This densely populated country scores 
low with regard to environmental sustainability. 
However, after the Paris Agreements, climate 
change policy is back on the political agenda.
Government apparatus lacks executive  
capacity and accountability. There are clear and  
increasing implementation problems, indicating 
that the “lean” government may find itself over-
burdened with intractable problems. Monitoring 
and coordination efforts are substandard with re-
gard to interministerial and agency monitoring. 
There are increasing problems with the country’s 
public ICT systems, and large-scale rail and 
road infrastructure. Regarding water manage-
ment, a traditionally strong area of Dutch gov-
ernance, administrative reforms are implemented 
smoothly. The overhasty devolution of central 
government functions with concomitant social 
security budget cuts may threaten the long-term 
decentralization of welfare policies to local gov-
ernments. In the area of public safety and secu-
rity, a contrary trend toward rapid centralization 
has led to problems in policing and the judiciary 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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of existing educational qualifications in a rapidly 
changing labor market is increasingly questiona-
ble and education at all levels is inadequately fi-
nanced. Labor market policies face a difficult bal-
ancing act between flexibility, and job security, 
decent wages and work-family relations. For an 
aging population, a sustainable economy should 
include decent (health) care provision and pensions. 
The third longer-term task is to strike a viable 
balance between identity politics and globaliza-
tion. Globalization manifests itself through  
multi-ethnicity and an increasingly multiracial 
composition of the population. The public disor-
der and “Black Pete” debates are initial steps  
toward a long overdue public deliberation about 
the integration of refugees and migrants.  
Considerable popular support for an openly  
xenophobic, anti-EU and anti-Islamist political 
party like the People’s Party for Freedom and De-
mocracy (PVV) is a sign of widespread public dis-
content and unease. Established political parties, 
particularly the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), 
show no desire to approach the debate openly. 
However, their leader, Sybrand Buma, agrees with 
the “angry citizens” who, in his eyes, help pro-
tect the “Judeo-Christian” identity of the Nether-
lands and Europe. The leader of the conservative 
liberals (VVD), Prime Minister Mark Rutte, in his 
eagerness to win the support of “angry citizens,” 
differentiated between the existence of “good” 
and “bad” populism in Dutch politics. 
Objectively, for the open Dutch economy, 
cooperation in Europe is crucial. Economic growth 
and employment, defense, and regulated migra-
tion depend on it. The Dutch economy cannot 
prosper without a stable euro, a well-function-
ing banking union, and a strong and fair internal 
market (i.e., a market offering equal pay for equal 
work in the same location). Therefore, it is neces-
sary that Dutch politicians publicly insist that the 
“I want to have my cake and eat it too” attitude 
held by a large proportion of Dutch citizens vis-à-
vis the European Union is unrealistic. 
It is increasingly clear that tackling the latter 
two challenges will require new modes of con-
structive citizen participation and representa-
tion. The gap between government and citizens 
creates significant discontent and feeds populist 
calls for more direct democracy. In view of recent 
negative experiences with national referendums 
in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, 
and finding a balance between identity politics  
and globalization. None of these key challenges 
received due attention during the 2017 election 
campaign, which was hijacked by a populist- 
dominated debate about immigration and Islam.  
This signals the need to seek and develop new 
modes of citizen representation and participation.
The first challenge involves an urgent restruc-
turing of traditional state functions. The Dutch 
have eagerly reaped the peace dividend after the 
fall of communism, in line with traditionally 
strong pacifist and anti-military public opinion. In 
view of threats from Russia and Turkey to parts of 
Eastern Europe, and a less certain U.S. commit-
ment to NATO, the Dutch and other EU states will 
have to increase their military capacity and spend-
ing in a relatively short time. Reforms to the po-
lice, judiciary and public prosecution (Ministry 
of Safety and Justice) have run into implementa-
tion obstacles and serious integrity problems that, 
without adequate political attention, may become 
chronic. Government tasks in the domain of (pub-
lic) finances require that the continuity of the tax 
apparatus is guaranteed, and the country should 
tackle its reputation as a tax haven for large for-
eign, especially U.S., corporations. 
The second major task is to design and fa-
cilitate a shift toward an environmentally sus-
tainable economy. The strong economic recovery 
that the Netherlands has experienced over recent 
years has a flipside: the Dutch can no longer fall 
further behind the rest of the European Union  
in implementing climate change (mitigation  
and adaptation) policies. The exhaustion of the 
Netherland’s natural gas resources in the me- 
dium-term means that a new energy policy  
for renewable energy sources is imperative.  
Public investment in more sustainable transpor-
tation infrastructure can no longer be postponed 
in view of a looming congestion crisis. Foresee- 
able technological innovations (digitization,  
big data, robotification) necessitate reform of  
the educational system and the labor market.  
Technological innovations require the develop-
ment of a strategic approach to digitization,  
including its effects on essential human rights, 
regulation and control, and mechanisms for con-
sensus-building concerning contentious (ethical) 
issues around emergent new technologies.  
The growing segregation across levels and types 
of schools needs to be addressed. The relevance 
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The country’s new political cleavages – be-
tween “particularist” and “universalist” citi-
zens, between adherents of neoliberal and neo-
structural economic thought, between freedom 
for corporations and stricter disciplinary inter-
ventions for ordinary citizens, and between top-
down expert governance and bottom-up citizen 
participation – must ultimately be overcome if a 
viable democratic and sustainable Dutch society 
is to be created.
the highest legal and policy advisory body to 
the government, the Council of State (Raad van 
State), claimed that national referendums result 
in a dysfunctional representative democracy.  
In its view, participatory democratic practices 
ought to be limited to the local and municipal 
level. Critics, on the other hand, accuse politi-
cians of not taking emerging forms of citizen 
participation seriously. They call for a change of 
course from “defensive” participation to open-
ing up a “second track,” a more proactive form 
of participation, based on open dialog, trust and 
cooperation. To what extent this will be realized, 
remains an open question. 
New Zealand
Country profile SGI 2018
government. Generally able to command a legis-
lative majority, the National Party negotiated con-
fidence and supply agreements with three smaller 
parties, the Maori Party (two seats), United Fu-
ture (one seat) and the ACT Party (one seat). In 
Executive Summary
Throughout much of the period under review, New 
Zealand’s center-right National Party led govern-
ment as the largest party in a formally minority 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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and operation of governance reflects a funda-
mental continuity. 
The country’s commitment to economic  
freedom is reflected in its leading position in  
the World Bank’s 2018 Doing Business report.  
According to the report, New Zealand provides 
the world’s best protection for investors. In ad-
dition, it is one of the safest countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region and offers a “low-risk  
environment for business investment.” Polit-
ical reforms implemented over recent decades 
have created a policy framework that demon-
strates impressive economic resilience. Open-
ness to global trade and investment are firmly 
institutionalized. The government has entered 
into several free trade agreements. For instance, 
in June 2017 New Zealand launched FTA nego-
tiations with the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colom-
bia, Mexico and Peru), has been an initiator of 
the 11-member Trans-Pacific Partnership Agree-
ment. and is exploring the possibility of a free 
trade agreement with the European Union. 
New Zealand’s economy rebounded quickly 
from the global recession. The impact of several 
severe earthquakes on economic growth has been 
limited; indeed, the subsequent rebuilding pro-
grams have contributed significantly to economic 
growth in the South Island. On the other hand, 
the recent influx of immigrants and the repatria-
tion of many New Zealanders from Australia  
early December 2016, shortly after the end of the 
review period for the SGI 2017, Prime Minis-
ter and National Party leader John Key, who had 
served as head of government since 2008, an-
nounced that he would step down. He was suc-
ceeded by Bill English, who had previously served 
as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister. 
In February 2017, English announced that there 
would be a general election on 23 September. Al-
though the National Party won the highest pro-
portion of votes, two of its three support parties 
failed to win parliamentary seats, leaving the New 
Zealand First Party leader, Winston Peters, hold-
ing the balance of power. Instead of endorsing 
the more favored National Party, Peters decided to 
form a coalition government with Labour, while 
the Green Party offered legislative support from 
the cross-benches. The new prime minister under 
this three-party arrangement is the 37-year-old 
Labour leader, Jacinda Ardern, who is the youngest 
New Zealand prime minister in modern times.
Throughout the review period, New Zealand 
performed well with regard to indicators of gov-
ernance capacity, policy performance and quality 
of democracy. New Zealand’s democratic system 
is based on a unicameral parliament, working 
rule of law, a strong executive branch and effec-
tive government. The system is healthy and sta-
ble. Despite an ongoing debate about adopting a 
written constitution, the fundamental structure 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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The new government has expressed a strong 
commitment to addressing the causes and effects 
of climate change.
Key Challenges
New Zealand is well positioned to tackle current 
and future challenges. Over recent decades, it has 
radically reformed its economy as well as its 
electoral and public management systems.  
Compared to other OECD countries, New Zealand 
has emerged from the global financial crisis in a 
relatively strong position. Nevertheless, four pro- 
blem areas persist: innovation, tax policy, regional 
development and government structures, and the 
government’s agenda-setting capacities.
First, innovation. Although governments,  
including the recent National minority govern-
ment, have increased investment in tertiary  
education (particularly in science, technology,  
engineering and mathematics), and research and 
development, there remains a need to intensify 
these efforts, as comparative data for OECD coun-
tries has made clear. Similarly, New Zealand does 
not invest enough in ongoing job-based education 
and training. The country has followed the tradi-
tion of Anglo-American liberal market economies 
(LMEs), which invest more extensively in trans-
ferable skills than in job-based training, which is 
the focus of some continental European coordi-
nated market economies (CMEs). Given that the 
New Zealand economy is extremely small, other 
approaches, including those used in Scandinavian 
countries, may well be better suited to local con-
ditions. Although unemployment rates are rela-
tively low, at just under 5 %, a particular area of 
concern is the high rate of youth unemployment 
in Maori and Pasifika communities.
The economy’s innovation potential is inextri-
cably linked to immigration policy, where attract-
ing highly skilled workers is of utmost impor-
tance. The new government led by Labour Prime 
Minister Jacinda Adern needs to remain commit-
ted to attracting skilled immigrants and ignore 
pressure from its populist anti-immigration co-
alition partner New Zealand First. Although New 
Zealand First is a small parliamentary party,  
as the key to maintaining the balance of power, 
it was strategically placed to negotiate with both 
major parties, Labour and National. By forming 
is placing severe strain on the housing market,  
especially in Auckland.
According to IMF figures, net general-gov-
ernment debt remained well under control at 
8.8 % of GDP in 2015. The equivalent rate in the 
United Kingdom was 80.3 % and in the United 
States it was 79.9 % for the same year. During 
the review period, economic growth has been 
relatively strong, and inflation has remained 
under control. Economic recovery from the glo- 
bal economic crisis has been driven by exports 
and the rebuilding of Christchurch. However,  
although the New Zealand economy came through 
the world financial crisis comparatively well,  
the government was forced to prioritize budget-
ary policy at the cost of other reform projects.  
As a result and despite strong performance in 
terms of macroeconomic indicators, fiscal aus-
terity policies have widened the socioeconomic 
gap between the rich and poor.
In the lead-up to the 2017 election, the rise  
in levels of child poverty became a particularly 
salient issue, with close to one in three children 
being defined as living in poverty. In response, 
the government introduced a number of initia-
tives to combat the problem.
Long-term policy challenges have not changed 
during the review period. First, New Zealand’s 
economic well-being strongly depends on devel-
oping a larger, more highly skilled and better  
paid workforce. This will require new initiatives 
and further investment in education and training,  
as well as a stronger commitment to research and 
development. Recent trends in immigration and 
employment have been positive, particularly em-
ployment rates in Auckland, the largest metropol-
itan area. Currently, the construction boom has 
created a demand for skilled labor that has yet to 
be met. Whereas New Zealand has demonstrated 
relative success with integrating immigrants, 
greater investment is needed to advance improved 
education outcomes and skills training among the 
Maori and Pasifika populations. New Zealand also 
needs to develop stronger links with its neighbors 
in the Pacific region.
Despite the government’s decision to with-
draw from its Kyoto obligations, New Zealand’s 
own vulnerability to the consequences of climate 
change were recognized in its endorsement of 
the objectives of the United Nations Climate 
Change Conference in Paris in October 2016.  
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provincial town of Kaikoura, has understandably 
dominated the government’s regional-develop-
ment agenda, with most of its activities receiv-
ing praise. The potential for restructuring the re-
gions on a more general scale should be evaluated.
Fourth, government as agenda-setter.  
New Zealand’s political system is still character-
ized by majoritarian design. There are no insti-
tutional veto players whose policy positions the 
government must consider (such as provincial or 
state governments, second chambers, constitu-
tional courts or local governments with constitu-
tionally guaranteed powers). However, the change 
to a mixed-member proportional electoral sys-
tem has led to a multiparty system, the emergence 
of several minor political parties with de facto veto 
powers, and the formation of minority and coali-
tion governments of different formats. After more 
than a decade, this governing arrangement has 
proven relatively positive, although parts of the 
electorate, especially older and more conservative 
voters, still need to be persuaded of the benefits of 
proportional representation. The outcome of the 
2017 election, with the most popular party being 
rebuffed by the small New Zealand First Party, 
has prompted many older and more  
conservative voters to question the legitimacy  
of the new center-left government.
Recent governments have been able to pro-
actively pursue their respective policy-reform 
agendas with noticeable success. However,  
while successive governments have been able  
to implement the vast majority of their policies,  
the process has been very time-consuming and 
occasionally produced contradictory policy initi-
atives. In 2013, former prime minister John Key 
proposed increasing parliamentary terms from 
three to four years to promote policy coherence 
and consensus. The proposal had failed in two 
previous government-initiated referendums 
(1967 and 1990). Judging from comments made 
by other party leaders, this proposal appeared to 
have wide-ranging support. At the same time, 
there is no evidence that public opposition has 
weakened. Short of gaining a 75 % majority 
among members of the unicameral parliament,  
a four-year term seems an unlikely proposition.
a coalition with the former, it has been given far 
more power than vote (7.2 %) or seat share (nine 
of 120 in parliament) would indicate. The recent 
surge in support for anti-immigrant parties in the 
United States and Europe has placed immigration 
policy firmly on the New Zealand political agenda.
Second, tax policy. Prioritizing a balanced 
budget, the new government has shelved plans 
for the new round of tax cuts promised by the 
former National-led government. The new gov-
ernment needs to tackle the politically sensi- 
tive issue of extending National’s “bright line” 
tax – a mild form of capital-gains tax – from two  
to five years with a view to reducing the impact 
of property speculation on the housing market. 
Since this has been a key Labour election pro-
posal for some time, the new government is 
likely to initiate legislation in this area. The new 
government has also promised to prevent 
non-resident foreign investors from speculat-
ing on housing. Unsurprisingly, the country has 
one of the highest rates of home ownership in the 
world at 63.2 % in 2016. However, these policies 
violate horizontal equity and divert capital away 
from more productive uses. A more robust cap-
ital-gains tax on all but the family home would 
cool the property market, especially in Auckland 
(population 1.4 million). There is growing con-
sensus among parties and economists that this 
anomaly in the tax structure needs to be tackled. 
Third, regional development and governance 
structures. The economy is characterized by a 
large and increasing urban-rural divide, particularly 
regional economic growth, labor productivity and 
population growth. The government needs to cre-
ate a focused regional policy both in metropolitan 
and rural areas. Regional economic policies should 
be accompanied by governance structures that 
geographically fit the problem area. The estab-
lishment of a unitary Auckland authority with an 
elected all-Auckland council has been a good start-
ing point, but this should not be the end of local 
government reform. A similar centralized structure 
for the Wellington area was rejected by a poll of the 
city’s residents in 2015. Auckland’s local govern-
ment covers more than one-third of the total pop-
ulation of the country. This implies a heavily asym-
metric local government structure vis-à-vis central 
government. The 2010 and 2011 earthquakes in the 
Christchurch and the Canterbury region, followed 
by a 2016 earthquake that hit the South Island 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org  André Kaiser, Raymond Miller, Aurel Croissant
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Norway
Country profile SGI 2018
try’s oil fund, Norges Bank Investment Manage-
ment (NBIS, an arm of the Norwegian central 
bank), decided to divest from investments in 
petroleum-related industries.
Since 2014, the drop in oil prices has had a 
significant impact on the economy, exposing its 
vulnerability. Unemployment is rising due to re-
duced investment and increased economic un-
certainty. Governance is responding to changing 
economic circumstances, and there is a greater 
awareness of the need to diversify the economy 
and reduce its dependence on petroleum. It re-
mains to be seen how successful these efforts 
will be. For now, the country’s economic base 
remains strong but weakened and the country’s 
currency has depreciated. Public finances have 
tightened, but there is still a conspicuous con-
tinuity in economic policy, which includes rela-
tively high levels of public spending, taxes and 
welfare services. There has been no shift toward 
austerity in economic policy.
Norwegian policymaking has long followed a 
strongly state-centered approach, resulting in a 
Executive Summary
As a typical consensus-driven democracy, Norway 
performs well in most international comparisons 
of governance, quality of life, and economic and 
social conditions. Continuity is the most conspic-
uous quality of the country’s governance, which 
is typically steady and based on the implementa-
tion of cautious, incremental legislative measures 
rather than spectacular, one-off reforms. Norway 
has been able to avoid the worst of the global fi-
nancial crisis and subsequent economic turmoil, 
which severely affected most of Europe, and has 
pursued a healthy economic policy. 
The country’s economy is heavily dependent 
on oil and gas revenues, and its maritime and 
technologically advanced petroleum-services 
industries. Many in Norway are concerned about 
the risks posed by an excessive dependence on 
the petroleum sector, and in recent years greater 
emphasis has been placed on developing and 
maintaining adaptability. In 2017, the govern-
ment, together with the managers of the coun-
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Key Challenges
The Norwegian political system functions well, 
and is characterized by continuity, a sound econ-
omy and a generous welfare regime, as well as 
a relatively high degree of trust and legitimacy, 
and internal and external security. 
Revenues from the petroleum industry  
have further strengthened the sustainability  
of the system. An effective public administra- 
tion and well-developed, cooperative relations 
between the government and various inter-
est organizations (particularly organizations 
representing employers and employees) have 
helped mitigate conflict and enhance the  
ability of stakeholders to implement joint  
reforms and adaptations. Nonetheless,  
the process of implementation has been  
subject to inertia. Though Norway’s engage-
ment in international frameworks has  
improved the country’s reform capacity.
The most critical challenges involve reduc- 
ing the country’s dependence on the petroleum 
sector, managing the effects of a potentially  
long period of significantly lower oil and gas 
prices, and ensuring the sound management  
of the county’s economy and vast oil fund.  
Ensuring the competitive viability of the econ-
omy over the long term will be a key challenge. 
Norway’s economy and policymaking will suffer 
if global oil prices remain low for long and the 
risk of stranded assets grows as the effects  
of climate change intensify. 
peculiar system of state capitalism. The state is 
by far the largest owner of capital in the coun-
try, holding about 40% of equity traded on the 
Oslo stock exchange. The state is virtually the 
sole funder of research, education and culture, 
among other areas. Nevertheless, the country has 
remained open to globalization and free trade, 
with some minor exceptions, and has been keen 
to ensure that the benefits of international trade 
are fairly distributed. 
Citizens are subject to a relatively heavy tax 
burden. A large share of tax revenue is spent on 
welfare transfers to individuals, which contribute 
to low levels of inequality in Norway. The gov-
ernment spends significant resources on infra-
structure and the provision of public goods,  
with an arguably excessive emphasis on remote 
regions. Policymaking is generally effective but 
often inert when it comes to implementation. 
The labor force is one of the most educated in the 
world. However, the country’s share of science 
degrees is low by international standards, which 
limits the impact that public investment in ed-
ucation can have on economic competitiveness 
and innovation. International education rankings 
such as PISA show an improvement in Norwe-
gian students’ performance. The level of invest-
ment in research, development and innovation 
remains quite low. An aging population and  
increased migration, combined with a more 
challenging financial outlook, have increased 
pressure on the government to engage in welfare 
reforms and reduce welfare spending.
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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opments in the maritime, seafood and green-
tech sectors, among others. The high labor 
costs in the oil service sector are being re-
duced and a weaker currency has helped 
strengthen economic competitiveness. 
•   Education. The Norwegian government must 
direct more attention toward the quality of 
education. The government must do more 
to strengthen student incentives, monitor 
and improve teaching quality, and promote 
a culture of excellence. As Norwegian soci-
ety becomes more heterogeneous, securing 
high-quality education, promoting effective 
integration and ensuring equal access to the 
job market for immigrants have become  
increasingly important.
•   Research policy. Investments in research and 
development (R&D), both public and private, 
must be increased. Investments in academic 
and basic research should also be increased, 
promoting more joint activity between public 
and private actors. This major area of reform 
is currently widely neglected.
•   Infrastructure and regional policy. Norway’s 
stress on regional redistribution is excessive. 
Yet, infrastructural investments in national 
networks, and around the major cities of Oslo 
and Bergen have been insufficient. The rail-
way system, including commuting services, 
is inadequate. The policy of agricultural sub-
sidies is costly and should at a minimum be 
reconsidered.
•   Security and defense. Norway is a founding 
member of NATO, and its security depends to 
a large extent on a well-functioning trans-
atlantic alliance and good cooperation with 
European partners. Norway has committed 
to increasing its defense spending to meet 
NATO targets, although Norway has not yet 
met its targets. In the new geopolitical secu-
rity climate, it is necessary for Norway to  
increase its spending on security. However, 
this will be demanding and likely come at the 
expense of further welfare spending.
The terrorist attack in 2011 revealed serious 
shortcomings in an otherwise robust governance 
system. Specific shortcomings in security and 
police routines have been addressed, although 
concerns remain over the ability to confront and 
resolve systemic implementation and coordina-
tion failures. A governance system that allowed 
inertia and complacency to negatively affect its 
most basic responsibility (i.e., protecting citi-
zens) in the first instance, has compounded this 
failure by responding slowly in the aftermath of 
the attack. This has led to widespread public 
questioning of the governance system, in par-
ticular the system’s management, implementa-
tion, learning, adaptability and reform capacities. 
The recent election demonstrated that voters 
are increasingly concerned about how to manage 
immigration and integration. Labor mobility 
from the European market has brought talent 
and resources to Norway and has reduced in-
centives for businesses to outsource production. 
However, it has also created a slight downward 
pressure on salaries, and increased tensions be-
tween trade unions and business. In addition, 
Norway, along with many European countries, 
faces many challenges stemming from a largely 
heterogeneous population.  
Other persistent challenges include:
•   National leadership. The state-centered tra-
dition in Norway has many strengths, but is 
also seen by some as a burden on the coun-
try’s capacity for encouraging enterprise,  
innovation and reform. In a world of eco-
nomic and social competition, there is a need, 
particularly in a small country, for pluralism 
and diversity of leadership in order to drive 
modernization, change and competitiveness. 
However, Norway has demonstrated consid-
erable adaptability to changing global mar-
kets, and its consensus-based culture featur-
ing high levels of trust has been instrumental 
to fostering effective reforms and changes. 
•   Economic restructuring. There is renewed 
awareness of the need to restructure the 
economy to sustain a high level of wealth, 
decrease dependency on the petroleum sec-
tor, and ensure a more diversified and inter-
nationally competitive economy. This transi-
tion is now underway and new initiatives are 
being introduced to further stimulate devel-
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Ulf Sverdrup
 Stein Ringen
 Detlef Jahn
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the first activities of the new government tar-
geted the Constitutional Tribunal, public media 
and civil service. During its second year in office, 
the government turned to reducing the political 
independence of the Supreme Court, the National 
Council of the Judiciary and ordinary courts.  
Political liberties have suffered from new re-
strictions on assembly rights, increasing har-
assment by the police and growing government 
control of NGO funding. At the end of 2017, the 
PiS government started to amend electoral law. 
The quality of democracy has also been affected 
by the government’s strong discourse against 
Muslims, the LGBT community and “gender- 
ideology,” as well as increasing corruption and 
cronyism in state-owned enterprises, and polit-
ical polarization. The PiS government’s obses-
sion with retelling Polish history, and desire  
to impose its national-conservative values on 
society have impacted public discourses and 
laws regarding the arts, culture, history text-
books and museums, such as the Museum of  
the Second World War. 
Executive Summary
The national parliamentary election held in  
Poland in October 2015 altered the country’s  
political landscape and marked a shift in power 
away from the party previously in government, 
the centrist Civic Platform (PO), to the now ruling 
populist-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS). 
The PiS won a majority of seats in the Sejm and 
was able to form the first one-party govern-
ment in Poland’s post-socialist history. The PiS 
government was initially led by Prime Minis-
ter Beata Szydło (PiS) and, behind the scenes, 
by long-standing PiS party leader Jarosław 
Kaczyński. Capitalizing on its clear parliamentary 
majority and strong internal party discipline,  
the government initiated an ongoing process of 
radical institutional and policy change. Dubbed 
“the good change” by PiS, it has prompted a lot 
of domestic and international critique. 
The quality of democracy has greatly suf-
fered from the changes initiated by the PiS gov-
ernment. Following the Hungarian example,  
Poland
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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on the reform of the judiciary revealed  
rifts within the PiS and limits to the govern-
ment’s power.
The PiS government’s assault on democ-
racy and the rule of law and the resulting polit-
ical polarization have had little visible effect on 
the economy. In 2017, the Polish economy con-
tinued to grow, the unemployment rate fell to 
a historic low, and the fiscal and public deficits 
decreased. Along with the government’s popular 
social measures, the strong showing of the Pol-
ish economy has kept the government’s popular-
ity high. In October 2017, Prime Minister Beata 
Szydło was supported by 48 % of Poles, while 
38 % were unhappy with Szydło’s administra-
tion, while support for the two opposition parties 
in parliament, PO and Nowoczesna, fell to 16 % 
and 6 % respectively. 
The PiS government’s political course has 
done more damage to Poland’s international 
reputation. The government’s attempts to con-
trol the judiciary prompted massive protests in-
ternationally. In the European Union, there have 
been calls to launch a formal proceeding against 
Poland for breaching European common values 
and rule of law, and to cut transfers to Poland 
and restrict Poland’s voting rights in the Euro-
pean Council. In November 2017, the European 
Parliament eventually called on the European 
Commission to trigger an Article 7 procedure 
Favored by its absolute majority in parlia-
ment, the internal discipline of PiS and the con-
tested authority of PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, 
the PiS government has been quite effective in 
implementing its policy objectives. It has suc-
ceeded in quickly realizing its major campaign 
pledges, such as increasing the minimum wage 
and the family allowance, providing tax relief 
for small businesses, lowering the retirement 
age, and reversing recent reforms to the edu-
cation system (which will increase the age at 
which children start school). The PiS govern-
ment has bypassed the legal requirements for 
regulatory impact assessments and public con-
sultation by strongly relying on legislative initi-
atives proposed by individual members of par-
liament rather than the government. Precisely 
because so many bills have sailed so quickly 
through parliament, the quality of legislation 
has often proven to be very poor, often requiring 
immediate amendments. As in the PiS govern-
ment’s first year in office, massive street protests 
led the government to make some concessions, 
for example, to the petrol tax, the redrawing of 
regional districts and the renewed attempt to 
tighten abortion law. In winter 2016–2017,  
the Sejm crisis and the occupation of its building 
by opposition members of parliament delayed 
the passing of the budget. In July 2017, President 
Duda’s unexpected veto of two of the three laws 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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The government reshuffle can also be seen  
as a further strengthening of President Duda, 
who clashed several times with Macierewicz,  
for example, over the appointment of generals,  
and has started to build a reputation as a moder-
ating force. Originally perceived as a mere pup-
pet of Kaczyński, Duda surprised many observ-
ers by vetoing key elements of the government’s 
reform of the judiciary. While his own proposals 
included only cosmetic changes and were not in 
line with the constitution, the vetoes helped him 
become perceived as an actor in his own right 
and a man of the center. This raises the ques-
tion of how far Duda’s emancipation will go and 
to what extent he might succeed in reducing the 
political polarization in Poland.
Furthermore, the government reshuffle has 
made the cabinet less ideological and more tech-
nocratic. This might help the government to ad-
dress the policy challenges ahead. The structural 
reforms on the agenda, such as the reform of the 
health system and the energy sector, are com-
plicated issues and the economic and fiscal costs 
of the government’s generous social measures 
will be gradually felt. From the point of view of 
the PiS, however, the more technocratic orienta-
tion of the new cabinet also creates the risk that 
its hardcore members might no longer feel rep-
resented by the government.
against Poland for violating the common values 
of the EU. The conflict between Poland, and EU 
institutions and most EU member states became 
also visible in March 2017 when Poland, as the 
only member state, refused to re-elect Donald 
Tusk, a former Polish prime minister, as presi-
dent of the European Council. In response to Po-
land’s growing isolation in the European Union, 
Poland has turned to the Visegrad countries,  
and now aims to realize its interests through 
closer collaboration with Hungary, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic.
Key Challenges
In the second half of 2017, debates and rumors 
about a government reshuffle grew. Ultimately, 
the changes turned out to be more sweeping 
than expected. The replacement of Beata Szydło 
as prime minister by Minister of Finance  
Mateusz Morawiecki in December 2017 was  
followed by the replacement of a number  
of controversial ministers in January 2018,  
including Defense Minister Antoni Maciere-
wicz, Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski,  
Health Minister Konstanty Radziwiłł and  
Environment Minister Jan Szyszko. 
These changes were widely interpreted as  
an attempt to placate the public and the Euro-
pean Union. A major figure of the PiS’s radi-
cal right, Macierewicz was well-known for his 
conspiracy theories about the Smolensk plane 
crash and the general betrayal of Poland by the 
center-left. Meanwhile, Waszczykowski had  
irritated his EU colleagues with his slur against 
cyclists and vegetarians; Radziwiłł had alienated  
doctors and medical staff, and had failed to 
deal with the massive unrest and strikes in the 
health sector in 2017; Szyszko had attracted 
widespread criticism over his moves to allow 
logging in the Białowieża primeval forest.  
It remains to be seen though whether or not 
these changes in personnel will be followed  
by changes in “substance,” not only “style.”  
In the case of judicial reform, arguably the most 
controversial field, the PiS governments have  
so far refrained from making any substantial 
concessions, and the fact that Minister of  
Justice Zbigniew Ziobro kept his office does  
not point to any changes here.
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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 Radoslaw Markowski
 Frank Bönker
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Portugal
Country profile SGI 2018
dividuals – including many celebrities – that 
moved to Portugal during this period.
On the political side, António Costa’s mi-
nority government has proved stable, while also 
showing itself able to bring the parties to its  
left – the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda, BE),  
the Communist Party (Partido Comunista Por-
tuguês, PCP) and the Green Party (Partido Ecol-
ogista os Verdes – PEV) – into a governing alli-
ance that had hitherto seemed impossible.  
This has led to increasing international interest 
in the Portuguese political solution – the “gerin-
gonça” (or “contraption”), as this government 
has been dubbed. Moreover, the period was 
marked by a largely collaborative dynamic  
between the government and the very popu-
lar president of the republic, Marcelo Rebelo de 
Sousa, despite the latter’s membership in the 
center-right Social Democrat Party (Partido  
Social Democrata, PSD).
The above elements would suggest an over-
whelmingly positive assessment regarding Por-
tugal’s governance. However, this period was 
Executive Summary
The period under analysis here provides  
seemingly contradictory evidence with regard  
to governance in Portugal. 
On one reading, we could say that Portugal 
performed spectacularly during the review period. 
The budget deficit was reduced to 2 % of GDP, 
the lowest level since democratization. The Eu-
ropean Commission closed the country’s exces-
sive deficit procedure, which had been open since 
2009. Conditions of austerity have been gradu-
ally, if not yet wholly, alleviated. Portugal has  
increasingly become a poster child for the success 
of post-bailout policies within the EU. The econ-
omy has been growing, boosted by exports and 
tourism. Unemployment rates have fallen to sin-
gle digits. The country has become increasingly 
attractive to the tech sector, a fact expressed by 
its ability to play host to the 2016 and 2017 Web 
Summits. All this is symbolically reflected in  
the country’s growing international popularity,  
as seen in the host of foreign companies and in-
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etary ones more specifically, these coexist with 
persistently low scores in governance dimen-
sions pertaining to policy formulation. The reg-
ulatory impact assessment framework remains 
weak, as does the strategic component of deci-
sion-making and efforts to monitor institutional 
governing arrangements; moreover, there has 
been little systematic effort to improve strategic 
capacity by making changes to these institutional 
arrangements. As in the past, this weak capacity 
is likely to affect the quality and impact of new 
and existing policies. The Costa government pro-
gram does include a number of measures regard-
ing governance-quality improvement, and some 
initial steps have been taken in this area.  
The question is whether this government will 
be able to deliver in a domain where so many 
predecessors have promised more than they 
achieved in terms of state reform.
Key Challenges
To begin, we must note that there are four  
challenges common to many other compara- 
tively new democracies that are not a problem  
in Portugal.
1.  Migrants and refugees: Portugal remains 
outside the routes taken by the large popu-
lations of migrants and refugees currently 
also marked by events that underline the coun-
try’s historic governance weaknesses. In par-
ticular, the country was rocked by devastating 
and deadly forest fires; one fire in June caused 
some 65 deaths, and a second set in October led 
to a further 45 deaths. These fires, along with 
the faulty civil-protection response that allowed 
so many deaths – many of which, it transpired, 
could have been avoided – reflected a host of  
deficiencies that have been present in Portuguese 
governance for decades, including weak strategic 
planning, a lack of coordination, weak supervi-
sion and implementation of public policies,  
frequent changes in the law, and the lack of a 
stable policy framework. In June and October, 
these deficiencies came home to roost. These 
same governance weaknesses helped facilitate 
the theft of military equipment from the Tan- 
cos military base in late June (although this  
situation was resolved in October thanks to  
an anonymous tip that led to the retrieval of  
virtually all the lost material).
Overall, the period highlights the dual nature 
of development in Portugal. While some sectors 
are modernizing, others remain neglected until 
a tragedy occurs, as with the forest fires of June 
and October 2017. 
Thus, while some positive changes in Portu-
gal have been evident in this period, notably with 
regard to economic aspects in general and budg-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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be reversed. The Costa government managed 
to square this circle well over this review pe-
riod. However, more pressure, not less, is likely 
to emerge in the future, especially as the econ-
omy recovers.
The third challenge is the need to improve 
governance capacity. As made clear in the ratings 
in this report, and in all past SGI reports, Portu-
gal scores poorly in a number of areas related to 
this topic, including the use of evidence-based 
instruments in policymaking; the degree of  
strategic planning and input in policymaking;  
societal consultation; policy implementation;  
and the degree to which institutional governing 
arrangements are subject to considered reform.  
Inevitably, weaknesses in these areas impinge on 
the quality of policy, both in terms of conception 
and implementation. This governance capacity 
pertains not only to decision-making arrange-
ments, but also to broader oversight mecha-
nisms. Indeed, the period under review here 
quite tragically highlighted the results of failures 
in the domains of territorial planning, foresta-
tion, forest-fire prevention and civil protection. 
Unfortunately, the country’s governance failures 
have also extended well beyond these domains. 
The fourth serious challenge has to do with 
youth unemployment. As noted in this report, 
youth unemployment rates have not followed the 
declining trend of unemployment in general,  
remaining fairly stable in this period above the 
EU and euro zone averages, over this period.  
Labor-market policies will need to engage with 
this issue in the future in order to avoid wasting 
the significant educational investment that has 
been made over the past decade.
leaving Africa, the Middle East and South 
Asia. Even so, the country has accepted more 
than 1,500 refugees since the end of 2015,  
the fifth-highest level in the European Union. 
2.   Portugal does not have the problem with Is-
lamic terrorist radicalization (jihadists) that 
has been experienced by several other coun-
tries in the European Union, including neigh-
boring Spain in August 2017. Its (small) Is-
lamic community is generally well integrated 
and a participant in the country’s strong in-
terfaith dialog. Indeed, President Marcelo’s 
inauguration in March 2016 included an in-
terfaith ceremony held at Lisbon’s mosque. 
3.   Unlike a number of other European countries 
and the United States, Portugal has not seen 
the rise of populist, anti-system parties (or 
major political figures, as in the case of the 
current U.S. president) either on the right or 
the left of the political spectrum. 
4.   Unlike several other comparatively new de-
mocracies, there are no pending issues (e.g., 
the elimination of “prerogatives”) currently 
causing friction in civil-military relations. 
However, four real challenges do exist. 
A first challenge will be to ensure that budg-
etary consolidation persists into the future.  
The excessive deficit procedure that was closed 
in 2017 was the third such for the country since 
2002. In each of the preceding two cases, a new 
excessive deficit procedure was opened within 
less than two years of the preceding one clos-
ing. This risk is compounded by the high level of 
public debt; at 130.1 % of GDP in 2016, this is  
the third-highest such ratio within the EU.  
Barring relief, bringing this debt under con- 
trol will require an unprecedented sustained  
effort over many years. An April 2017 forecast by 
the Portuguese government estimated that debt 
would decline to 60 % of GDP in 2032, some 14 
years earlier than its previous estimation in the 
2016 budget. However, this earlier date will  
continue to require an unprecedented degree  
of effort to sustain budgetary consolidation over 
a long time span, and across international and 
domestic economic and political cycles. 
A second and related challenge in the short- 
and medium-term will be to reconcile this budg-
etary consolidation with citizens’ expectations 
that the previous years’ austerity policies will 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Thomas C. Bruneau
 Carlos Jalali
 César Colino
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cians and others accused of or convicted for  
corruption, including PSD leader Dragnea,  
these initiatives sparked an unexpectedly strong 
public outcry. Hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple took to the streets, forcing the government 
to withdraw the decrees. Since then, there have 
been strong confrontations between the gov-
erning coalition and the president, and between 
parts of the opposition and civil society on the 
other. The governing coalition has sought to 
strengthen its control over the judiciary and dis-
credit and weaken the much-acclaimed National 
Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) – with little 
effect during the period under review.
The Grindeanu government succeeded in  
implementing a number of campaign promises,  
including tax cuts as well substantial increases 
in the minimum wage, public sector wages and 
pensions. These procyclical measures fueled  
the strong growth of the Romanian economy. 
With real GDP up by more than 6 %, Romania 
became the EU country with the strongest eco-
nomic growth in 2017. However, the combination 
Executive Summary
The socialist PSD emerged as the clear winner 
of the parliamentary elections in December 
2016. The party formed a coalition with the Al-
liance of Liberal Democrats (ALDE) and replaced 
the technocratic government led by Prime Min-
ister Dacian Cioloș, that had been established 
after Victor Ponta, the previous prime minister 
from the PSD, was forced to resign amidst cor-
ruption scandals in October 2015. As PSD leader 
Liviu Dragnea had been convicted of voting fraud 
and was therefore barred from becoming prime 
minister, the relatively unknown PSD politician 
Sorin Grindeanu was installed as prime minis-
ter in early January 2017. In June 2017, Grindeanu 
was ousted by his own party following a vote  
of no-confidence. He was succeeded by Mihai  
Tudose, another PSD politician.
Soon after coming to office, the Grindeanu 
government launched legislation aimed at de-
criminalizing and pardoning certain offenses. 
Broadly understood as an attempt to help politi-
Romania
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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strategic planning or the low quality of RIAs.  
The pledge to reform the subnational adminis-
tration remained merely a pledge. Under both 
governments, policymaking has been compli-
cated by the influence of PSD leader Dragnea.
Key Challenges
Until recently, Romania drew considerable  
acclaim for its judicial reform and fight against 
corruption. The country’s efforts were widely  
regarded as a model for other countries, for ex-
ample, the neighboring Bulgaria or Ukraine.  
Efforts by the PSD/ALDE coalition to rollback judi-
cial reform and anti-corruption efforts – blocked 
only temporarily by mass protests, parts of the 
opposition and President Klaus Iohannis – puts 
these achievements at risk. These developments 
will likely be accompanied by democratic erosion 
in other areas. The legislation introduced by two 
members of parliament from the governing coali-
tion in June 2017 and passed by the Senate in No-
vember 2017 that places restrictions on NGOs and 
is clearly inspired by the “foreign-agent” legis-
lation observed in Russia and Hungary, is a good 
case in point. The campaigns waged against pro-
testers and the intimidation of critical journal-
ists are further examples. The developments in 
Romania must thus be seen as part of a broader 
of tax cuts and spending increases also contrib-
uted to a growing fiscal deficit. Only by adopting 
two supplementary budgets and by cutting down 
on public investment did the Tudose government 
eventually manage to keep the deficit slightly 
below 3 % of GDP in 2017. Both the Grindeanu 
and the Tudose governments made little pro-
gress with structural reforms. In the case of ed-
ucation and health care, no major reforms were 
adopted. As for pensions, the shifting of reve-
nues from the mandatory, fully funded second 
pillar to the public pension pillar has increased 
uncertainty among future pensioners and capital 
markets, thus having a negative impact on the 
pension system’s reliability and long-term sus-
tainability. Similarly, the many changes in taxes 
have diminished the credibility of the tax system. 
While public R&D funding increased in 2017,  
the structures governing R&D and the allocation 
of funds have worsened. 
Institutional reforms under the Grindeanu 
and the Tudose government were largely con-
fined to changes in the portfolios of ministries. 
The Grindeanu government increased the num-
ber of ministries from 21 to 26. It had two min-
isters dealing with EU funds, none of which was 
able to help Romania improve its absorption rate. 
The Tudose government even started with 27 
ministers. Neither of the governments addressed 
long-standing challenges such as the lack of 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries and elsewhere.
Backtracking on both judicial reform and the 
fight against corruption is likely to have nega-
tive effects on the development of the Romanian 
economy, too. While there are many factors in-
fluencing economic performance, progress with 
judicial reform and anti-corruption mechanisms 
would certainly help improve the country’s rep-
utation and thereby foster economic growth.  
The combination of more corruption and less 
legal certainty will negatively impact investor 
confidence and favor a diversion of effort and  
resources from productive to rent-seeking activ-
ities. It will distort the allocation of public R&D 
spending and EU funds, and it will aggravate the 
growing shortage of qualified labor by fueling 
the emigration of talent. While fiscal expansion 
might stimulate economic activity in the short-
term, its fiscal limits have already become vis-
ible and it won’t raise medium- and long-term 
growth prospects.
Romanian citizens’ resistance against the 
PSD/ALDE governments’ attempts at decrim-
inalizing corruption and restricting the inde-
pendence of the judiciary has been impressive.  
The big question is whether or not this resist- 
ance can be sustained. Romania’s recent past 
suggests we should view this with cautious  
optimism. After all, the country had seen mass 
protests against corruption in 2015 and the PSD 
still won the December 2016 parliamentary  
elections with a landslide. Sustaining the mo- 
bilization against the governing coalition until 
the presidential elections in 2019 and the par-
liamentary elections in 2020 will be complicated 
by the biased media landscape and the govern-
ment’s attempts to weaken NGOs. Moreover,  
the opposition continues to suffer from frag-
mentation. These problems make it even more 
important that the EU take a clear position and 
make use of the leverage it has for containing 
democratic backsliding in Romania.
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Andrea Wagner
 Lavinia Stan
 Frank Bönker
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As for the quality of democracy, no signifi-
cant progress was achieved in the period under 
review. The country has continued to suffer from 
opaque media ownership, a strong politicization 
of courts and public administration, and ram-
pant corruption. As evidenced by the controver-
sial change in the leadership of the public broad-
caster RTVS in June 2017, political pressure on 
the media has further increased. Despite some 
legal steps in the right direction, widespread dis-
crimination against Roma, women, LGBTI per-
sons, refugees and Muslims has persisted. On a 
more positive note, reforms introduced by Min-
ister of Justice Lucia Žitňanská have made the 
judiciary more transparent, and the long-stand-
ing stalemate between President Kiska and the 
parliament over the appointment of Constitu-
tional Court justices has been overcome. 
With GDP growing by almost 3.5 % in 2016 
and 2017, the Slovak economy remains among 
the strongest growing EU and OECD countries. 
The stronger-than-expected economic growth 
has brought a further decline in the unemploy-
Executive Summary
In the parliamentary elections in March 2016, 
Prime Minister Robert Fico’s social-democratic 
party, Smer-SD, lost its absolute majority of 
seats. While Smer-SD remained the strongest 
faction in parliament and Fico was sworn in  
as prime minister for the third time, the gov-
erning coalition only won a marginal majority 
of 78 out of 150 seats. The coalition also  
includes “strange bedfellows,” namely the  
nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) and 
Most-Híd, a centrist party representing the 
Hungarian minority. To the surprise of many 
observers, the coalition turned out be rather 
stable in its first year in office. The first  
coalition crisis only broke out in August 2017. 
Prompted by the decision of SNS leader Andrej 
Danko to withdraw from the coalition, the cri-
sis lasted just two weeks. Its main result was 
the resignation of Minister of Education Peter 
Plavčan, a SNS nominee involved in a scandal 
about the misuse of EU funds.
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in the reform plans of France and Germany,  
and to be part of a deeply integrated “core”  
European Union.
Key Challenges
Since autumn 2017, the political scene in Slova-
kia has changed. The regional elections in early 
November saw a continuation of the trend of  
declining support for Prime Minister Fico and his 
once dominant Smer-SD party, which set in with 
Fico’s surprise defeat in the 2014 presidential 
elections and continued with Smer-SD’s loss of 
its absolute majority in the 2016 parliamentary 
elections. Fico’s Smer-SD lost four of six  
regional governors and a considerable share of 
chairs in the regional councils. Fico’s core mes-
sage of strength and dominance has begun to 
fail. His one-week silence after the regional elec-
tions raised questions and unrest in his party has 
grown, as evidenced by the resignation of Marek 
Maďaric, the vice-chair of Smer-SD, in Decem-
ber 2017. In mid-March 2018, Fico resigned after 
the murder of the investigative journalist Jan 
Kuciak, who had uncovered links between people 
in government, the mafia and his fiancée, which 
sparked mass protests and a coalition crisis.  
The resignation of Fico and some other conces-
sions by Smer-SD cleared the way for a con-
ment rate and helped the government to reduce 
the general government fiscal deficit to below 
1.5 %. By contrast, there was little progress with 
much-needed health care, education and R&D 
reforms. In the case of education and R&D,  
the implementation of reforms was delayed  
by resignation of Minister of Education Peter 
Plavčan in summer 2017. 
The change from a one-party to a coalition 
government after the 2016 elections resulted in 
some differences between the second and third 
Fico governments. In the latter, ministerial com-
pliance has become more precarious, particularly 
since SNS-nominated ministers are not party 
members and lack experience. After the coali- 
tion crisis in August 2017, more formal coordi-
nation mechanisms were introduced to improve 
communication and consultation among the  
coalition partners. 
While Prime Minister Fico pursued a rather 
confrontational approach toward the European 
Union in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, 
his attitude changed during 2017. In the face of 
a regression of democracy and rule of law, and 
the eurosceptic positions of Hungary and Poland, 
Fico sought to pursue a different policy course. 
Fico emphasized that he is very much interested 
in regional cooperation within the Visegrad-4 
but that Slovakia’s vital interest is with the Eu-
ropean Union. He expressed a desire to cooperate 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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and Progresívne Slovensko (Progressive Slova-
kia) – indicates, the next elections might  
bring about substantial changes in the party 
landscape.
tinuation of the coalition of Smer-SD, SNS and 
Most-Híd, now led by former Deputy Prime 
Minister Peter Pellegrini. Contrary to opposi-
tion and public demands, no early elections were 
called and Smer-SD has gained an opportunity  
to win back credibility. This will require Smer-SD 
to take a clearer position on corruption, and to 
end its interventionist approach to the media and 
public institutions. 
The resignations of Minister of Interior  
Robert Kaliňák and Prime Minister Fico will not 
be sufficient to overcome public frustration with 
the political class. One critical issue will be deal-
ing with the audit of Slovak anti-corruption leg-
islation, which Fico and the OECD had agreed on 
at the beginning of 2017. What is also required 
is the continuation of the reform of the judici-
ary started by Minister of Justice Lucia Žitňan-
ská (who resigned in March 2018), and a de-po-
liticization of specific public bodies – such as the 
Public Procurement Office, the Prosecutor Gen-
eral and the Supreme Audit Office – and public 
administration more generally. In the case of the 
Constitutional Court, the rules for the appoint-
ment of justices should be amended with a view 
to strengthening professional requirements. 
While Slovakia’s short-term economic and 
fiscal situation looks favorable, the country faces 
a number of policy challenges. Long-term eco-
nomic prospects are limited by the poor state 
of the infrastructure, a lack of skilled labor and 
limited R&I activities. All these aspects require 
an improvement in order to sustain the economic 
course in the mid- to long-term perspective. 
As for the next parliamentary elections, 
party competition is likely to focus on the polit-
ical center. Defying widespread fears, right-wing 
populist and extremist parties scored poorly in 
the regional elections in November 2017.  
Marián Kotleba, the extremist governor of  
the Banská Bystrica region, was ousted by an 
independent candidate. This suggests that the 
good results of far-right parties in the national 
elections in 2016 do not reflect a deeply an-
chored attitude in the Slovak public, but were 
primarily a consequence of the aggressively an-
ti-migration and xenophobic discourse nurtured 
by Fico and his party in the electoral campaign. 
As the recent formation of two new centrist 
and programmatic parties – Spolu – Občianska 
Demokracia (Together – Civic Democracy)  
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Marianne Kneuer
 Darina Malová
 Frank Bönker
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high, and the three parties of the governing  
coalition continued to score poorly in public 
opinion polls.
 In 2017, the recovery from the economic  
recession of 2008-2013 continued. The country’s 
robust economic growth helped reduce the  
fiscal deficit and resulted in a strong decline  
in unemployment. At the same time, however,  
the favorable short-term economic situation  
reduced the pressure to move on with policy  
reforms. Although Slovenia features the largest 
long-term sustainability gap of all EU members, 
the announced comprehensive health care re-
form has been postponed once more. The gov-
ernment presented in March 2016 its “White 
Book on Pensions” and achieved some consen- 
sus with social partners regarding pension  
reform, but has not committed itself to any con-
crete measures yet. The tax reform eventually 
adopted in summer 2016 has been more modest 
than initially announced, and minor changes an-
nounced by the minister of finance for 2017 were 
canceled. The promised privatization of Telekom 
Executive Summary
From September 2014 to April 2018, Slovenia was 
governed by a center-left coalition led by Prime 
Minister Miro Cerar and his Modern Center Party 
(SMC). Despite some differences of opinion and 
infighting, the three-party coalition managed to 
stay together and bring some much-needed eco-
nomic stability to a country that had stood at the 
brink of a financial crisis in 2013/14. The Cerar 
government benefited from a favorable political 
position. Divided into two right-wing and two 
left-wing parties rarely able to reach a consen- 
sus on goals and interests, the opposition was 
not effective in blocking legislation. At times,  
the government even managed to cooperate effec-
tively with the opposition, which has been rela-
tively rare in recent Slovenian politics. While the 
Cerar government partially regained the public 
trust it lost in 2015, when trust in government 
fell to the lowest levels found among citizens 
across OECD countries, disenchantment with 
politics and political institutions has remained 
Slovenia
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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once again strengthening the power of direct  
democracy in Slovenia. Nonetheless, the project 
was not halted as turnout levels for the referen-
dum were too low to render the vote binding and 
votes in favor of the government’s plan slightly 
outnumbered votes in opposition to the plan.
Governance in Slovenia is marked by a strong 
corporatist tradition, which has had a mixed  
impact on the government’s strategic capacity.  
At the beginning of the Cerar government’s 
term, when the country’s economic problems 
were acute and visible, the unions accepted 
major reforms, which gave the government 
a chance to capitalize on the support of so-
cial partners. However, as economic stability 
and growth returned, the unions have become 
less willing to accept further compromise and 
have once again become more active in organ-
izing strikes and have rejected new pay-related 
arrangements in the public sector. Slovenia’s 
strong corporatist tradition accounts in part for 
the lack of strategic planning in policymaking,  
as well as the government’s limited reliance on 
independent academic experts, a weak core  
executive, an increasingly politicized civil service 
and a largely symbolic use of RIA. 
Institutional reforms under the Cerar gov-
ernment have largely been confined to a reshuf-
fling of ministerial portfolios at the beginning of 
the term and a strengthening of the Government 
Slovenije, the largest communication company 
in the country, fell victim to political opposition 
from within and outside the governing coalition. 
The same happened with the promised privat-
ization of largest bank NLB, which was further 
postponed in May 2017.
The quality of democracy has continued to 
suffer from widespread corruption. While the 
Cerar government continued to implement the 
Anti-Corruption Action Plan adopted in January 
2015, and the Commission for the Prevention of 
Corruption managed to upgrade its supervisor 
web platform and launch its successor Erar in 
July 2016, doubts about the political elite’s com-
mitment to fight corruption were raised by two 
developments in particular. The first involved 
the intransparent management of a government 
project in which a second railway track was con-
structed between Divača and the port of Koper. 
The second involved investments by Magna,  
a Canadian-Austrian company that received large 
subsidies and unconditional support from the 
government for a plan to build a new car paint 
shop close to Maribor but failed manage things 
transparently and deliver on its promise of 
bringing several thousand new jobs to the region. 
The differences in opinions between the govern-
ment and civil society organizations on the fi-
nancial construction of the second railway track 
project resulted in a referendum being called, 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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short-term. Adopting substantial health care and 
pension reforms, particularly in a failing public 
health sector saddled by corruption, should be a 
clear policy priority. In order to strengthen the 
economy, the government should also intervene 
less – whether formally or informally – in state-
owned companies and implement its strategy 
to privatize remaining state-owned enterprises. 
The government should also stand firm on its 
decision to give much more attention to R&I and 
higher education, two areas which have been  
neglected for years.
Achieving these goals could be facilitated by  
a number of changes in the Slovenian policy-
making process. The government could make 
greater use of expert advice, strengthen strate- 
gic planning and improve the RIA system.  
Such changes would make it easier for the gov-
ernment to plan and act on a long-term basis, 
overcome resistance by special interest groups, 
which often hinder or even disable governmental 
activity, and win larger share of public accept-
ance for much-needed reforms.
Office for Development and European Cohesion 
Policy, the public body in charge of coordinating 
the use of EU funds. In addition, the Cerar gov-
ernment adopted a strategy for the development 
of public administration in April 2015 and a  
separate strategy for the development of local 
government in September 2016 but failed to  
implement any serious reforms. As a result,  
conflicts between municipalities and the national 
government have continued.
Key Challenges
After four years of relative political stability,  
the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2018  
are likely to bring about change to the political 
scene in Slovenia. The three parties of the gov-
erning coalition have scored poorly in the polls 
and, as has been the case in previous elections, 
new political forces will likely emerge. Marjan 
Šarec, a comedian turned mayor who came sec-
ond in the presidential elections in 2017, has al-
ready announced that he will establish a new  
political party. The strong showing in the polls  
of the center-right SDP led by Janez Janša,  
a controversial former prime minister at odds 
with major parts of the political elites, further 
strengthens the concerns that building a stable 
new government after the elections might  
become difficult. 
In order to regain the lost public trust in po-
litical institutions and political elites in general, 
the new government should strengthen the  
judiciary’s quality and take a tougher stance on 
corruption. In addition, the selection and pro-
motion of civil servants on the basis of their po-
litical affiliation, which has continued under the 
Cerar government, should be brought to an end 
and the career civil service model should be  
rebuilt. To counter fears about a weakening of 
media freedom and independence, the strategy 
for media regulation presented to the public in 
summer 2016 should be first amended and  
then implemented rigorously. 
While steady economic growth has reduced 
short-term reform pressures, the need for struc-
tural reforms remains strong. Without major 
pension and health care reforms, aging demo-
graphics in Slovenia are likely to result in sub-
stantial fiscal pressures in the medium- and 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Miro Hacˇek
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 Frank Bönker
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suppressed by a state that impeded the freedom 
of the press, manipulated public opinion and cre-
ated blacklists of artists who were seen as critical 
of the government. It was also revealed that the 
government had colluded with private businesses 
to create slush funds. However, the massive  
protests against President Park that began in 
October 2016 showed that the Korean public re-
mains ready to defend its democracy and stand 
up against corruption. On 3 December 2016, an 
estimated 2 million people across the country 
took to the streets to demonstrate again Presi-
dent Park. While the protests were to a large de-
gree spontaneous, they were in part driven by the 
work of vibrant civil-society organizations. News 
reports, particularly from JTBC TV, also played an 
important role in uncovering the scandals. 
The Moon administration has promised 
major changes with the aim of making South 
Korea more democratic and improving social 
justice. During his first six months in office, 
Moon announced a large number of policy pro-
posals (“100 policy tasks”) that include welfare-, 
Executive Summary
The period under review saw dramatic changes 
in South Korea, with the parliament voting to 
impeach conservative President Park Geun-hye 
in December 2016 following a corruption scan- 
dal and months of public demonstrations in 
which millions of Koreans participated. In March 
2017, the Korean Constitutional Court unani-
mously decided to uphold the impeachment,  
and new presidential elections consequently took 
place in May 2017. The elections were won by the 
leader of the opposition Democratic Party, Moon 
Jae-in, by a wide margin. The corruption scan-
dal revealed major governance problems in South 
Korea, including collusion between the state and 
big business and a lack of institutional checks 
and balances able to prevent presidential abuses 
of power in a system that concentrates too much 
power in one office. Particularly striking were 
the revelations that under conservative Presi-
dents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye,  
the political opposition had been systematically 
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ments and wants to actively engage and negotiate 
with North Korea. However, this policy path car-
ries its own difficulties given the continuing prov-
ocations from the North, as well as the actions of 
hard-line leaders in the United States and Japan 
that have used the threat from the North to pur-
sue their own agendas of nationalist consolidation 
and militarism. Beyond the North Korea question, 
the character of the country’s future international 
engagement – for example, with regard to urgent 
issues of climate change, poverty in the Global 
South, and a fairer global economic and financial 
system – has yet to come into sharp focus. 
In conclusion, South Korea has begun a new 
project to restore democracy and revitalize the 
transformation to a mature democracy that had 
stalled and even regressed somewhat under the 
previous two conservative administrations.  
However, South Korea is moving in the right  
direction with the momentum gained from the 
so-called candlelight revolution.
Key Challenges
At the domestic level, the biggest challenge for 
the incoming Moon administration will be to  
deliver on the candidate’s numerous campaign 
promises, particularly at a point when  
Moon’s party lacks a parliamentary majority.  
justice- and education-system reforms. He also 
promised to decentralize power and put place new 
limits on the constitutional powers of the pres-
ident. These changes were to be proposed in a 
set of constitutional reforms that would be put 
to a referendum in 2018. As of the time of writ-
ing, many of the policy proposals had not yet been 
implemented. Moreover, many will certainly face 
difficulties, as President Moon’s Democratic Party 
lacks a parliamentary majority. Negotiating the 
remaining overlap between the Park and Moon 
governments presents a major challenge, as does 
completion of the new government’s many an-
nounced but as-yet-unimplemented policies. 
Economically, Korea is doing exceptionally 
well in cross-OECD comparison. With an annual  
GDP growth rate of 2.8 % in 2016, Korea was 
above the OECD average of 1.78 %. Korea remains 
a major exporter, with many highly competitive 
multinational corporations producing a great va-
riety of products in the automotive, IT and other 
industries, although this also leaves the country 
vulnerable to global market volatility. The overall 
unemployment rate remains low at 3.8 %, but the 
labor-market participation rate is below average, 
and the lack of social mobility is causing an in-
creasing degree of concern, particularly among 
the younger generations. With regard to interna-
tional relations, President Moon Jae-in has aban-
doned the hard-line rhetoric of previous govern-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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pare for inevitably lower growth rates and an in-
creasingly aging society. Moreover, the rise in so-
cial inequality in what was previously a relatively 
equitable society has undermined social cohesion. 
Several long-term tasks, including restructuring 
the country’s dominant business conglomerates 
and strengthening SMEs and startups, are be-
coming increasingly critical. The economy must 
also move away from its current dependence on 
the construction sector, and instead place greater 
focus on innovation. The ongoing restructuring of 
the shipping and shipbuilding industries, in par-
ticular, will be very costly and is expected to lead 
to substantial unemployment. South Korea is also 
behind the curve in shifting to a sustainable and 
low-carbon economy based on renewable energy. 
North Korea continues to be a major threat to 
stability on the Korean peninsula and within the 
East Asian region as a whole. More than 60 years 
after the end of Korean War, there is still no 
peace treaty that would formally end the Korean 
War. The unpredictable and confrontational be-
havior of the North Korean regime, particularly 
with regard to nuclear and missile tests, has led 
to further deterioration in North-South relations. 
Maintaining peace and achieving the demili-
tarization of the Korean peninsula is an urgent 
and critical task for the South Korean govern-
ment. The Moon administration has promised 
to abandon the failed hard-line policies toward 
the North and combine deterrence and strength 
with engagement and negotiations. However, 
the election of U.S. President Donald Trump and 
the re-election of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in 
Japan have made the situation even more dif-
ficult, as each of these figures has followed a 
hard-line strategy. While war on the Korean 
peninsula remains unlikely for now, the further 
deterioration of relations with the North and the 
prospect of an escalating arms race in East Asia 
are grave dangers that will undermine stability 
in East Asia in the medium and long term. In ad-
dition, amid these mounting tensions, there al-
ways remains the possibility that error, accident 
or sudden unintended escalation could produce 
unpredictable consequences.
While Moon remains extremely popular, and at 
the time of writing had proven relatively suc-
cessful in filling positions and implementing a 
few of his promises, it will be difficult for his  
administration to fully satisfy the public expecta-
tions built up during the last years of frustration 
under the Park Geun-hye government. Many of 
President Moon’s proposals are likely to improve 
social and economic conditions in South Korea. 
For example, he has promised to reform oligopo-
listic and paternalistic structures in the corporate 
sector, strengthen the small and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) sector, increase the minimum 
wage, and transform irregular employment con-
tracts into permanent ones. He has also promised 
to pay more attention to the environment, a badly 
needed policy change after previous administra-
tions’ focus on growth, support for business and 
car-oriented infrastructure planning. 
From an institutional perspective, Moon has 
promised to make the country’s political system 
more democratic, more decentralized and less 
corrupt. In particular, he has proposed to decen-
tralize the power of the president; strengthen the 
cabinet, parliament and regional governments; 
and enhance opportunities for citizen participa-
tion. He has additionally proposed a constitu-
tional change transforming the one-time five-
year presidential term into a four-year term  
with a second term possible. In combination, 
such reforms would make South Korea more 
democratic, while at the same time increasing 
strategic-planning capacities by reducing the 
lame-duck period. In general, it is expected that 
civil- and human-rights conditions will improve 
substantially under President Moon, who is a 
former human-rights lawyer. 
Economically South Korea is doing well,  
but the country remains vulnerable to global 
economic volatility and external political con-
flicts due to its dependence on exports. The tide 
of global trade protectionism is additionally be-
coming a significant challenge to the South Ko-
rean economy. Domestically, the biggest economic 
challenge is to enhance social mobility and im-
prove job conditions for irregular workers and the 
younger generation. In addition, household debts 
related to a real-estate bubble and high education 
costs are also major challenges. The historically 
low-tax country also faces a major challenge in 
further expanding the welfare state so as to pre-
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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secured the support of smaller parties in exchange 
for investment pledges and tax benefits. Also in 
2017, however, the conflict in Catalonia escalated 
into the country’s biggest political crisis since  
democracy was restored in 1978. Police violence 
exerted to prevent the holding of a referendum 
on the political relationship between Catalonia 
and the rest of Spain, which had been suspended 
by Spain’s Constitutional Court, has damaged the 
image of the country internationally.
After secessionist Catalan members of  
parliament voted to declare an independent  
republic in October, the Spanish government  
dissolved the Catalan parliament and announced 
new elections for December 2017. The Spanish 
senate granted Rajoy unprecedented powers to 
impose direct rule on Catalonia under article  
155 of the constitution. The interpretation and 
application of article 155 have been widely dis-
cussed. Some consider that the state had to take 
measures to protect the general interest. Others, 
among them the Catalan ombudsman, consid-
ered the application of article 155 as “abusive.”
Executive Summary
After several years of recession, social unrest 
has eroded the legitimacy of and public trust in 
Spain’s political system. The shift from a two-
party into a multiparty system has been a notable 
consequence of these developments. In addition 
to traditional parties such as the Popular Party 
(PP) and Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), this mul-
tiparty constellation now includes the leftist party 
Podemos and liberal Ciudadanos. Although the 
nascent parties offered a fresh pluralistic impetus 
in parliamentary debates, this came with higher 
political instability: since the traditional parties 
lost support, the building of coalition govern-
ments at the national level had become unviable. 
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy began the process 
of securing parliamentary support for the 2017 
budget in a test of his minority government’s 
power. With a fourth of the year already gone,  
the Spanish cabinet passed his 2017 tax and 
spending plans. Spain’s lower house approved  
the long-delayed 2017 national budget after Rajoy 
Spain
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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weaknesses persist. Bank lending remains lim-
ited and current-account deficits may reemerge, 
the labor market continues to languish, and in-
equality is becoming more extreme. Most new 
jobs created are unstable. Social exclusion re-
mains a perennial problem, with 22 % of Span-
iards at risk of poverty. In addition, increasing 
life expectancies are leading to an unsustaina-
ble population pyramid – the most challenging 
in Europe. In combination with the effects of the 
crisis, this challenge has reopened the debate on 
the future of the Spanish social security system. 
Spain continues to collect less in taxes relative 
to wealth than most other European countries, 
making ambitious education, welfare and envi-
ronmental policies difficult. Investment in R&D 
accounts for just 1.2 % of GDP, compared to Eu-
ropean Union and OECD averages that are above 
2 %. There are some positive trends in policy 
areas such as health care (a well-considered and 
innovative system, despite recent budgetary cuts). 
The crisis had a profound impact on public 
trust in democratic institutions and the Catalan 
conflict is considered by some in the country to 
be damaging the quality of democracy. Opaque 
party financing and several corruption scandals 
(most cases under investigation have their ori-
gins in the housing bubble years) materialized as 
significant challenges for the future. At the na-
tional level, the capacity of citizens to participate 
Most economic domains continued to  
bear the fruits of previous economic reforms.  
Economic growth has been strong and balanced  
in 2017 and is projected to moderate but remain 
robust in 2018 and 2019. In fact, economic 
growth will be much higher than in other euro 
zone countries in 2017. After radical austerity 
programs, reforms in the banking sector,  
increasing foreign investment, and labor market 
reforms, the unit labor cost fell significantly and 
productivity rose. In 2017, these competitive-
ness gains continued to support exports, despite 
the strength of the euro. The European Commis-
sion’s decision to grant more flexibility in meet-
ing fiscal targets and euro area monetary policy 
were also helpful as were the decline in oil prices 
and the record-breaking number of tourists  
(80 million forecast for 2017). 
The recovery has also been driven by domestic 
demand. Nevertheless, the Spanish economy has 
not yet rebounded to 2008 levels, the incomes of 
Spaniards remain lower than before the crisis and 
bank lending remains limited. Although house-
holds have reduced their debt by nearly 55 % of 
GDP since mid-2010, the public deficit remains 
very high (forcing the continuity of austerity  
policies). Unemployment rates are lower than  
in 2016 but remain very high (16.5 % in 2017). 
It is premature to assume Spain is now on  
a truly sustainable economic path, since several 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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The economic growth observed over the past 
years has not made a difference in many Span-
iards’ lives. Management of the crisis under-
mined every social program and has amplified 
inequality and increased social exclusion. As a 
consequence, the government’s social policies 
require strategic attention over the coming years. 
Maintaining social cohesion has itself become 
a critical challenge. There is the near-term risk 
that adjustment costs may become unsustainable 
as well as a longer-term risk that spending cuts 
in health care, education, inclusion and family 
policies may increase social tensions. Widespread 
support is increasingly found among the Spanish 
population to carry measures dealing with this 
increasing inequality. 
The aging population represents another 
major challenge. The average Spaniard today lives 
81.6 years, the birth rate is extremely low (1.3) 
and forecasts suggest that one-third of Spain’s 
population will be 64 years of age or older by 
2050 (compared to 17.4 % in 2012). Effectively 
addressing this challenge will depend on future 
immigration patterns and the integration of for-
eign workers, but also requires tackling the un-
sustainable pay-as-you-go pension system.  
Remarkably, given the large inflow of foreigners 
followed by a deep economic crisis, Spanish soci-
ety has thus far not succumb to xenophobia, al-
though this may change with the next generation. 
The central government has demonstrated 
little concern for environmental sustainability, 
despite the country’s risky geographic location 
with regard to global challenges such as deser-
tification and climate change. Spain, which im-
ports most of its energy, has gone so far as to 
reduce earlier investments for developing re-
newable energy sources. In contrast, local gov-
ernments and the governments of the Auton-
omous Communities began in recent years to 
adopt policy measures to reduce pollution and 
protect the environment. 
Regarding political stability, the single-party 
minority government requires allies for most 
legislative initiatives. This means PP must strike 
compromises with other parties in the parlia-
ment on a variety of issues, including budgetary 
matters. Due to ideological (and tactical) consid-
erations, it will be difficult for PP to do so with 
the parties on the left, in particular, the social-
ists, PSOE, and Podemos. Ciudadanos will be a 
through legally binding referendums remains  
a weakness of the political system. However,  
at the local level and at the level of Autonomous 
Communities, new mechanisms of direct democ-
racy are progressively being used. In addition, 
Spaniards abroad, whose numbers have recently 
substantially grown, face barriers to political 
participation domestically. Media pluralism  
and independence could be improved as well.
Key Challenges
Spain is no longer viewed as the euro zone mem-
ber whose troubles are most likely to put the sin-
gle currency in peril. Instead, it is regarded as a 
success story thanks to reforms implemented by 
the Spanish government in recent years. External 
factors contribute to foster this growth. For this 
to continue, however, the country’s profound 
domestic challenges must be addressed. On the 
fiscal front, the persistent gap between public 
spending and tax receipts will oblige Spain to  
either implement additional austerity measures 
or collect more revenue. The latter, more ap-
pealing option, can be realized by making the 
tax system more efficient and reducing the high 
level of tax evasion. Also, the financing system  
of the 17 Autonomous Communities must be  
reformed so that these subnational governments 
have sufficient resources. Deficit levels remain 
very high; although Brussels is inclined to help, 
much more progress is required. 
In order to improve the competitiveness 
of the Spanish economy and foster economic 
growth, the government must place greater  
emphasis on innovation and education. Evidence 
suggests that Spain’s current education and R&D 
systems are hindering the move toward a more 
knowledge-based economy. 
Regarding the country’s extraordinarily high 
unemployment, especially among youth and those 
who have now been out of the labor market for 
several years, the government must develop and 
implement job-creation policies involving more 
than simple wage cuts. Needed reforms include 
policies to improve human capital and expand 
R&D, increase competition in goods and services 
markets, end labor-market dualities, reduce en-
ergy costs, and find an effective and capable means 
of redistributing income to reduce inequality. 
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mittee to study the current territorial model.  
The committee’s final report may be the impetus 
for a constitutional reform. However, such a re-
form would require traversing a perilous constitu-
tional process (article 167). Also, a constitutional 
reform may help to consolidate the territorial 
model, but may not be enough to reduce tensions 
between Catalonia and the “rest” of Spain.
source of support, though alone insufficient to 
get legislation passed. This means PP must count 
on other minor parties, including Basque moder-
ate nationalists and Canary Islands regionalists. 
As a consequence, it is unlikely the government 
will secure majorities for major reforms and 
quite possible that elections are called before the 
current parliamentary term ends in 2020. 
The push for independence in Catalonia, one 
of Spain’s wealthiest regions, endangers political 
stability and threatens constitutional turmoil.  
Political positions in Madrid and Barcelona remain 
very distant and negotiation channels have yet to 
be established. In October 2017, PP, Ciudadanos 
and PSOE agreed to create a parliamentary com-
Sweden
Country profile SGI 2018
changing: party membership continues to  
decline and electoral allegiance to parties is  
increasingly volatile. Yet these changes may 
simply demonstrate that Sweden’s system is  
capable of adaptation and reinvention.
Executive Summary
Democratic governance remains robust and 
deeply institutionalized in Sweden. Some of 
the societal underpinnings of governance are 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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modating and integrating the large number of asy-
lum-seekers that have arrived in Sweden. This pol-
icy challenge has upended the dynamics between 
parties as new alliances have formed while con-
ventional collaborative arrangements are showing 
signs of strain. This development has exacerbated 
ambiguities in an already fragile parliament.
Until the change of government in September 
2014, the non-socialist “Alliance” government 
had continued its goal-oriented policy of trans-
forming the welfare state. It had implemented 
market-based reforms in a wide variety of sec-
tors, so much so that it appears as if bringing the 
market into public services and the welfare state 
was an end in itself. The previous government 
had extensively cut taxes, yielding cutbacks in 
many welfare programs, which put pressure on 
those on medical leave to return to work. Some 
of the implemented measures did not, at first 
glance, undermine the logic of the Swedish wel-
fare model. Considered individually, the family, 
labor market, tax and social insurance reforms 
seem moderate. However, in sum, these reforms 
represent a significant departure from the tra-
ditional Swedish model. The tax policy reforms, 
in particular, mark a genuine break with the past 
and are ideologically driven to a greater extent 
than in many previous governments.
The unique features of Sweden’s political, 
economic and social systems appear to be fading 
with time. Stability, broad consensus, and the 
absence of right-wing populist parties have  
traditionally been defining features of Sweden’s  
political environment just as corporatism,  
centralized wage bargaining, high taxes and a 
The Swedish political and administrative  
system is fragmented by design. Agencies are au-
tonomous in relationship to the political center. 
Local and regional governments likewise enjoy 
substantive, constitutionally guaranteed auton-
omy. Reforms over the past several years have 
focused on strengthening the political center’s 
oversight powers. Advocates of these reforms 
argue that such powers are essential to sustain a 
responsive political leadership. Equally important 
is the need for accountability, as the agents and 
structures of political power must be held respon-
sible for the policy measures they advance.
These reforms have also increased the stra-
tegic capacity of the political system; though this 
appears to have come at the price of some inclu-
siveness of societal interests, discourse and de-
bate. Using information increasingly as a strategic 
asset, the government, and not least the Govern-
ment Office (GO), is today more secluded and in-
accessible to the media and interest associations. 
Increasing coordination among government  
departments, where fragmentation had been  
a major hinderance, is enhancing the strategic  
capacity of the government at the same time as  
it weakens the points of contact with society.
In terms of economic policy, the government 
has skillfully navigated the Swedish economy past 
crisis and instability. Not being a member of the 
euro zone has certainly helped, but the govern-
ment deserves praise for its management of the 
economy through the recent series of financial 
and economic crises, global as well as European.
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the 
Swedish government in late 2017 involves accom-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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productive public sector, and carefully managed 
international influence. Many indicators sug- 
gest that Sweden is well on its way to achieving 
these goals. The key challenges facing the  
government relate to aiding the economic and 
social losers. Sweden’s long-term social and 
economic sustainability hinges on the capacity of 
the government to address this need. Sweden’s 
government now faces the challenge of clearly 
defining its social agenda. Choosing which  
strategy to implement is not feasible until the 
government delineates its policy objectives.
With the Social Democrats’ return to polit-
ical power, a key issue is determining which of 
the previous non-socialist government’s reforms 
of the welfare state, education system and labor 
market should be continued and which should  
be reversed. Reversing a large number of reforms 
could introduce a stop-and-go pattern of poli-
cymaking that would be detrimental to institu-
tional capacity, stability and predictability,  
which are important for economic development. 
On the other hand, simply further administering 
an inherently non-socialist policy agenda would 
be difficult to sustain electorally. 
In terms of challenges facing the govern-
ment, four related problems stand out:  
immigration and accommodating asylum- 
seekers, unemployment, integration and equal-
ity. Over the past several years, Sweden has en-
joyed strong economic development, except for 
the odd year in the midst of the global financial 
crisis. However, even during high-growth  
periods, the government has recorded relatively 
high levels of unemployment. Whether these are 
the result of shortcomings in the preparing of 
students for work life or invisible thresholds to 
entering the labor market, unemployment in 
general and youth unemployment in particu- 
lar remains a problem. The previous gov- 
ernment put their trust overwhelmingly in the 
market and incentives; the new government  
appears to be more “dirigiste” in its approach. 
It is too early to assess whether this new policy 
style will be any more successful in addressing 
these urgent issues. 
Integration poses a similar type of challenge. 
Visible and invisible obstacles prevent immi-
grants from finding meaningful jobs and societal 
acceptance in Sweden. A comparison with other 
countries is insufficient. Unlike other countries, 
generous welfare state have attracted considera-
ble praise. Noted for its societal homogeneity  
and high levels of equality, employment and  
affluence, Sweden is becoming increasingly  
diverse and faces sustained unemployment,  
dualities in the labor market, growing inequal- 
ity, and diminished quality of life and health.  
In short, Sweden is losing its “unique” status  
as a role model in the European context.
The Social Democratic and Green coalition 
government that was formed after the 2014 gen-
eral elections appears to place less trust in the 
market than their predecessors. As the red-green 
coalition government has no clear majority in 
parliament, it remains to be seen if it is capa-
ble of organizing stable majorities and to what 
extent their more state-centric policy style will 
help address urgent issues in education, welfare 
and unemployment. As of late 2017, the govern-
ment has been rather successful in securing suf-
ficient support for its most significant bills. 
The capacity of the parliament to set long-
term goals and pass budgets has been severely 
constrained by the post-2014 distribution of 
seats. The red-green coalition and non-socialist 
“Alliance” parties control roughly the same  
percentage of seats. The right-wing populist 
Sweden Democrats party holds a pivotal posi-
tion between these two blocs, yet neither of the 
two is willing to negotiate with them. This re-
sulted in a major parliamentary stalemate until a 
December 2014 agreement helped ensure passage 
of the minority governments’ budget proposals. 
That agreement, however, collapsed in October 
2015. As of 2017, the argument about whether the 
other political parties should cooperate in some 
form with the Sweden Democrats appears to 
have been put on hold pending the 2018 general 
elections, which may or may not produce a more 
manageable parliament. Until then, it is easy to  
see that the combined factors of a political  
system under duress and the challenge of  
ensuring a working majority in parliament  
has not strengthened the strategic capacity  
of government institutions.
Key Challenges
Sweden’s long-term strategic ambitions are 
global competitiveness, a lean but effective and 
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number of immigrants represent, in the short 
term, a significant challenge in terms of accom-
modation and welfare provision. These chal-
lenges will impact local governments even 
harder in 2018, when state subsidies will be  
reduced. In the longer term, achieving real  
integration will be essential to the future wealth 
and stability of the country.
Sweden has devoted financial resources to solv-
ing the problem. Yet its formula has not worked, 
likely because the government has been unable 
to overcome societal obstacles. The government 
has taken the first step in strengthening the in-
ternal strategic capacity of the state, but now, 
in a second step, it needs to address the issue 
of making societal governance more integrative 
and effective.
Core values of Swedish governance such  
as equality and equal treatment are being  
tested by the acute crisis in accommodating  
asylum-seekers and refugees from Syria and 
other war-torn countries. In the past, equality 
was one of the major features of the Swedish 
model. However, inequality has increased in 
Sweden because of wage bargaining deregula-
tion, the trend away from collective wage deter-
mination toward individualized patterns and  
increasing income from capital for high-income 
earners. Tax reforms under the previous govern-
ment further accelerated the trend toward  
inequality. From a comparative point of view,  
Sweden remains a very egalitarian society.  
From a historical point of view, however,  
the rise in inequality has been strikingly fast  
and threatens to further undermine societal  
trust and integration. Addressing rising inequal-
ity will therefore be a political challenge for the 
new red-green government. 
The government has a rare opportunity to 
capitalize on high institutional trust, a strong 
economy, a vibrant civil society and a competent 
professional staff at all levels of government. 
The key decision it must make is whether to  
employ those resources to pursue collective goals 
or instead promote individual initiatives and de-
regulation. This is obviously a political decision, 
although many scholars argue that the correla-
tion between growth and a small public sector is 
weaker than once assumed. For Sweden,  
it appears unlikely that strong growth can  
be sustained with a “race to the bottom”  
strategy, which would undermine integration,  
equality and trust. Instead, economic prosperity 
will more likely be the outcome of concerted  
action between an effective, capable and produc-
tive public sector and a globally competitive and 
balanced business community.
The major challenge in the longer term, 
however, will be integration. The very large 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
 Jon Pierre
 Sven Jochem
 Detlef Jahn
209
Country profiles
Switzerland
Country profile SGI 2018
have resulted in an absence of deep social divi-
sions and marginalization (at least among Swiss 
citizens). As a result, citizens report a high level 
of life satisfaction and positive opinion of the 
national political system compared to neighbor-
ing countries.
Notwithstanding these successes, the short-
comings and challenges that existed a year ago 
persist, with some amplified to an extreme  
degree (see also “Key Challenges”):
1.  Most dramatic in this regard are the  
developments in relations with the European 
Union. With 54 % of exports going to the  
European Union and 72 % of imports coming 
from the European Union (2016), as well as a 
strong inflow of highly qualified labor from 
the European Union, Switzerland is far more 
dependent on the European Union than the 
European Union is on Switzerland. The rela-
tionship is based on bilateral treaties,  
many of which are conditional on each other.  
If one of the major treaties were to be termi-
nated, other important treaties would auto-
Executive Summary
In the current review period, governance in 
Switzerland has shown considerable continu-
ity with SGI 2017. By implication, the country’s 
strengths and shortcomings have remained  
unchanged. These strengths include the stabil-
ity and quality of democracy, the efficient rule 
of law, an excellent system of public education 
and research, and a competent system of public 
transportation. The country has a high level of 
GDP per capita (one of the highest in the OECD) 
and accumulated wealth, and the natural envi-
ronment remains ecologically sound. Social and 
economic policies are pragmatic, solution-ori-
ented and heterodox. The Swiss government can 
be commended for maintaining a highly com-
petitive economy, sustainable fiscal position, 
comparatively sustainable and generous wel-
fare state, and moderate and stagnant income 
inequality. The flexible labor market has main-
tained full employment and high employment 
rates for both men and women. These policies 
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cided upon in a popular vote between 2018 
and 2020. If this proposal wins approval,  
international law and treaties would become 
subordinate to Swiss law. Third, in Septem-
ber 2017, the party announced that it would 
collect signatures for a new popular initia-
tive, which is necessary to call a public vote. 
This initiative aims to force the government 
to terminate the current bilateral treaty on 
the free movement of labor between Switzer-
land and the European Union, which would 
automatically lead to the termination of other 
basic bilateral treaties. 
2.  Closely connected to the issue of European-
ization (and globalization) is the polariza-
tion of Swiss politics, and the concomitant 
weakening of the system of consensus de-
mocracy and social partnership. This applies 
not only to institutional and behavioral in-
dicators of consensus democracy, but also to 
deep-seated cultural patterns and indispen-
sable elements of the elite socialization of the 
past, such as the willingness to compromise 
and interact respectfully with political oppo-
nents. The political system of Switzerland is 
converging toward the continental pattern of 
non-majoritarian politics.
3.  As in previous years, the system of direct de-
mocracy succeeds in giving citizens the feel-
ing they have a say in government policies. 
matically become null and void. In 2014,  
the Swiss electorate voted for a constitutional 
amendment establishing a cap on immigra-
tion. Such a cap is not compatible with bilat-
eral treaties between Switzerland and the  
European Union. While many Swiss citizens 
and politicians expected the European Union 
to adapt existing treaties to the new consti-
tutional amendment, the European Union  
rejected a renegotiation of existing treaties. 
As a result, implementing the amendment 
against the will of the European Union would 
have entailed enormous economic risks.  
Most Swiss politicians have shown them-
selves unwilling to take such a risk, instead 
embarking on a strategy of, in effect, not im-
plementing the amendment. In this context 
the Swiss People’s Party (already the strong-
est party in the country) is pursuing three 
projects which may further strain the re-
lationship with the European Union. First, 
the party strongly opposes an institutional 
framework agreement between Switzerland 
and the European Union. Such an agreement 
would allow for a smooth revision of existing 
treaties and court-based adjudication of con-
flicts between the two trade partners. Second, 
the party has also submitted a new proposal 
for a constitutional amendment (the “self- 
determination initiative”), which will be de-
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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lic revenues of local and canton authorities. 
To achieve this, the government proposed to 
lower taxes for domestic firms in line with 
the effective tax rates enjoyed by foreign 
companies, thereby obviating the preferen-
tial tax treatment of foreign firms. As a con-
sequence, general tax income would decrease. 
This is against the wishes of the political left, 
which generally would like to see a higher 
level of taxation, in particular on capital. In a 
popular vote in February 2017, the public  
rejected this reform. There were two major 
reasons for this rejection. First, a large share 
of citizens found the proposal too complex 
and given their uncertainty opted against it. 
Second, another share of voters found the 
proposal excessively biased in favor of “the 
rich” and large enterprises. Currently, the 
Ministry of Finance is developing a new re-
form proposal which is less generous toward 
large enterprises and contains compensation 
payments (increased child allowances) in 
order to win support from left-wing voters.
Key Challenges
Switzerland faced ongoing, interrelated chal-
lenges at the close of the current review period. 
There is a disconnect between Swiss identity 
and reality: an enormous share of the popula-
tion is comprised of foreign workers and other 
migrants. Policymakers are struggling to im-
plement popular referenda by navigating be-
tween a “responsive” (implementing the peo-
ple’s preferences) and “responsible” (furthering 
the people’s common good under conditions of 
constraint choices) reaction. They also have to 
reform the pension system, establish a tax re-
gime for enterprises that is EU-compatible, and 
find sustainable solutions for the relationship 
between the European Union and Switzerland.
First, the country’s relationship with the Eu-
ropean Union remains provisional and increas-
ingly fragile. In the past, the realities of domes-
tic politics made bilateral agreements the only 
practical solution as neither a policy of “going it 
alone” nor EU membership were feasible strate-
gies. However, this bilateral solution is becoming 
increasingly untenable. While domestic conflicts 
about the future relationship between the Eu-
This system is one of the major reasons why 
Swiss citizens are far more satisfied with the 
way democracy works in their country than 
their European neighbors. However, the sys-
tem of direct democracy also demonstrates 
serious shortcomings. Among them is the 
likelihood that voters approve constitutional 
amendments which cannot be implemented 
for legal or economic grounds. A recent ex-
ample is the initiative capping immigration, 
illustrating the tension between the myth of 
the people’s unconstrained sovereignty and 
the reality of a semi-sovereign political order 
where international law and economic inter-
dependence severely limit democratic politics.
4.  Although the welfare state is sustainable and 
generous, the pension system must cope with 
demographic challenges. While increasing the 
age of retirement beyond 65 is not feasible 
given the constraints imposed by direct de-
mocracy, there are possibilities for reforming 
the three-pillar pension system (basic pen-
sion, occupational pension and tax-deduct-
ible savings for retirement). A major reform 
was rejected in a popular vote in September 
2017. Under considerable time pressure, poli-
ticians must work on a new adaptation of the 
pension system to demographic challenges.
5.   Another major political conflict relates to 
environmental and energy policies. In the  
aftermath of the catastrophe in Fukushima, 
the Swiss government opted for an exit from 
nuclear power. It has been difficult, however, 
to implement that decision. In its new en-
ergy strategy, the government opted for a 
long-term “soft” exit which allows all nu-
clear power stations to remain in operation 
for their lifespan. No new nuclear power  
stations will be licensed to operate, however.  
Following a left-green initiative that de-
manded a quicker and harsher exit from  
nuclear energy failed in a popular vote in  
November 2016, the government’s strategy 
was approved in May 2017.
6.  In the past, Swiss cantons have offered 
generous tax deals to foreign firms. This has 
provoked criticism from the OECD and  
European Union, leading to a reform pro-
posal. Switzerland wants to keep these for-
eign companies in the country, since they 
make a substantial contribution to the pub-
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remain only partially implemented because full 
implementation would violate international law, 
international treaties or economic requirements. 
This has put the administration in a difficult  
position: full implementation would violate  
international or economic norms, but partial  
implementation gives rise to accusations among 
right-wing politicians that the “will of the peo-
ple” is not respected. In order to mitigate the 
conflict between responsive and responsible  
government, political elites must effectively 
communicate that the Swiss nation is – as all 
Western nations – at best semi-sovereign and 
that there are strict limitations on what the pub-
lic can decide upon. However, such a communi-
cation strategy would clash with the self-image 
of the Swiss, who are immensely proud of their 
(perceived) independence and sovereignty.
As in most other mature democracies,  
Switzerland’s pension system must cope with 
the challenges posed by an aging population.  
To date, the system has been sustainable and 
provides relatively generous pension payments. 
Nonetheless, without exceptionally strong pro-
ductivity growth or a continuing inflow of young 
foreign labor, in the long run either the retire-
ment age will need to be raised or the level of 
benefits reduced. After the failed pension reform, 
the government is under strong pressure to de-
velop a new reform proposal that will gain the 
support of a majority of voters in a popular vote.
ropean Union and Switzerland have not abated, 
solutions have to be found. The current strategy 
of muddling-through, currently successful,  
may become unsustainable in the future. 
Second, minimizing internal political con-
flicts fueled by migration has grown more chal-
lenging. The share of foreigners within Switzer-
land’s population is among the highest in the 
world. Immigration has stimulated economic 
growth. To sustain the high economic growth 
rate, it remains essential that the country con-
tinue to recruit highly skilled labor. An extraor-
dinarily high proportion of elite positions in the 
economy and higher education are staffed by 
foreign workers. Foreigners are also younger 
than the average Swiss citizen. Consequently, 
they contribute far more to the Swiss pension 
system than they receive. Hence, they subsidize 
the Swiss pension system and contribute sig- 
nificantly to its sustainability. Nonetheless,  
immigration has prompted considerable  
concerns among Swiss workers about housing 
prices, jobs and the use of infrastructure (e.g., 
roads and public transportation). Swiss workers 
constitute the base of the right-wing populist  
Swiss People’s Party (SVP). Today, the SVP  
is among the strongest populist parties in  
Europe in terms of votes, representation in  
government and success in referenda. Notably, 
this political strength cannot be primarily at-
tributed to xenophobia. At least in international 
comparison, Switzerland and some of the Nordic 
European democracies show a relatively low level 
of xenophobia. Even so, the SVP has been ex-
tremely successful in mobilizing xenophobic  
elements within the population.
This points to another challenge. In recent 
years, a growing number of popular initiatives 
have been approved by voters but implemented 
incompletely or not at all. This failure to imple-
ment constitutional amendments derived from 
popular initiatives is not entirely new. Historical 
examples of provisions left unimplemented in-
clude the prohibition on absinth (1908) and ban 
on gambling houses (1920–1921). Notwithstand-
ing, these precedents are few and the exponents 
of these initiatives were not in the political  
center. By contrast, the number of successful  
initiatives has grown in recent years and their 
advocates (e.g., SVP and related organizations) 
are politically powerful. Several recent initiatives 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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sponsibilities, and a meritocratic public admin-
istration are important parameters of a country’s 
competitive political system, which Turkey  
currently lacks. Domestic and international  
challenges require a new economic, political  
and social grand strategy for Turkey in order to 
raise the level of sustainable governance.”  
The war in Syria has had a profound impact 
on Turkish politics and society. The terrorist  
attacks in Suruc, Ankara and Istanbul, the mas-
sive inflow of Syrian refugees, and the emer-
gence of the Islamic State group have fueled 
tensions across the country and presented the 
government with major political challenges.  
The government’s extensive military counterin-
surgency in predominantly Kurdish provinces in 
the southeast of Turkey and attacks by terrorist- 
designated groups – such as the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdistan Freedom 
Hawks – signified an end to the peace process 
between the Turkish state and PKK, which had 
shown significant promise in recent years.  
The government appears to lack a clear strategy 
Executive Summary
The period under review was marked by deep 
political and social divisions in Turkey. The failed 
coup attempt of 15 July 2016, and the subsequent 
state of emergency has changed the course of 
Turkish politics and increased uncertainty.  
The government’s politically charged allegations, 
judicial investigations and dismissal of thou-
sands of civil servants, and the immense organ-
izational capacity of the Gülenist movement in 
the public and private sector brought public trust 
to rock-bottom levels. Rising popular authori-
tarianism has undermined the rule of law, legal 
certainty and judicial independence, exacerbated 
widespread social discrimination, and reinforced 
the presidential model and exclusion of the leg-
islature from governmental processes. The chair 
of TÜSİAD, Turkey’s leading business associa-
tion, stated “Judicial independence and impar-
tiality, freedom of thought and expression, a free 
and scientific academic environment, free media 
and internet, well-defined authorities and re-
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Electoral fairness, the AKP’s use of state  
resources and the lack of campaign finance 
transparency were major issues in both the 
June and November 2015 parliamentary elec-
tions. Throughout both elections, the AKP failed 
to fully implement the recommendations of the 
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on 
campaign and party funding. The use of lan-
guages other than Turkish was permitted in both 
elections. Despite strengthening anti-discrimi-
nation efforts, Alevis and Roma people still  
lack access to basic public services. Moreover,  
anti-Semitism in Turkish politics and society  
remains widespread. Authorities have begun 
to address gender discrimination, but violence 
against women persists, and there has been no 
improvement in the educational attainment and 
economic participation gender gaps. The inflow 
of Syrian refugees is likely to have serious social, 
economic and political implications for Turks 
and Syrians living in Turkey. At the time of writ-
ing, there are more than three million Syrian 
refugees in Turkey.
Over the last decade, Turkey has experienced 
important gains in income and living standards. 
Though economic competitiveness has decreased, 
recently. While economic growth has returned 
after the 2016 economic slowdown, such posi-
tive signs are based on the availability of cheap 
and abundant money, which increases demand 
(higher consumption and public expenditure) 
rather than efficiency.
for ending the conflict in Turkey’s southeast  
region. This not only hampers economic oppor-
tunities in the southeast, but will also undermine 
democratic governance in the years ahead.  
Indeed, throughout the review period, the gov-
ernment continued to respond to dissent with 
repressive tactics, including openly threatening 
perceived opponents (e.g., activists, academics or 
journalists). Many journalists critical of the gov-
ernment now operate under financial threats, 
self-censorship and increased job insecurity.
Although the number of civil society organi-
zations increased during the review period, their 
influence in decision-making processes remains 
limited. The massive polarization between pro- 
and anti-government camps is present across  
all spheres of political, economic and social life. 
The negative effects of this divide were evident 
in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections 
on 7 June 2015, which failed to deliver a coali-
tion government in line with the constitution. 
This inability and/or unwillingness to engage in 
a power-sharing agreement demonstrates a se-
rious crisis of democracy in Turkey. The election 
marked the first time in modern Turkish his-
tory that civilian politicians refused to accept a 
parliamentary election result and reach a cross-
party compromise. The Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) secured an absolute parliamentary 
majority during the November 2015 parliamen-
tary election, allowing the AKP to rule alone for 
the fourth time since 2002.
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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arity. In addition, the 10 % electoral threshold 
should be reduced to increase smaller parties’ 
participation in national decision-making.
At the same time, the AKP should seriously 
consider domestic and international concerns 
about increasing authoritarianism and exclusiv- 
ist conservatism, and declining pluralism and  
liberalism within society. The government should 
contribute to the peaceful inclusion of all social 
groups, while continuing to tackle extremism and 
terrorism. The AKP’s monopoly on government, 
and the authoritarian stance of President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan against groups and media criti- 
cal of the regime is a concern for foreign observ-
ers, but even more so for Turkish citizens.  
Since the Gezi protests, mass protests have con-
tinued against the government and its policies. 
However, protests are typically suppressed by the 
government, using its state of emergency powers. 
A more inclusive, reconciliatory rhetoric and bet-
ter communicated policy intentions are urgently 
needed. Freedom and security must not be con-
sidered zero-sum games. In this respect, interna-
tional stakeholders, such as the European Union 
and the Council of Europe, repeatedly exercise 
their influence over the Turkish government.
Despite the global financial crisis, Turkey’s 
economic performance has been above average. 
To sustain this positive trend, the government 
should introduce structural reforms and extend 
the EU-Turkey Customs Union Decision of 1995, 
which covers industrial commodities, to include 
agriculture, services, government procurement 
and investments. Turkey’s relatively high cur-
rent account deficit remains a major challenge, 
requiring action such as the adoption of a real 
exchange rate policy. Turkey and the European 
Union have shown a willingness to open a new 
chapter and conclude the present chapter of  
accession talks. However, U-turns and dramatic 
shifts in Turkey’s foreign policy may not bring 
the expected outcomes.
During the review period, Turkey’s gradual 
demographic shifts and the country’s economic 
slowdown have increasingly posed a problem. 
While a young and well-educated population is 
a boon and offers enormous potential, financial 
and social provisions for the elderly need to be 
addressed. The government should continue  
reforming the pension system to tackle social 
exclusion and poverty. Furthermore, the coun-
Environmental sustainability, energy secu-
rity, sustainable urban development and pro-
gress toward a high-tech, science-based society 
are not assured. However, increased govern-
ment spending (e.g., on research and develop-
ment, education and vocational training, social 
policy and health care) during the review period 
marked a step forward, but so far fails to show 
sustainable results.
Key Challenges
Turkey’s main problems are political and social. 
Political stability versus political competition and 
participation, freedom of religion versus freedom 
from religion, majority-minority cleavages ver-
sus an integrated state and society – each issue 
presents a trade-off with political, social and  
international repercussions. The polarization of 
society has been a key strategy used by the Jus-
tice and Development Party (AKP) to secure and 
hold on to power. Legal uncertainty, distrust in 
the judiciary, the deterioration of fundamental 
rights and freedoms, and inefficiency in govern-
mental sectors have increased in the aftermath 
of the averted military coup of 15 July 2016.  
Suppression of opposition has intensified.  
The parliament has not been willing to reduce 
the 10 % electoral threshold for representation  
in the parliament. Moreover, gerrymandering, 
single-member district plurality and narrow 
electoral district boundaries have been used by 
the AKP to reinforce the party’s parliamentary 
majority. However, the establishment of a new 
party, İYİ Parti (Good Party), may present a real 
challenge to the AKP in the next presidential and 
parliamentary elections, a reaction to Erdoğan 
and his alliance with the Nationalist Movement 
Party (MHP).
Civil rights shortcomings persist. The in-
cumbent AKP government should expand mi-
nority rights for Kurds, Alevis, Christians and 
other minorities to increase the visibility of mi-
nority groups within society and foster minority 
groups’ identification with the state. This would 
promote intra-societal peace and a pluralist,  
integrated society. The government should en-
hance the powers of local and regional author-
ities, and introduce stronger mechanisms for 
democratic participation and political subsidi-
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try’s record on environmental issues, education 
and innovation is poor when compared to other 
OECD countries. Since these areas are key to  
supporting Turkey’s growing population and 
economy, the government should increase ex-
penditure in these areas. Illegal immigration and 
the refugee situation are exacerbating social ten-
sions and leading to widespread discrimination.
Turkey has become a major emerging  
economy and a key regional power. However,  
it increasingly struggles with the repercussions 
of internal conflicts in neighboring and regional 
countries, and the coup attempt of 15 July 2016. 
In order to regain credibility and influence,  
Turkey should use diplomatic means to reestab-
lish trust, peace and security in the region,  
and pursue dialogue with reliable regional  
actors and Western partners. Turkey’s interna-
tional influence and credibility would further in-
crease if the government became more involved 
in and implemented more international agree-
ments, especially OSCE, Council of Europe and 
EU agreements. An active continuation of reform 
processes in line with the acquis communau-
taire and in close cooperation with the European 
Commission is necessary for Turkey’s EU acces-
sion ambitions and democratization in Turkey.
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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undeniably entail prolonged and difficult govern-
ance changes, the speed with which new gov-
erning arrangements were concluded compares 
favorably with other countries faced with similar 
electoral outcomes. An emerging governance 
challenge is the inability of the party system to 
aggregate voters’ preferences on Brexit in a rep-
resentative way. This risks engendering endur-
ing divisions in British society, with unpredicta-
ble consequences for social cohesion. In addition, 
cross-party cooperation (which might be a suit-
able reaction in such a situation) continues to 
be an unattractive option in a system in which 
the dynamics and the logic of party competition 
are dominant. Shortcomings in preparations for 
Brexit have also been exposed, including a reluc-
tance to spell out in a timely manner what the 
United Kingdom wanted from the negotiations, 
amid evident political disagreements among 
senior ministers.  The economic situation in the 
United Kingdom is mixed. Job creation is robust 
and the headline total of people in work reached 
a new all-time high, but – although there has  
Executive Summary
The political situation in the United Kingdom  
remains defined by the result of the “Brexit” 
referendum of June 2016. The most significant 
influences on governance in the last year were 
the triggering of Article 50 of the Treaty on  
European Union in March 2017 to start the pro-
cess of the United Kingdom leaving the Euro-
pean Union and the outcome of the snap general 
election called in April 2017, demonstrating the 
practical irrelevance of the Fixed Term Parlia-
ment Act passed by the previous parliament.  
The loss of the slim absolute majority that the 
Conservative Party previously held has weakened 
the prime minister and left her able to govern 
only by relying on a “confidence and supply” ar-
rangement with the Northern Irish DUP. This is 
likely to constrain the government in an area cen-
tral to Brexit, namely the question of the status 
of Northern Ireland. While these developments 
exposed profound political divisions – as much 
within parties as between them – and Brexit will 
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government aimed at strengthening imple- 
mentation, political indecision has stalled major  
infrastructure developments. For example,  
yet another postponement of a definitive green 
light for a new London runway was announced, 
prolonging a process dating back to the 1960s. 
The United Kingdom has persevered with efforts 
to improve the openness of government and to 
communicate more effectively with stakeholders. 
The sheer administrative burden of Brexit and  
its dominance of the political agenda has, how-
ever, had a debilitating effect on other major 
policy initiatives resulting in them being stalled 
or inadequately thought-out. An example was  
a proposal for redressing inter-generational  
imbalances in meeting the costs of care for the 
elderly, initially put forward in the Conservative 
manifesto, was quickly dropped. No real alterna-
tive has since been proposed, despite the urgency 
of finding solutions.
Key Challenges
Dealing with the consequences of the Brexit ref-
erendum – internally and externally, as well as 
politically and economically – remains the main 
challenge for the United Kingdom until the  
process is complete. More than 18 months into 
the process, it can safely be stated that in many 
been a further fall in youth unemployment – it  
is around double the rate of older age groups.  
However, UK growth (previously at the higher 
end of the league table of larger economies)  
now lags behind and there are growing con- 
cerns about the economy’s weak productiv-
ity growth. There has been an uptick in infla-
tion and, because nominal wages have not kept 
pace, consumers are likely to be squeezed by re-
ductions in household spending power. Invest-
ment remains a weakness and uncertainty about 
the eventual outcome of Brexit negotiations has 
led many firms to hold off making significant 
investments. There are also concerns about the 
impact of Brexit on the financial and business 
services sectors which are important both as net 
exporters and sources of tax revenue. The public 
finances of the United Kingdom are still shaky, 
despite many years of supposed austerity and, 
in a number of areas, public services are over-
stretched. In particular, health care, which was 
(as so often) one of the most salient themes of 
the June 2017 general election and its integration 
(or lack of it) with social care is an unresolved 
governance concern, accentuated by the respon-
sibility of local authorities for the latter at a time 
when their resources have been cut substantially. 
The general election also prompted renewed 
disputes over the funding of higher education. 
Despite governance reforms at the center of 
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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to try to block an agreement with the European 
Union. Difficult though Brexit undoubtedly is, 
the United Kingdom cannot neglect other impor-
tant societal challenges. Because of the inexo-
rable effects of an aging population, much more 
will have to be done to improve health care and 
to integrate it better with social care, against a 
backdrop of constrained public funding and staff 
shortages. Similarly, and even if Brexit does ul-
timately stem the inflow of economic migrants, 
the need for an increase in housing is striking, 
the funding model for higher education has to be 
revisited, and over-stretched infrastructure calls 
for substantial new investment. Concerns have 
surfaced about the readiness of the armed forces 
to undertake missions and, as so often, terror-
ist threats remain high. Dealing with these and 
other domestic priorities will be demanding at a 
time when Brexit is consuming so much political 
attention and capital. While much has changed  
in recent years, arguably for the better, in the 
conduct of public administration, not least in 
making government more open, the extent of 
change in the pipeline will be testing for the 
government. The challenge for the executive  
will be to reconcile the heavy demands of Brexit 
with the need to maintain momentum in other 
policy domains.
areas the challenges are not being handled op- 
timally. Unsurprisingly, given the complexity 
of the tasks the British government has taken 
on, delays, disagreements and wishful thinking 
largely characterize the situation. Finding good 
solutions for as many of these challenges as pos-
sible will require political will and skill, hitherto 
lacking.  The main domestic political challenge  
is to find and sustain a stable political majority 
for completing Brexit, despite both major par- 
ties being split over the course to be taken and 
seeming unable to find compromises that bridge 
their antagonisms. Internationally, maintaining 
good relations with the European Union is vital 
both for successfully concluding the Brexit nego-
tiations and securing a mutually satisfactory  
future relationship. However, the tactical behav-
ior of some UK politicians over Brexit so far has 
threatened the credibility of the United Kingdom 
as a negotiation partner. In parallel, the United 
Kingdom faces the challenge of recasting its  
economic, political and security relationships 
with other parts of the world. Unrealistic expec-
tations of a rapid conclusion to trade deals will 
have to be tempered, while renewing relation-
ships with old partners (for example, Common-
wealth countries) and enhancing them with  
others will need attention. An economic chal-
lenge will be to achieve a post-Brexit outcome 
that minimizes the risks to economic growth 
while making it politically possible to claim to 
have achieved increased sovereignty. However,  
the economic policy agenda facing the United 
Kingdom transcends Brexit. A weak record on 
productivity and a persistent external deficit are 
known problems, but greater urgency is needed 
in resolving them. Consolidation of the public  
finances has been slow and the longer-term 
consequences of unwinding the substantial pro-
gram of quantitative easing undertaken by the 
Bank of England will have to be taken into ac-
count. Constitutionally, there are immediate 
challenges in settling the continuing difficul-
ties in Northern Ireland, but there is also unfin-
ished business around the devolution of powers 
from central government to Scotland, Wales and 
the growing number of mayor-led authorities 
in England. This is especially important to avoid 
the sort of constitutional crisis that could arise 
if the respective political authorities disagree 
with the terms of Brexit, possibly leading them 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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gram, and rejection of spending cuts for mid-
dle-class entitlement programs (Medicare and 
Social Security). He endorsed the long-stand-
ing Republican plan to “repeal and replace” the 
Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), signaled op-
position to policies benefiting racial minorities 
and low-income people, and dismissed concerns 
about climate change. Congressional Republi-
cans initially espoused alternative viewpoints  
on some issues, particularly trade, interna- 
tional security and entitlements spending.  
Given Trump’s staunch support among the  
party’s voter base, however, most eventually  
deferred to his policy positions.
Beyond policy positions, however, both Trump 
 and the Republican-controlled Congress have 
demonstrated substantial difficulties in capabil- 
ity and execution. By conventional, nonpartisan 
standards, Trump has proven an incompetent, 
even dangerously unfit president. The White 
House has been poorly staffed and managed.  
The administration lacks experienced leadership 
in most key positions and been unable to fill many 
Executive Summary
The twelve-month period ending in November 
2017 was a challenging time for the United States. 
The country’s performance on the Sustainable 
Governance Indicators (SGI) has deteriorated 
sharply across numerous indicators. 
Some of this erosion was the straightfor- 
ward consequence of the 2016 elections: the 
election of Donald Trump as president and Re-
publican majorities in both houses of Congress. 
Neither Trump nor the contemporary Repub- 
lican party have policy agendas that align well 
with the normative assumptions of the SGI. 
Trump campaigned on a platform of “Amer- 
ica First” nationalism – promising drastic ac-
tion on illegal immigration and a moratorium  
on Muslims entering the country. He raised  
objections to U.S. participation in NATO and 
complained that the United States was treated 
unfairly in its major trading relationships.  
Despite long-term fiscal imbalances, he promised 
major tax cuts, a massive infrastructure pro-
United States
Country profile SGI 2018
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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In many Republican-controlled states, however, 
the 2016 election continued the trend of raising 
barriers to voter participation for black, Latino and 
lower-income citizens. The sources of campaign 
funding, although relatively balanced between the 
two major parties, became even less accountable 
with the increased role of independent expendi-
tures funded in large part by extremely wealthy 
individuals. In addition, voters’ access to reliable 
information has suffered because of the increased 
prominence of social media as a news source.
The worst scores in this assessment – some 
radically lower than those from the last year of the 
Obama administration – are in the areas of gov-
ernance, especially those of “steering capability.” 
There is a bad news, good news story: the leader-
ship of the U.S. government has been uninformed, 
ideologically extreme and reckless, but also rela-
tively ineffective in achieving its policy goals.  
In its first year, most of the Trump administra-
tion’s policy achievements have consisted of or-
dering reversals of Obama-era administrative reg-
ulations, using truncated administrative processes 
that eventually may not withstand judicial scrutiny.
Key Challenges
The presidency of Donald Trump is itself the 
major challenge facing the United States. From a 
important posts. Trump himself has remained 
undisciplined, uninformed and prodigiously 
mendacious. 
At the same time, Republicans in Congress 
have declined to cooperate with Democrats on 
their major policy goals, yet been too divided to 
govern effectively without Democratic support. 
Until the enactment of a major tax cut in Decem-
ber 2017 (after the assessment period of this re-
port), Trump was on track to become the first 
modern U.S. president unable to pass a single 
major law in his first year.
In terms of the SGI, the United States contin-
ues to have high scores in some areas of long-
term strength, including economic policy,  
labor market efficiency and innovation. Indeed, 
the American economy continued to perform 
well in 2017. However, as a consequence of the 
policy agendas of the Trump administration and 
the Republican-controlled Congress, the United 
States inevitably performed worse in policy areas 
concerned with social inclusion, the integration 
of new immigrants, elementary education,  
family policy, environmental protection,  
and fiscal sustainability. 
With respect to the quality of democracy,  
the United States continues to exhibit strengths, 
including equal political rights, candidate and 
party access to the ballot, and relatively balanced 
news media coverage and campaign funding.  
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators.
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influence and credibility in several regions  
of the world. Trade relations were unsettled 
with China, Japan, Canada and other impor-
tant trading partners. Trump had also recklessly 
exacerbated dangerous tensions with nuclear 
North Korea. 
Given the political circumstances, plausible  
paths toward significant progress are hard to 
identify. At this point, the main item on con-
gressional Republicans’ agenda for 2018 is to 
mitigate some of the adverse fiscal consequences 
of the tax bill by cutting spending on entitlement 
programs. The most bloated programs – Medi-
care and Social Security – subsidize middle-class 
retirees and will be difficult to cut; Trump at 
times has opposed cutting them. For the United 
States to bring long-term budget deficits under 
control would almost certainly require not only 
reversing most of the 2017 tax cuts, but also 
raising taxes beyond recent levels – steps that 
the Republicans will be unwilling to take for the 
foreseeable future. 
After the chaotic first year of Trump’s  
foreign policy, the United States must develop 
carefully deliberated, stable positions on exist-
ing trade relations, the North Korean nuclear 
weapons program, several Middle East conflicts, 
the country’s role in NATO and other security 
alliances, and the rivalries with Russia and 
China. In view of the successful broad-based  
effort by the Russian government to disrupt  
and distort the 2016 elections, the federal  
government and states must harden the  
security of election systems and strengthen  
deterrence of such efforts in time for the 2018 
elections. The worst-case scenarios of many  
of these challenges are indeed calamitous.  
Unfortunately, Trump and his administration 
will likely remain incapable of developing co-
herent foreign-policy positions and unwilling  
to deal seriously with the threat of Russian 
election interference. 
Trump’s second year as president will be 
dominated by the 2018 midterm congressional 
elections. Almost a year before the election, 
polling suggests that a building anti-Trump, 
anti-Republican wave could return control of 
the House, the Senate or both to the Democratic 
party. A Democratic House or Senate would  
effectively nullify Trump’s legislative agenda 
for the rest of his presidency. Beyond that,  
sustainable-governance perspective, the United 
States must deal with numerous challenges. 
Among them a dangerously excessive long-term 
budget deficit, increased economic inequality, 
the loss of well-paying middle-class and work-
ing-class jobs, and cost problems and provider 
shortages in some health care insurance mar-
kets. Racial tensions have increased and there 
has been an explosion of drug addiction (i.e., 
the opioid crisis). The Trump administration 
lacks motivation and thereby effective policies 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Beyond its 
borders, the United States faces several major 
foreign-policy challenges centering on North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the Syrian 
war and Russian expansionism. 
The Trump administration and Republican- 
led Congress have few plans, if any, that credi-
bly address these challenges. In his presidential 
campaign, Trump’s appeals were an incoherent 
blend of populist nationalism, Tea Party con-
servatism and sheer puffery with virtually no 
supporting analysis. He promised to stop  
illegal immigration, including by building a wall 
on the Mexican border; to repeal and replace 
Obamacare; to enact massive tax cuts, while re-
jecting reductions in Social Security and Medi-
care spending; to dramatically increase military 
spending; to cut back regulations, especially  
on environmental protections; to rebuild the 
country’s infrastructure; to cancel or renego-
tiate supposedly unfair trade deals; to reduce 
American involvement in the Middle East;  
and to limit American support for NATO. 
At the end of the first year, Trump had 
achieved some of his goals: a very large tax cut, 
primarily for corporations and wealthy individ-
uals, an increase in deportations and sharp re-
duction in illegal immigration, and cancellation 
of many Obama-era regulations, effected en-
tirely by administrative means. These successes, 
however, were limited and qualified. Trump and 
the Republican-controlled Congress, despite 
lengthy efforts, had failed to repeal Obamacare. 
They had failed even to propose the broad  
outlines of an infrastructure program. The tax 
bill increased the ten-year budget deficit by an 
estimated $1.5 trillion and was hugely unpopu-
lar. The regulatory revisions were subject to  
judicial appeal, with many vulnerable to rever-
sal. In foreign affairs, the United States had lost 
Full report available at 
www.sgi-network.org
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a Democratic-controlled House would likely 
vote to impeach him. Although his being  
convicted in the Senate (requiring a 2/3 vote) 
appears highly unlikely, Trump’s removal from 
office by one means or another is a possibility. 
It is a time of extraordinary dangers both to 
Trump and his presidency and to the rule of  
law in American politics.
 Paul J. Quirk
 Christian Lammert
 Martin Thunert
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